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Abstract 
In the wake of urban riots and terror attacks in the United Kingdom, British public debate 
and policy have focused on the nation's immigrant communities.  These debates have commonly 
called into question whether immigrant communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into 
"mainstream" society and included in the nation.  These questions have been particularly focused 
on the country’s immigrant Muslim communities because they have, over the years, been 
accused of segregating themselves from, and within, British society.  This study explored the 
local and national identities of young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, which is one of 
the largest Muslim communities in Britain.  National identity is commonly thought to be 
predicated upon equality, but there is limited empirical data to support the theory.  Through 
survey-based research, this study adds a layer of data to support the theory as it found young 
British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they felt as if they 
were equal members of society, thought they had equal access to education, or thought British 
South Asians had equal access to education.  This study also explored the educational priorities 
of the Muslim community because it has struggled to attain a high rate of educational 
qualifications.  This study found the educational goals of British South Asian Muslims differed 
from those of the White British population.  These differing priorities may further explain the 
communities’ educational qualifications gap.  As such, this study offers valuable insight for 
policy makers and educators as they consider consumer demands while allocating scarce 
resources in the city’s education sector. 
Keywords: Islam, Bradford, UK, Muslim identity, British identity, Education 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the wake of the 2001 urban riots in northern England, as well as the July 7, 2005 terror 
attack in London, British public debate and policy have often focused on the nation's immigrant 
communities (Peach 2006; Phillips 2006; Githens-Mazer 2008; Shaw 2002; Thomas and 
Sanderson 2011).  These debates have commonly called into question whether immigrant 
communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into "mainstream" society and included in the 
nation - simply put, are they "British"?  These questions have been particularly pointed at 
Muslim immigrants because they have, over the years, been accused of segregating themselves 
from British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006). 
One of the Muslim communities frequently accused of segregating itself is the South 
Asian Muslim community in Bradford, West Yorkshire.  With a quarter of the Metropolitan 
District being Muslim, Bradford has one of Britain's largest Muslim communities, and was the 
scene of some of the worst urban riots in 2001.  In July 2001, two days of rioting there injured 
326 police officers and 14 members of the public.  The riots involved as many as 500 individuals 
and caused up to £10 million of property damage (Hussain and Bagguley 2005).  Government 
inquiries into the cause of the riots, which also occurred in nearby Burnley and Oldham, 
concluded racial segregation had been a contributing factor.  The Home Office's report on the 
riots, for example, concluded, "many [of these] communities operate on the basis of a series of 
parallel lives.  These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote 
any meaningful interchanges"(Home Office 2001). 
 This conclusion was echoed ten years later by Prime Minister David Cameron who 
argued state multiculturalism had created a society that "encouraged different cultures to live 
separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream" (New Statesman 2011).  In a February 
2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Cameron claimed multiculturalism in Britain 
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had failed because it allowed a segment of the British Muslim community to segregate itself 
from "mainstream" society.  He argued the breakdown of a common sense of British national 
identity had also contributed to Islamist extremism and "home grown" terror.  To counter 
extremism, Cameron argued stronger British and local identities were needed to promote "true 
cohesion" in society. 
 Driven by these public concerns for the integration and national identity of British 
Muslims, this study sought to determine whether they identified with the nation.  As alluded to 
by Cameron, a shared national identity is thought to promote social solidarity and cohesion 
(Jelen 2011).  According to social theorists like Deutsch (1964), national identity is fostered by 
equality; however, immigrants, including those in Bradford, are commonly disadvantaged 
members of society.  For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households in the UK live 
in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006).  In Bradford, the 
Muslim community is particularly disadvantaged in the areas of education and employment.  
According to the 2001 Census, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no 
educational or vocational qualifications, and nearly a third (30.3%) of all Muslim adults had 
never worked or were long-term unemployed (Office for National Statistics 2001c).  The 2001 
Home Office inquiry into the urban rioting also highlighted the Muslims' low level of 
qualifications and concluded educational opportunities in Bradford had been far from equal.  
Peach (2006) has argued some British Muslims feel excluded from society because of their poor 
socioeconomic conditions.  This study sought to determine whether the community's very 
identification with the nation has also been affected by how they perceive this inequality. 
 Given the Muslims' low level of qualifications, this study also sought to explore their 
educational priorities and whether they felt like they were able to achieve them.  At the national 
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level, Modood (2006) has demonstrated ethnic minorities, including Pakistanis, are more likely 
than white students to enter into higher education.  In 2001, the likelihood of a white student 
entering into higher education was 38%, while the likelihood for a Pakistani student was 49%.  
However, Modood found ethnic Pakistani students were less likely to enter prestigious 
universities and less likely to get high grade degrees.  Modood also found Pakistani students, 
most of whom are Muslim, were the most likely to leave school without qualifications (Modood 
2006). 
 While this has been demonstrated at the national level, this study sought to determine 
whether Muslim students in Bradford felt like they had equal access to education, and whether 
they were able to achieve the educational goals that were most important to them.  The inability 
of British Muslims in Bradford to meet some of their demands in the education sector has, in the 
past, led to feelings of injustice and rejection.  This study sought to determine whether education 
is an area of public life where the city's Muslim community continues to feel it is being 
discriminated against. 
Lastly, this study explored the acculturation strategies of young British South Asian 
Muslims.  According to Berry (1997), immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies 
when interacting with others in their host society. Depending upon how immigrants value 
interaction with the new society and the maintenance of their own cultural identities, they can 
choose one of the following strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization.  
For example, Robinson's (2009) study of adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester found young 
Pakistani Muslims most commonly pursued segregation.  While this is in keeping with the  
charge that British Muslims segregate themselves from society, Phillips (2006) claims British 
Muslims in Bradford are eager to better integrate into British society.  To test Phillips' claim, this 
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study explored the local, regional, and national identities of young Muslims in Bradford to 
determine whether they were more likely to show signs of segregation or integration.  
Academically, this study adds to the growing literature on immigration, acculturation, 
and national identity.  It also adds empirical data to the theory that equality promotes national 
identity, which is important because Shulman (2003) has argued there is little data to support the 
commonly accepted theory.  The findings of this study suggest the majority of young British 
South Asian Muslims in Bradford have successfully integrated into British society as they 
readily identify with the nation.  Nevertheless, a sizable minority has not; and based upon the 
community's educational priorities identified in this study, Muslims in Bradford may integrate 
less in the future.  
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Chapter 2  Previous Research 
 To establish the academic foundation for this study, this chapter briefly highlights the 
following topics: the 'nation' and national identity; national identity and international migration; 
and lastly, acculturation.  This chapter also provides some historical background on immigration 
to Britain and the establishment of the South Asian community in Britain.  Finally, this chapter 
explores the socioeconomic conditions of the South Asian community in Bradford, with a 
particular focus on the Pakistani Muslim population. 
2.1 The Nation and National Identity 
The 'Nation'  
 In its simplest form, a nation is a political community attached to a geographically bound 
territory. The attachment to the land can be either physical or emotional.  Theorists, however, 
have struggled to more objectively define the nation.  Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading scholar of 
nationalism, concluded after a lifetime of study that a purely scientific definition could not be 
produced (Anderson 2006).  Although scholars have struggled to objectively define the nation, 
Hutchinson and Smith (1994) claim the descriptions of it put forward by Renan, Stalin, and 
Weber represent the broad views held within the discipline. 
Ernest Renan and the Nation: "An Everyday Plebiscite" 
The nation, argued Renan in a Parisian lecture hall in 1882, is "a soul, a spiritual 
principle" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  In his lecture, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, Renan claimed 
the nation can be unified by a common language and shared interests.  He also noted the historic 
role played by a common ethnicity or religion in unifying tribes or small political bodies like the 
Greek city-states.  However, he argued these traits alone do not define the modern nation. Renan 
claimed the modern nation is, above all else, a product of common history and the shared desire 
of a people to form a collective; as he argued:  
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A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.  Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, 
this spiritual principle.  One is in the past, the other is in the present.  One is the 
possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, 
the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in 
common... To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have 
accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition 
for being a nation. (Hutchinson and Smith 1994) 
United by a common heritage, even an imagined history, the key to the nation, according to 
Renan, is the willingness of a people to participate in it.  Renan claimed, "[The nation] supposes 
a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, 
clearly expressed, to continue the communal life.  The existence of a nation (pardon this 
metaphor!) is an everyday plebiscite" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  Renan's views are akin to 
the right of self-determination that carried significant weight during the early 20th century, 
particularly in the creation of new nation-states following World War I.  
Joseph Stalin and the Nation: A Community of People with a Common Language, 
Territory, and Economy 
Stalin defined the nation as an "historically constituted, stable community of people, 
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  To constitute a nation, Stalin 
argued, each of these traits had to be present.  To illustrate this requirement, he pointed to the 
British and Americans.  Despite sharing a common language, heritage, and, for a time, national 
identity, the two ultimately became independent nations because they did not share a common 
territory. Stalin argued the nation requires the extended cohabitation of a people on the land, as 
he claimed, "a nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result 
of people living together generation after generation" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  Stalin's 
prerequisite for sustained cohabitation has implications for international migrants because it 
implies the first immigrant generations are not part of the nation. 
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Max Weber and the Nation: A Community of Sentiment 
 According to Weber, the nation cannot be defined in empirical terms because nations are 
ultimately tied to prestige, cultural values, and communal solidarity.  Although he asserts a 
common anthropological type can be relevant to nationality, Weber argues nations are not 
necessarily based upon a common race, ethnicity, or religion - though these elements can unify 
the community.  Weber identified the nation as a "community of sentiment" linked to a legend of 
a "providential mission" or destiny, and distinguished from others by its unique cultural values.  
He writes, "The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the 
irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the 
cultivation of the peculiarity of the group"(Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  According to Weber, it 
is the responsibility of the nation's members, particularly the intellectuals, to preserve and 
cultivate the cultural values which distinguish the nation from others.  
National Identity 
 National identity is one’s moral and emotional identification with the nation, and has 
been described as the “social glue” that binds the nation together (Mortimer and Fine 1999; 
Tilley and Heath 2007; Jelen 2011).  Parekh writes, "National identity is about whether we 
identify with a community, see it as ours, are attached to it and feel bonded to our fellow 
members in a way in which we are not bonded to outsiders" (Mortimer and Fine 1999).  
According to Parekh, national identity creates the sense of belonging and social solidarity that 
unifies members of the nation and allows them to see past their differences.  Likewise, Loden 
(2008) claims shared national identity promotes cohesion by reducing in-group bias amongst the 
nation's subgroups. As this is the case, national identity is more than a mere passive 
identification with the nation, national identity actively sustains it. 
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National Identity Promoted by Symbolism, Economic Advantage, and Equality 
Because shared national identity fosters social harmony, the nation's powerbrokers 
commonly strive to promote it amongst the population.  In the view of Renan, it is the role of the 
intellectuals to promote national identity.  However, these efforts can also be the function of the 
state, and are commonly undertaken in cooperation with social institutions, including national 
educational systems (Marginson 2002; Hobsbawm 1992).  In 2010, for example, the French 
government mandated that a copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, a 
symbol of French national identity, be placed in every French classroom.  The government's 
intent was to promote French national identity in response to the country's growing immigrant 
population (Willsher 2010). 
As attempted in France, states and national powerbrokers often appeal to symbolism to 
foster national identity. Symbols have long been used as "devices" to promote or reify national 
identity, and can include anthems, flags, currency, architecture, documents, flora, and fauna 
(Jelen 2011).  In addition to a copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the 
2010 French mandate required every classroom display a French flag.  This is an example of 
what Billig (1995) termed "banal nationalism", or the everyday evocation of nationalism through 
the use of symbols like flags.  For example, the Stars and Stripes is an omnipresent unifying 
symbol of American national identity, as Samuel P. Huntington writes: 
Since the Civil War, Americans have been a flag-oriented people.  The Stars and Stripes 
has the status of a religious icon and is a more central symbol of national identity for 
Americans than their flags are for peoples of other nations.  Probably never in the past, 
however, was the flag as omnipresent as it was after September 11. It was everywhere: 
homes, businesses, automobiles, clothes, furniture, windows, storefronts, lampposts, 
telephone poles. In early October, 80 percent of Americans said they were displaying the 
flag, 63 percent at home, 29 percent on clothes, 28 percent on cars.  Wal-Mart reportedly 
sold 116,000 flags on September 11 and 250,000 the next day, compared with 6,400 and 
10,000 on the same days a year earlier.... The flags were physical evidence of the sudden 
and dramatic rise in the salience of national identity for Americans compared to their 
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other identities. (Huntington 2004) 
 
Observing the role symbolism plays in fostering national identity, Parekh writes, “Symbols play 
an important part in nurturing and vivifying national identity.  They are symbols of our 
community, and not any other, and give it an unmistakable and tangible presence.  They integrate 
us into the life of our community and link us to its past and future” (Mortimer and Fine 1999).
 In addition to symbolism, national identity can also be fostered by appeals to material 
benefit.  Karl Deutsch, for example, argued “images of the community” are formed when social 
interactions, which he termed as transactions, lead to rewards; as he writes: 
If these [social] transactions were rewarded, the image of a community may be strongly 
positive.  Liking this kind of community, people may say: We belong together.  In their 
favorable reaction to the community, they might then also say, I can see myself as a 
member of this community; I will call it “we” if I speak of a group.  I will call it “home” 
if I speak of a territory.  I will express and experience love of country (patriotism) or love 
of a group of people (nationalism), but in any case I identify with this symbol or this 
group.  What is done to this country or to this group or to its symbol, such as the flag, is 
done to me.  I feel diminished or enlarged, depending on the diminution or enlargement 
of this country or this group. (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964)  
 
According to Deutsch, national identity is promoted when individuals think their membership in 
the nation yields economic advantage.  An example of this was the adoption of a common British 
identity following the creation of Great Britain in 1707.  Despite the longstanding animosity and 
distrust between the English, Welsh, and Scottish, the three nations ultimately adopted a 
common British identity because access to the British Empire gave them economic advantage 
(Colley 2009). 
 Not only does the nation need to offer its members economic advantage to foster national 
identity, but, according to Deutsch, it needs to do so equitably.  Deutsch argues the uneven 
distribution of benefits diminishes political integration and national identity, as he writes, 
“Where wealth distributions are so skewed that only a small percentage of the population 
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receives a large percentage of the nation’s wealth, social conflict and disintegrative tendencies 
also usually exist” (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964).  In Deutsch’s 
opinion, it is the responsibility of the state to ensure the equal distribution of benefits – be they 
economic, educational, social, or cultural. 
 According to Shulman (2003), scholars commonly accept Deutsch’s dual arguments that 
economic advantage and equality foster national identity.  However, Shulman argues there is 
little empirical evidence to support these theories.  In his own study, Shulman concluded the 
economic strength of a nation, or equality within it, do not necessarily translate to a stronger 
national identity.  One of the primary hypothesizes Shulman tested was the claim that wealthier 
members of the nation would have a stronger attachment to it because the nation had “served 
them better economically”(Shulman 2003).  His study concluded, however, that poorer members 
of the nation were slightly more likely than wealthier members to identity with the nation.  
Although wealth was a poor indicator of national attachment, his study concluded factors like 
ethnicity, education, and age each had greater influence upon one’s attachment to the nation 
(Shulman 2003).  As such, he noted the need for scholars to further investigate the links between 
ethnicity, economic inequality, and national identity. 
2.2 National Identity and International Migration 
 The 20th and 21st centuries have been marked by high rates of international migration. 
As of 2010, approximately 3.1% of the world's population were considered international 
migrants, defined as those living outside the country of their birth (United Nations Population 
Division 2013).  However, the world's international migrant population is not evenly distributed, 
and is concentrated in the more developed nations.  According to the United Nations Population 
Division, 60% of the world's international migrant population lives in Europe, North America, 
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Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (United Nations Population Division 2013). 
 In response to the high level of international migration, scholars have begun to examine 
its impact on national identity. Some, like Wright (2011), have questioned whether the high level 
of international migration threatens the social harmony that is derived from a common sense of 
national identity.  Others, like Jelen (2011), have argued national identity itself is threatened by 
the increasing number of people who consider themselves "stateless", including refugees, 
international students, travelers, and laborers who frequently cross national boundaries.  
Likewise, Weaver (1993) has expressed the concern that the high level of international migration 
threatens "societal security", or the "ability of a society to persist in its essential character" 
(Huntington 2004).  Echoing Weaver's concerns, Huntington (2004) argues international 
migration is the greatest threat to "societal security" as he claims it was responsible for the 
erosion of American national identity before 9/11.  Huntington argues American national identity 
had given way to other identities that had become more salient at the end of the 20th century, as 
he writes:  
Among some educated and elite Americans, national identity seemed at times to have 
faded from sight.  Globalization, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, 
subnationalism, and anti-nationalism had battered American consciousnesses. Ethnic, 
racial, and gender identities came to the fore.  In contrast to their predecessors, many 
immigrants were ampersands, maintaining dual loyalties and dual citizenships.  A 
massive Hispanic influx raised questions concerning America's linguistic and cultural 
unity... The national unity and sense of national identity created by work and war in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and consolidated in the world wars of the twentieth 
century seemed to be eroding.  By 2000, America was, in many respects, less a nation 
than it had been for a century.  The Stars and Stripes were at half-mast and other flags 
flew higher on the flagpole of American identities. (Huntington 2004) 
 
Huntington was concerned that American national identity and its cultural underpinnings were 
being challenged by the increasing member of immigrants from Latin America and Asia who, in 
his assessment, favored separation over assimilation. 
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Immigrants as a "Threat"  
 In 1806, Napoleon's government submitted a series of twelve questions to the Assembly 
of Jewish Notables that had been convened by the government.  Among the questions posed to 
the body were the following: 1. "In the eyes of Jews, are Frenchmen considered as their 
brethren?  Or are they considered as strangers?" and 2. "Do Jews born in France, and treated by 
the laws as French citizens, consider France their country?  Are they bound to defend 
it?"(Bloomberg 2004).  In response to the first set of questions, the Assembly affirmed the 
national identity of French Jews, as it attested:  
In the eyes of Jews, Frenchmen are their brethren, and are not strangers... How could they 
consider them otherwise when they inhabit the same land, when they are ruled and 
protected by the same government, and by the same laws? When they enjoy the same 
rights, and have the same duties to fulfill?  There exists, even between the Jew and 
Christian, a tie which abundantly compensates for religion - it is the tie of gratitude.  This 
sentiment was at first excited in us by the mere grant of toleration.  It has been increased, 
these eighteen years, by new favors from government, to such a degree of energy, that 
now our fate is irrevocably linked the common fate of all Frenchmen.  (Bloomberg 2004)  
To the second set of questions, the Jewish body acknowledged the community had, for a time, 
enjoyed fewer rights under French law, but they maintained their love for the nation regardless; 
as the Assembly responded:  
The love of the country is in the heart of Jews a sentiment so natural, so powerful, and so 
consonant to their religious opinions, that a French Jew considers himself in England, as 
among strangers, although he may be among Jews; and the case is the same with English 
Jews in France. (Bloomberg 2004) 
 
Pleased with these responses, Napoleon continued his policies of extending equal rights under 
the law to Jews in the French Empire.  
 As in Napoleonic France, immigrants today are commonly viewed as a threat, and 
sometimes, as in the case of Jews in France, as a potential fifth column.  Writing of the often 
hostile relationship between the host nation and immigrants, Triandafyllidou claims, "There is 
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virtually no record of an immigrant population that is perceived by the host nation as an inspiring 
Significant Other.  The negative and threatening representation of the immigrant seems to be an 
intrinsic feature of the host-immigrant relationship"(Delanty and Kumar 2006).  While it may be 
an "intrinsic feature" of the relationship, the threatening representation of the immigrant is 
amplified following outbreaks of public disorder and violence involving immigrant communities.  
This occurred in Britain, for example, after the urban riots in 2001.  It has also occurred after 
terrorist attacks and high profile anti-government demonstrations involving British Muslims.  For 
example, the far-right British Nationalist Party (BNP) vilified the Muslim community as a fifth 
column following a provocative 2010 Remembrance Day protest in London. During the day's 
customary moment of silence, a small group of young British Muslims burned poppies - the 
symbol of Remembrance Day - while chanting "British Troops burn in hell!”  Responding to the 
protest, the BNP posted on its website under the heading Islamic Fifth Column in Britain, "The 
justifiable outrage over the incident, which was clearly designed to insult all British people 
honouring the dead in all wars, has hidden a host of other incidents which clearly show that anti-
British sentiment runs very high across the entire Islamic community in Britain" (British 
Nationalist Party 2011).  The protest also drew the criticism of the mainstream media.  The Daily 
Mail reported, "Three miles across London from the Armistice Day ceremony at the Cenotaph, 
another face of Britain was on display.  It was contorted with hatred, poisoned by politics, and 
fuelled by flames from a giant, burning poppy.  These were the Muslim extremists who brought 
shame to the memory of the dead" (Harris 2010).  Like other mainstream outlets, the Daily Mail 
distinguished the actions of the minority as extremists, but the demonstration still cast a shadow 
over the wider Muslim community in Britain.  
Although immigrants are commonly seen as a threat, the British Muslim community has 
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faced additional scrutiny because of the security threat posed by a minority.  In 2011, British 
intelligence officials estimated there were at least 200 British Muslims actively planning suicide 
operations in the United Kingdom (Rayment 2011).   Moreover, since 2001, British Muslim 
immigrants have conducted five notable terror attacks in the UK, and have been implicated in at 
least ten major plots or attempted attacks (see Appendix A).  According to Thomas and 
Sanderson (2011), the number of terror attacks and plots demonstrate the nation faces a real 
threat from "home grown" Islamist terrorists. 
Because of the security threat posed by British Islamist extremists, the national identity of 
all British Muslims is ever present in the national headlines and as a topic of political debate 
(Thomas and Sanderson 2011).  This is partly due to the fact that some of the British Muslims 
who have been involved in "home grown" terrorism have demonstrated a weak identification 
with the nation, instead identifying with the 'umma, or global Muslim community.  For example, 
the ringleader of the July 7, 2005 attack in London seemed to identify more strongly with 
Muslims outside Britain than with other Britons.  With a thick Yorkshire accent, the second-
generation immigrant Mohammad Sidique Khan claimed in his "martyr's" video: 
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my 
people all over the world.  And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just 
as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.  
Until we feel security, you will be our targets.  And until you stop the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.  We are at war and I 
am a soldier. (Italics added for emphasis) (BBC News 2005) 
One of the attackers in the May 2013 murder of British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby made a 
similar statement in the immediate aftermath of his attack.  Michael Adebolajo, a British-born 
Muslim convert of Nigerian descent, told onlookers, "We will never stop fighting you.  The only 
reasons we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day.  This British soldier is an eye 
for an eye, a tooth for tooth.  We apologize that women had to see this today but in our lands our 
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women have to see the same.  You people will never be safe" (italics added for emphasis) 
(Hjelmgaard and Stranglin 2013). 
National Identities of Immigrants  
 Contemporary studies and social commentary on national identity and immigration are 
focused around the intertwined questions: 1. Do immigrants identify with their host nation? and 
2. What factors promote their ability to integrate into society?  These questions are more than 
academic.  For one, immigrants who integrate into society have higher self-esteem, are more 
competent in their work performance, and achieve higher academic standards (Phinney et al. 
2001).  Phinney (2001) also argues the immigrants' attachment to the nation promotes social 
cohesion, which is what the Conservative Government in the UK hopes to achieve through better 
integrating the nation's Muslim immigrant communities. 
 According to Berry (1997), immigrants arrive in a new country with differing views on 
the value of retaining their own cultural identities and adopting those of the host nation.  Based 
upon how these different values intersect, Berry argues immigrants adopt one of four 
acculturation strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization.  These 
differing strategies are represented in Figure 2-1.  If an immigrant considers it of value to 
maintain relations with the host society, and the host nation is receptive to immigrants and is 
open to cultural diversity, the immigrant will likely integrate or assimilate.  Alternatively, 
immigrants who do not value relations with the host society will either pursue a strategy of 
separation or marginalization depending on how they value the maintenance of their own cultural 
identities.  Phinney et al. (2001) argue integration is the best strategy for the immigrant's well-
being, while marginalization is the worst strategy.  For example, immigrant adolescents who 
integrate or adopt a "bicultural orientation" perform better in schools than those immigrants who 
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adopt other acculturation strategies. 
 Although it is thought integration is the best acculturation strategy for immigrants, fusing 
multiple identities is not easy.  For example, Indian-American author, Jhumpa Lahiri described 
the difficulties she faced trying to balance multiple, and at times competing, identities; as she 
writes:  
When I was growing up in Rhode Island in the 1970s I felt neither Indian nor American.  
Like many immigrant offspring I felt intense pressure to be two things, loyal to the old 
world and fluent in the new, approved of on either side of the hyphen...my perception as a 
young girl was that I fell short at both ends, shuttling between two dimensions that had 
nothing to do with one another. (Facing History and Ourselves Foundation 2008) 
While it can be difficult for immigrants to reconcile multiple identities, studies suggest multiple 
factors that increase the likelihood an immigrant will successfully integrate into society.  These 
factors include a common language and the absence of discrimination (Robinson 2009; Phinney 
et al. 2001; Loden 2008). 
 A common language is generally seen as a fundamental building block of the nation 
(Smith 1991; Hutchinson and Smith 1994).  Despite Huntington's (2004) concern that 
immigrants increasingly maintain their own language instead of learning the language of their 
host nation, studies suggest immigrants continue to see learning the host language as an 
important entryway to full participation with the nation.  For example, the 1994 General Social 
Survey in the United States found more than 85% of Hispanics in the national survey saw 
speaking English as being "very" or "fairly important" in making someone a "true American" 
(Citrin et al. 2007).  The 2002 Pew National Hispanic Survey also found Hispanics 
overwhelmingly believed learning English was essential to succeeding in America (Citrin et al. 
2007).  Loden's (2008) study of national identity amongst secondary school students in Sweden 
concluded Swedes and immigrants alike agreed the ability to speak Swedish was an important
 17 
 
(Berry 1997) 
Figure 2-1: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry 
step in becoming a "real Swede". 
 Equality, or at least the absence of overt discrimination, has also been identified as a 
determining factor in the success of an immigrant's acculturation.  Loden (2008), for example, 
concluded in his study that "fair chances to establish oneself as a full member of society" was 
essential to the immigrants' subsequent identification with the nation.  Robinson's (2009) study 
of Hindu and Muslim students in Britain likewise found perceptions of discrimination affected 
the immigrants' acculturation strategy.  Robinson concluded discrimination was reported less 
frequently from those adolescents who pursued integration than from those who adopted 
separation as an acculturation strategy. 
2.3 Britain: A Legacy of Migration 
 Responding to the xenophobic criticisms of King William III, Daniel Defoe wrote in 
1701: 
The Romans first with Julius Cæsar came, 
Including all the nations of that name, 
Gauls, Greek, and Lombards; and, by computation, 
Auxiliaries or slaves of ev'ry nation. 
With Hengist, Saxons; Danes with Sweno came, 
In search of plunder, not in search of fame. 
Scots, Picts, and Irish from th' Hibernian shore; 
And conq'ring William brought the Normans o'er. 
All these their barb'rous offspring left behind, 
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The dregs of armies, they of all mankind; 
Blended with Britons, who before were here, 
Of whom the Welch ha' blest the character. 
From this amphibious, ill-born mob began, 
That vain ill-natured thing, an Englishman.  
(Defoe 1870) 
 
As encapsulated by Defoe in his satirical poem, The True-Born Englishman, England - and by 
extension Britain - is a nation of migrants.  Some of the earliest immigrants arrived in the form 
of invading armies, introducing the likes of the Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans to Britain 
(Layton-Henry 1992).  Others immigrated to Britain as refugees, escaping either religious or 
political persecution.  These settlers included French Protestants in the 17th century and Eastern 
European Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries.  Some of the more recent immigrants moved to 
Britain for economic reasons.  For example, immigrants from the West Indies and South Asia 
migrated in response to Britain’s labor shortages in the middle of the twentieth century.  Their 
immigration was also a legacy of Britain’s colonial history.  
 In addition to a long history of immigration, Britain has been a considerable source of 
emigration over the centuries.  The British emigrated for many of the same reasons that 
immigrants settled in Britain, including economic gain, refuge from religious or political 
persecution, and Britain’s colonial policies.  Pushing aside initial concerns that Europeans who 
settled in foreign lands would lose their civility, the British became the leading colonizers of 
North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (Earle 1992; Erickson 1989). 
 Although the recent levels of immigration to Britain have drawn significant public 
attention, historically, the level of British emigration outpaced the volume of immigration.  
Figure 2-2 depicts the net migration to Britain between 1871 and 1940, while Figure 2-3 
represents net migration between 1951 and 1988.  As seen in these figures, annual emigration 
has exceeded immigration for most of the last 140 years.  Even in the 1930s when immigration 
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briefly surpassed the rate of emigration, many of the immigrants were in fact British citizens 
returning to Britain after having failed to establish themselves abroad (Layton-Henry 1992). 
 Only in the last three decades has the annual rate of immigration consistently surpassed 
the level of emigration.  Figure 2-4 represents net migration to Britain between 1964 and 2011.  
Between 1964 and 1987, net migration totaled -842,000 and the annual number of immigrants 
exceeded the number of emigrants only six times.  In contrast, net migration between 1988 and 
2011 equaled 2.3 million and the annual number of immigrants outnumbered emigrants 21 times 
(Hawkins 2013).  The increased level of immigration to Britain in recent decades is consistent 
with trends observed elsewhere in Western Europe as countries that once sent migrants out into 
the world have since become "immigrant receiving societies" (Massey et al. 1993).  
 Notwithstanding the historical presence of minorities in Britain and the continued 
presence of a large ethnic majority, recent immigration has reshaped the country's human 
landscape.  In 1991, the white population represented 94.1% of the total population in England 
and Wales.  Ten years later, the white population represented 91.3% of the population, and in 
2011, it represented 86% of the population (National Statistics 2006; Office for National 
Statistics 2013d). The decreasing proportion of whites in England and Wales is due in part to 
weak natural population growth.  Between 1991 and 2011, the white population grew by just one 
percent (Office for National Statistics 2013d; National Statistics 2006). 
 By contrast, the non-white population in England and Wales, particularly the South Asian 
population, has grown rapidly in recent decades because of immigration and natural population 
growth.  In 1991, South Asians represented 2.9% of the overall population of England and 
Wales; in 2011, they represented 5.3% (National Statistics 2006; Office for National Statistics 
2013d).  Between 1991 and 2011, the ethnic Indian population grew by 65%, the Pakistani  
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(Layton-Henry 1992) 
Figure 2-2: Net Migration to Britain, 1871-1940 
 
 
(Layton-Henry 1992) 
Figure 2-3: Net Migration to Britain, 1951-1988 
 
 
-1000 
-800 
-600 
-400 
-200 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
Net Migration to Britain  
1871-1940 
Net Migration 
-800 
-700 
-600 
-500 
-400 
-300 
-200 
-100 
0 
100 
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
Net Migration to Britain  
1951-1988 
Net Migration 
 21 
 
 
(Hawkins 2013) 
Figure 2-4: Net Migration to Britain, 1964-2011 
population by 140%, and the Bangladeshi population by 168% (National Statistics 2006; Office 
for National Statistics 2013d). 
 The transformation of Britain from an emigrant sending nation to an "immigrant 
receiving society" has produced a strong public reaction.  A poll conducted in June 2013 by 
Ipsos-MORI highlighted the widespread public concern with recent levels of immigration.  The 
annual survey found that after the economy, the second most important issue facing Britons was 
race relations/immigration.  While 50% of respondents said the economy was the most important 
issue facing Britain, 35% claimed the most important issue was race relations/immigration 
(Economist 2013b).  It has been claimed that the public's concern over recent immigration is 
sharpened by the fact that many of the immigrants in the 20th century were former colonial 
subjects (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  However, the concern is also tied to economic 
considerations.  An Ipsos-MORI survey in April 2013 found 55% of British respondents thought 
the level of immigration had to be solved to end the country's economic crisis (Economist 
2013b). 
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 The public's concern with immigration is also reflected in government policy.  
Immigration control, for example, has been a cornerstone of the Conservative Government's 
agenda.  In addition to pledging to reduce annual net migration to the tens of thousands, the 
government has made the integration of immigrant communities a priority.  In an April 2011 
speech to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued new immigration controls were necessary to 
better integrate new immigrants into British society and to relieve the pressure that recent 
immigrants had placed on society.  In his address to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued: 
Between 1997 and 2009, 2.2 million more people came to live in this country than left to 
go and live abroad.  That is the largest influx of people Britain as ever had and it has 
placed real pressure on communities up and down our country.  Not just pressure on 
schools, housing and healthcare - though those have been serious - but social pressures 
too.  Because real communities aren't just collections of public service users living in the 
same space.  Real communities are bound by common experiences, forged by friendship 
and by conversation; knitted together by all the rituals of the neighbourhood, from the 
school run to the chat down the pub.  And these bonds take time.  And so real integration 
takes time too.  That's why, when there have been significant numbers of new people 
arriving in neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the same language as those living 
there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate, that has created a kind 
of discomfort and a disjointedness in some neighborhoods. (The Guardian 2011) 
To reduce net migration and promote the integration of new immigrants, the Conservative-led 
coalition government has since introduced policies which limit non-EU immigration, tighten 
controls on student visa programs, and place greater emphasis on the need for immigrants to 
speak English. 
 Government Efforts to Restrict Immigration to Britain 
 The Conservative Government's initiatives are the latest in a series of government efforts 
to restrict immigration since the turn of the 20th century.  A timeline of key events and efforts to 
restrict immigration is found in Table 2-1.  The timeline highlights the repeated concern for the 
ability of immigrants to integrate or assimilate into British society, as well as the continued 
concerns with non-European immigration. 
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 Each of the events in Table 2-1 were important in the development of immigration 
controls in Britain.  However, the intent here is to highlight the efforts to limit immigration at the 
turn of the 20th century because of the parallels with Muslim immigrants today.  Some of the 
most visible migrants at the turn of the century were Jewish refugees who, like the Muslims 
today, were distinctly different from the white majority because of their religious and cultural 
markers.  The panic over anarchist-linked migrants at the turn of the century also resembles the 
contemporary fear of Islamist-linked immigrants.  Indeed, government debates in the 1890s over 
the right to deport anarchists bears striking semblance to the government efforts in the 21st 
century to deport immigrants like Abu Qatada who are suspected of links to international 
terrorism. 
Jewish Immigrants at the Turn of the 20th Century 
 At the turn of the 20th century, persecution and pogroms in Eastern Europe and Russia 
pushed a large number of Jewish migrants to the west.  Although most of these settled in the 
United States, many of them transited Britain.  According to an account of the day, Britain was a 
natural transit point for the Jewish refugees because of its geographic location and its dominance 
of the world's sea trade (Anonymous1897).  While most Jewish migrants travelled onto the 
United States, some settled in Britain.  Between 1875 and 1914, an estimated 120,000 Jewish 
refugees chose to settle in Britain (Layton-Henry 1992). 
 While the Jewish community in Britain was relatively small, it did not go unnoticed 
because successive waves of immigrants settled in relatively few places.  Most immigrants were 
attracted to London, in particular to East London.  In 1901, the East London Borough of Stepney 
was home to 40% of London's immigrant population (The National Archives n.d.).  The spatial 
concentration of immigrants spurred political movements opposed to their presence.  For 
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example, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Stepney, Sir William Evans-Gordon, 
helped to form the anti-immigrant British Brothers' League.  Established in 1901 as an anti-
immigrant movement, it soon became associated with anti-Semitism.  The movement's political 
power was demonstrated the following year when the government responded to its pressure by 
forming the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon as a member of the 
body.  The Commission's recommendations led to the 1905 Aliens Act that gave the government 
the power to refuse entry to destitute immigrants.  However, the act also established the right of 
asylum to those, like the Jewish immigrants, who could prove they were fleeing persecution. 
The Anarchist Debates 
 Politicians like Evans-Gordon were opposed to immigration on the grounds that 
immigrants posed a threat to the British working class.  However, the House of Commons' 
Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners) in 1889 had concluded the rate of 
immigration was not sufficient enough to warrant legislation.  Nevertheless, a crisis on the 
continent in 1894 led Parliament to reexamine the issue.  In June 1894, French President Marie 
Carnot was assassinated by the Italian anarchist Santo Caserio.  It was claimed in the press that 
the assassin’s plot had been planned in England. 
It was not the first time that England had been charged as being a safe haven for 
anarchists.  In February of 1894, a terror attack in Paris carried out by anarchist Émile Henry was 
also reported to have been planned in England.  After the attack, The Times reported parts of 
London had become rife with Continental anarchists and their supporters.  The Times also 
claimed the material support for the attack had been provided in London, as it reported:  
The district of Tottenham Court Road has long been notorious as the favourite domicile 
of the most advanced section of the Socialist party and of the Anarchists, English and 
foreign.  In a street off this main thoroughfare is a club, known to the police for years past 
as the resort of political desperadoes of all nationalities, wherein anarchy and the ‘Social 
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Table 2-1 
Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain 
1889  
A Select Committee of the House of Commons concluded newly established immigrant 
communities led to localized overcrowding in major cities; however, the number of 
immigrants was not large enough to warrant legislation. 
1894 
Political campaigns respond to Jewish immigration that had created large immigrant 
settlements in East London. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury introduced a Bill to restrict 
immigration. 
1898 
Lord Hardwicke's bill, which was similar to Lord Salisbury’s Bill of 1894, failed to pass 
Parliament. 
1901 
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Evans-Gordon formed the British Brothers' 
League, an anti-Jewish movement that campaigned against immigration.  
1902  
The government responds to pressure from the British Brothers' League by establishing the 
Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon a member. The Commission 
concluded the immigrant population was not numerically significant and was as "healthy and 
clean" as the British population. The Commission also concluded immigrant children were 
able to adapt well in English schools after any deficiencies in language were overcome. 
Nevertheless, the Commission recommended the government have the power to refuse entry 
to 'undesirable' aliens.  
1905  
The Royal Commission’s recommendations led to the 1905 Aliens Act. The Act granted the 
government the power to refuse entry to immigrants who could not financially support 
themselves.  The Act also firmly established the policy of asylum to those who could prove 
they were fleeing religious or political persecution.  
1914 
The onset of WWI led the Liberal Government to pass the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914.  
The Act gave the Home Secretary complete control over immigration and foreign residents 
inside the country.  
1919 
The Aliens Restrictions (Amendment) Act of 1919 replaced the 1905 Aliens Act and extended 
the 1914 Act by a year.  
1920 
The Aliens Order is passed giving the Home Secretary the authority to deport any immigrant 
whose presence in Britain was not considered ‘conducive to the public good'.  The law was 
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued) 
 
renewed annually until the Immigration Act of 1971. 
1947 
After WWII, the government took pro-immigration initiatives to settle 120,000 Poles who 
had served under British command during the war. The Polish Resettlement Act was passed 
to assist Polish service members and their families to establish citizenship and permanent 
residence in the Commonwealth. 
1948 
The Nationality Act of 1948 conferred British citizenship to all those who then lived within 
the Empire and Commonwealth, giving them full access to live and work in Britain without 
a visa. 
 
The Empire Windrush, the first Caribbean migrant ship arrived in Britain.  The Windrush 
brought West Indian migrants on its return trip from delivering British emigrants to 
Australia. 
1949 
The Royal Commission on Population, first established in 1944, reports the declining 
fertility rate in Britain would lead to an economic downturn and decreased emigration. It was 
feared these would reduce British influence in the world.  However, the Commission 
concluded large-scale immigration was impractical due to concerns over training and 
housing immigrants.  The Commission was also concerned with the immigrants’ ability to 
assimilate.  
1952 
Between 1952-1957, Conservative MP Cyril Osborne carried out an anti-immigration 
campaign in the House of Commons.  Although he was not successful, his views on 
restricting "colored immigration" were shared by many, including members of the cabinet.  
However, it was not politically viable to restrict Commonwealth immigration because the 
government was, at the time, actively promoting the image of a multiracial Commonwealth.  
1958  
Anti-minority riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill force the issue of immigration to the 
fore. After the riots, the Daily Express published the results of a public opinion poll claiming 
79.1% of national respondents favored controls of "colored immigration".  Conservative MP 
Martin Lindsey claimed, “We all know perfectly well that the core of the problem is 
coloured migration.  We must ask ourselves to what extent we want Great Britain to become 
a multi-racial community … a question which affects the future of our own race and breed is 
not one we should merely leave to chance” (Layton-Henry 1992).   
1960 
In an attempt to indirectly restrict immigration, the government tried to persuade colonial 
and Commonwealth governments to unilaterally limit the issuance of passports to their 
citizens.  As an example of the pushback, the Indian Supreme Court ruled it was  
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued) 
 
unconstitutional for the Indian government to refuse passports to its citizens. 
 
1961  
At the Conservative party's annual conference, 39 resolutions demanding immigration 
controls were submitted for discussion.  In October, the Queen announced the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill.  
1962 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill became law on 1 July. The law enacted immigration 
controls for all holders of Commonwealth passports, except those born in the UK or those 
holding British passports. Holders of Commonwealth passports wishing to migrate to Britain 
had to receive a work voucher through the Ministry of Labour. The voucher system gave 
priority to those with either a job offer or those with high demand skills.  According to 
Layton-Henry, the Bill signaled a “decisive change in 
 
British government policy and the break with the long tradition of treating all 
Commonwealth and colonial people as British subjects with equal rights of citizenship, 
including access to the UK as native Britons” (Layton-Henry 1992). 
1964  
In the wake of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, race and immigration were key issues in 
the General Elections.  In election speeches in Bradford and Birmingham, Conservative 
Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home boasted nearly a million would-be immigrants had 
been excluded as a result of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill.  Harold Wilson, who 
became Prime Minister in the election, accused the Conservatives of using immigration as an 
excuse for their failures to address housing and education. 
 
In Birmingham, Conservative Peter Griffiths pulled off a shock victory over Patrick Gordon 
Walker who was expected to become Harold Wilson's foreign secretary.  Griffith's campaign 
benefited from an anti-immigrant campaign poster bearing the racially charged and offensive 
slogan, "If you want a nigger for a neighbour, Vote Labour". 
1965 
As the number of minority immigrant students increased in the 1950s and 1960s, white 
parents sought to limit their enrollment. In response to pressure, local authorities placed 
quotas on the number of minority students allowed to enroll in a given school. In 1965, the 
Department of Education and Science instituted a policy of busing minority immigrants from 
the inner cities. 
1968 
Responding to the immigration of South Asians from East Africa, the Labour government, 
under pressure from the Conservatives, issued the 1968 Immigration Act. The Act required 
new immigrants to have sufficiently close connections to Britain, such as a parent or 
grandparent born in Britain. 
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued) 
1971 
The 1971 Immigration Act was even more restrictive than the 1968 Immigration Act.  The 
act  
 
allowed only those Commonwealth citizens whose father or grandparents were born in the 
UK, 
or were previously naturalized and living in the UK, to enjoy an automatic right of abode. 
Other Commonwealth citizens could only immigrate if they had a work permit for a specific 
job with a known employer. 
2002 
The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act introduced the Life in the UK Test for those 
seeking naturalization or permanent settlement in the UK.  The test was intended to test the 
applicant's English skills and knowledge of "British life". 
2010 
The Coalition government under Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron promised to 
cut net migration from 196,000 to "tens of thousands".  The government introduced a cap on 
the level of skilled laborers who could enter Britain from non-EU countries.  
(BBC News 2010; Brown 2001; Brah 2008; House of Lords and House of Commons Join 
2009; Peach 2006; Layton-Henry 1992) 
Table 2-1: Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain 
Revolution’ are preached.  Some time ago the frequency of the visits paid by some of the 
leading frequenters of the club to a house in another street leading off Tottenham Court 
Road, and the fact that a number of French and Spanish Anarchists had taken up their 
residence in the same building, led to a special and very careful watch being kept on the 
place.  It was speedily discovered that the suspected men were in frequent 
communications with the leading Continental Anarchists, and, as a matter of fact, as it is 
now known, the latest bomb-thrower, Emile Henry, was in the house only a few weeks 
ago.  There is also reason to believe that he obtained from fellow-conspirators in this 
house the ingredients and material with which to manufacture the infernal machine which 
he threw with such terrible effect in the Café Terminus in Paris. (Great Britain Parliament 
1892)  
Lord Salisbury used this report to justify the introduction of his Aliens Bill before the House of 
Lords in July of 1894.   
 Lord Salisbury's legislation sought in part to grant the government the power to expel 
known anarchists from the country; however, the bill also sought government powers to restrict 
the entry of destitute immigrants.  Lord Salisbury argued the bill was necessary to safeguard 
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Britain’s working class population, as he claimed destitute immigrants had increased the burden 
on the tax payer through increased poor rates (Steele 2001).  He also appealed to the principles of 
supply and demand in the labor force, arguing the increased presence of migrants made it more 
difficult for working class British citizens to find work.  During the second reading of the bill, 
Lord Salisbury argued: 
[The immigrants] diminish the chances of earning a livelihood which your own 
population feels so much.  Their difficulty of finding employment is increasing more and 
more, the number of those who are seeking public relief gets greater and greater, and 
there is a very general belief among working men, and I think that belief is founded upon 
facts, that the introduction of these aliens, who are content with the very lowest 
conditions of existence, has a tendency  to drive our own population out of employment 
and to increase the hardness of that battle which they have to fight in finding the means 
of living. (Great Britain Parliament 1892) 
According to Salisbury, it was incumbent upon the government to restrict immigration to limit 
the competition faced by British workers in the labor market. 
 In the final decades of the 19
th
 century, other countries had enacted restrictions similar to 
those proposed by Lord Salisbury.  For example, the United States had passed the Immigration 
Act of 1891 which gave the government the authority to exclude “all idiots, insane persons, 
paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a 
dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous 
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”(Anonymous1891).  Because of this, and 
similar legislation elsewhere, Lord Salisbury claimed Britain would become the only country 
open to receive the world's destitute if Parliament did not act.  He argued the failure to act would 
permanently disadvantage the country's working class. 
 Despite these arguments, Lord Salisbury's bill was not carried further than a second 
reading.  The bill was attacked by its opponents as a case of the "anti-alien party" capitalizing 
upon a crisis in Europe to force anti-immigrant measures (The Speaker 1894).  Opponents of the 
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bill did not want to reverse Britain's traditional openness to immigrants.  They also feared the 
bill's passage would be a tacit admission that Britain had indeed been a “hot bed of conspiracy 
against other countries”(The Speaker 1894).  Those opposed to the bill were also unsatisfied with 
the legislation's provision to expel those deemed as anarchists, fearing it would lead to 
government overreach.  They feared the Home Office would be inundated with requests to 
extradite foreign dissenters who could be falsely labeled as anarchists.  To illustrate this concern, 
they argued the legislation would have led to the expulsion of the Italian nationalists who had 
found refuge in Britain decades earlier, including Giuseppe Mazzini.  The Earl of Cowper, who 
opposed the bill, argued it would have forced the Home Secretary to consider foreign requests to 
extradite Mazzini because he had been an advocate of political assassinations. 
In Lord Salisbury's counter-argument, he claimed the Mazinni example was not 
applicable.  Lord Salisbury argued the anarchists posed a problem not previously faced in 
history.  Using an argument that could be mistaken for a present-day appeal to removing 
international terrorist safe havens, Lord Salisbury argued: 
My whole case is that everything has changed since the days of Kossuth, Mazzini, and 
Garibaldi.  It is no longer a case of liberty against despotism.  It is no longer a question of 
giving a harbor of safety to those who, in the vicissitudes of politics, have failed to carry 
their own ideals into effect.  You are now dealing with men for whom any such excuse is 
impossible, and would be almost disgraceful.  You are dealing with men who commit 
crimes, which it is difficult to exceed by reference to any which history has recorded, and 
which it would be difficult to exceed in any imagination that the power of poets or 
romancers could portray.  If you remain the only State from which they cannot be turned 
out, by a mathematical law they must all come here. (Great Britain Parliament 1892) 
 
Salisbury's argument did not convince his peers, who ultimately thought the anarchist threat and 
level of immigration were insufficient to warrant rushed legislation.  Those who held this view 
were bolstered by the release of a report by the Board of Trade, which was published as the 
Aliens Bill was before Parliament.  The purpose of the Alien Bill was to curb the tide of destitute 
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immigrants, but the report concluded immigration to Britain constituted more of a trickle.  The 
report concluded: 1. the number of immigrants had been exaggerated and paled in comparison to 
both the number of emigrants and the total population; 2. there were relatively few destitute 
immigrants who would be considered paupers; 3. contrary to the public opinion, the majority of 
the immigrants were law-abiding, industrious people; and lastly, most immigrants quickly 
assimilated into English society (Anonymous1897).  The timing and conclusions of the report led 
many Parliamentarians to dismiss out of hand the need to enact any controls on immigration. 
2.4 South Asians in Britain   
South Asian Immigration before World War II 
 There has been a South Asian presence in Britain since the 1600s, but settled 
communities did not appear until the 19th century (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008; Peach 2006).  
The earliest to settle were lascars, Asian sailors who, in 1924, constituted 17% of the British 
merchant fleet (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  Working conditions at sea were difficult, and the 
first Asian settlers were lascars who abandoned their ships while docked in Britain.  As a result, 
the first South Asian immigrant communities in Britain were located in the port cities of Cardiff, 
Liverpool, and East London (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  Although early lascar settlers often 
faced discrimination, they also found support from charities and missionary societies like the 
Strangers’ Home for Asiatics in London that provided them with food and lodging as they 
settled. 
 British labor shortages during World War I encouraged further South Asian immigration.  
Despite government warnings against the hiring of lascars who abandoned their ships, companies 
like Lever Brothers and John Walker and Tate heavily recruited them during the war (Ali, Kalra, 
and Sayyid 2008).  During the war, lascars continued to settle in industrial port cities, but South 
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Asians also began to settle further inland as they found work in Britain's wartime munitions 
factories (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  As a result, Asian settlements appeared in Sheffield and 
Glasgow.  
 A depressed economy during the interwar years decreased the overall demand for labor 
and discouraged further immigration.  Moreover, to protect British workers, employers and the 
British government introduced policies that excluded immigrants from whole segments of the job 
market (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  However, not all industries were equally impacted by the 
downturned economy.  Emerging industries, including car and appliance manufacturing, 
established new factories in the country’s interior.  The establishment of these new industries 
encouraged the relocation of South Asians from the docks to Britain’s interior, including the 
Midlands. 
 Despite the reduced demand for labor, South Asians continued to settle in Britain during 
the interwar period.  High unemployment in India, as well as a downturn in Punjabi agriculture 
encouraged South Asian emigration (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).  Changes in the shipping 
industry also further encouraged lascar settlement.  As ships switched from coal to oil-fired 
power, the demand for South Asian workers in the labor-intensive boiler rooms decreased, 
leading lascars to seek out new work on land (Spencer 1997).  South Asian students also 
continued to immigrate to Britain.  On the subcontinent, a British education was viewed as an 
invaluable opportunity for upward mobility, and in 1927, there were approximately 1,700 Indian 
students in Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Leeds, and Bristol.  Many of 
these students settled in Britain after completing their degrees (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). 
South Asian Immigration after World War II 
 The outbreak of World War II restored the demand for immigrant labor as many of the 
factories established during the interwar years were retooled for the manufacture of munitions 
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and war materiel.  The demand for Asian lascars also rebounded as British mariners were called 
to serve in the Royal Navy.  As a result, the number of lascars nearly doubled during World War 
II (Spencer 1997).  However, as the lascars' ships were either given over to the war effort or 
destroyed at sea, many of the lascars again found themselves out of work.  Asian immigrants 
during the war, including unemployed lascars, were directed by British authorities to seek work 
at wartime factories in Bradford, Leeds, Birmingham, and Coventry (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 
2008). 
 Wartime labor demands encouraged immigration, but the mass migration and settlement 
of South Asians in Britain did not occur until after World War II.  Britain's growing economy 
after the war required additional labor.  At the same time, Britain's former colonies did not have 
the means to make their labor forces fully productive.  The result was migration from the 
peripheries of the former Empire to Britain as its former colonies, particularly the New 
Commonwealth, became a source of inexpensive labor (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). 
 As seen in Figure 2-5, New Commonwealth immigration to Britain after the war was 
initially dominated by Caribbean immigration.  By the 1960s, however, the number of South 
Asian immigrants to Britain dramatically increased.  In contrast to Caribbean immigration, which 
had been relatively gender-neutral, South Asian migration was, at first, largely undertaken by 
males (Peach 2006).  Attracted to Britain by higher wages, South Asian males immigrated to 
Britain to support their families who often remained in India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. 
 Initially, the workers did not see themselves as settlers, and their remittances were used to 
build up estates, homes, and businesses in South Asia.  The laborers' intent to not settle was 
evidenced by their frugal living conditions in Britain, as most lived in domiciles shared by 
multiple migrant workers (Cohen 1974).  Most South Asian migrant laborers fully anticipated 
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they would return to South Asia after the season of their labor in Britain was complete.  Changes 
to British immigration laws in the 1960s and 1970s, however, altered South Asian immigration 
trends.  As British subjects, prior to the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 
1962, South Asians were free to enter and leave Britain without restriction.  However, the new 
law, which was enacted in the summer of 1962, required holders of Commonwealth passports to 
obtain vouchers from the Ministry of Labour before they could enter the UK.  The new law, 
which was unabashedly intended to reduce "coloured immigration", had the unintended 
consequence of leading to a sharp increase in South Asian immigration.  Migrant male laborers 
who had initially planned to return to Asia, instead summoned their families to join them before 
the law was enacted.  In the 18 months prior to the enacting of the law, approximately 50,000 
Pakistanis entered Britain, compared to the 17,000 who had entered between 1955 and 1960 
(Shaw 1988). 
 
(Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008) 
Figure 2-5: New Commonwealth-born Population of Britain, 1989-91 
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"Push" Factors Contributed to South Asian Migration  
 British demand for labor after World War II was not the only factor that contributed to 
South Asian immigration, as "push" factors in South Asia also contributed. For example, the 
construction of the Mangla Dam in northern Pakistan during the 1960s led to a mass emigration 
from Mirpur District.  The Dam and Mangla Reservoir, which were created under the Indus 
Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, immersed approximately 200 villages 
and towns, including the district center.  Over 65,000 acres of land were submersed, and up to 
100,000 people were displaced as a result of the project, which was completed in 1967 (Kalra 
2000).  While some of those displaced relocated to the immediate surrounding area, others were 
given land in the Punjab as compensation.   A number of others, however, emigrated to Britain 
with the money they received as compensation.   
 In the 1960s and 1970s, South Asians in East Africa were also compelled to emigrate, 
and due to colonial ties, many migrated to Britain.  In the late 19
th
 century, Britain had recruited 
Asian laborers as indentured servants to build the railroads in East Africa.  When the East 
African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika gained their independence in the 1960s, the 
nations’ South Asian populations, which were never fully incorporated into East African society, 
were granted British citizenship and allowed to emigrate to Britain.  In 1972, Idi Amin, then 
President of Uganda, stripped the Asians of their Ugandan citizenship and expelled them from 
the country; many of these also settled in Britain. 
Patterns of South Asian Settlement in Britain 
 
 The initial South Asian settlements in Britain reflected the community’s lascar heritage as 
the earliest communities were located in port cities like Cardiff, Liverpool, and London.  These 
first communities were small.  In the first half of the 20th century, Cardiff was the largest center 
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of Asian, African, and West Indian settlement, but there were fewer than 2,500 of these 
minorities living there in 1930- and most of them were Arabs and Somalis (Spencer 1997).  By 
the middle of the 20th century, South Asian communities had expanded into Britain's interior as 
industries and wartime factories required their labor.  By the end of World War II, South Asian 
communities were also located in Sheffield, Glasgow, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, 
Bradford, Leeds, and Bristol. 
  At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, Britain's South Asian communities are still 
primarily concentrated in these same industrial cities (Peach 2006).  A quarter of Britain's 
Bangladeshi population lives in only one London district, in the Borough of Tower Hamlets.  
Similarly, British Sikhs are largely concentrated in London, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, 
while Hindus are centered in London and Leicester.  British Pakistanis, who are predominately 
Muslim, are centered in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, and Luton (Peach 
2006). 
 South Asian communities are found in relatively few British cities, but they originated 
from even fewer places.  According to Peach (2006), 80% of the British Pakistani population 
originated from either Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir or from the nearby Chhachh area in 
Attock District (formerly known as Campbellpur District) in Punjab Province.  Similarly, over 
80% of the British Bangladeshi population emigrated from Sylhet District in Bangladesh, and 
80% of British Sikhs came from Jullundur District in the Indian Punjab.  Lastly, 70% of Indian 
Hindus and Muslims came from the Indian state of Gujurat (Peach 2006). 
 The large number of immigrants from relatively few places is a factor of colonial ties, 
physical geography, and chain migration.  Figure 2-6 depicts the British Pakistanis' places of 
origin.  As noted above, over 80% of the British Pakistani community emigrated from Mirpur 
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and Attock districts.  The others came from Peshawar in Khyber Paktunkhwa Province and from 
villages in the Punjabi districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujurat, and Faisalabad (Shaw 1988).  
 Mirpur and Attock districts had been a source of lascar laborers for Britain's merchant 
fleet in the 19th and early 20th century.  For example, laborers from the Chhach area in Attock 
District commonly found employment in Bombay as stokers in the fleet's boiler rooms, as a 1907 
edition of the Punjab District Gazetteer attested, "From the northeast corner of the Chhachh very 
large numbers of men go out as stokers on the P. & O. and British India boats and come back 
shattered in health, but full of money" (Cohen 1974).  In the 19th century, Mirpur and Attock 
were also primary sources of recruitment for the British Indian Army and Navy (Kalra 2000; 
Shaw 1988).  
 In addition to these colonial ties, the physical terrain of northern Pakistan contributed to 
the migration of Mirpuri and Chhachi males to Britain.  In contrast to the center of Pakistan's 
Punjab Province, which is arid but irrigated, the land in the north is rough, hilly, generally 
underdeveloped, and dependent upon rainfall for agriculture.  As a result, much of the land is not 
cultivatable.  According to Shaw (1988), these factors naturally predisposed males in northern 
Pakistan to seek work outside of their home districts.  Moreover, because primogeniture was not 
practiced in Pakistan, the scarce land available for agriculture was divided into smaller plots with 
each successive generation (Shaw 1988).  This contributed to underemployment in the region 
and applied pressure to the area's male population to find work elsewhere.  
 The geography of northern Pakistan predisposed the region's male population to migrate, 
but the process of chain migration accounted for the relocation of near entire villages from 
northern Pakistan to Britain.  Mirpuri and Punjabi communities place particular emphasis upon 
clan loyalty and the male networks of the extended family, or biradari (brotherhood) (Shackle 
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2010).  These networks played a key role in determining the patterns of immigration and 
settlement in Britain.  Once established with a job and housing, the first migrant workers assisted 
others within their biradaris to immigrate, often helping them find initial work and housing.  As 
a result, Pakistani immigrant settlements in Britain tended to closely mirror their communities in 
South Asia.  For example, a study of the Pakistani community in Oxford discovered the majority 
of its 2,000 members could be traced back to two immigrant chains, one of which began with a 
single individual who immigrated to Glasgow during World War II (Spencer 1997).  Chain 
migration explains how British Pakistanis from Mirpur, Attock and Peshawar are centered in 
Bradford, while British Pakistanis from Jhelum and Faisalabad are predominately found in 
Oxford (Shaw 1988). 
2.5 The South Asian Community in Bradford 
 There is not one South Asian community in Bradford; instead, there are multiple South 
Asian communities divided by ethnicity, religion, and places of origin.  According to the 2011 
Census of England and Wales, there were 130,032 South Asians of Pakistani, Indian, or 
Bangladeshi descent living in the City of Bradford Metropolitan District (see Table 2-2).
 1
  In 
2011, the number of South Asians in Bradford equaled 24.9% of the district's overall population, 
representing a significant growth since 2001(Office for National Statistics 2013d).  In 2001, 
there were 85,409 South Asians in Bradford, or 18.3% of the district's population at the time 
(Office for National Statistics 2001a).  This represented a 52.2% growth in ten years.  By 
contrast, the district's White British population decreased .9% during the same time (Office for 
National Statistics 2001a; Office for National Statistics 2013d).  The district's South Asian 
                                                          
1
 The Metropolitan District includes Bradford and surrounding towns, including: Keighley 
Shipley, Bingley, Ilkley, Haworth, Silsden, and Denholme. 
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Figure 2-6: British Pakistanis' Places of Origin (Map) 
population is centered in Bradford, where they constitute nearly four-tenths (39.7%) of the city's 
population.
2
  Keighley is the district's other center of South Asian settlement, as seen in Figure 2-
7.  In 2011, South Asians represented 52.1% of the census ward Keighley Central (9,512 South 
Asians/18,255 total residents) (Office for National Statistics 2013b).  
                                                          
2
 Bradford includes the following census wards: Bolton and Undercliffe, City, Great Horton, 
Little Horton, Clayton and Fairweather Green, Queensbury, Wibsey, Royds, Bowling and 
Barkerend, Bradford Moor, Thornton and Allerton, Toller, Heaton, Manningham, and Tong. 
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    All Usual 
Residents 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Indian 
2011 Census Ward  # % # % # % 
Baildon 15,360 81 0.5% 2 0.0% 121 0.8
% Bingley 18,294 126 0.7% 17 0.1% 90 0.5
% Bingley Rural 17,895 324 1.8% 25 0.1% 133 0.7
% Bolton and Undercliffe* 16,365 2,237 13.7% 617 3.8% 850 5.2
% Bowling and Barkerend* 20,618 6,785 32.9% 1,669 8.1% 858 4.2
% Bradford Moor* 21,210 13,553 63.9% 1,127 5.3% 954 4.5
% City* 23,485 10,037 42.7% 553 2.4% 1,632 6.9
% Clayton and Fairweather 
Green* 
16,982 2,789 16.4% 267 1.6% 1,201 7.1
% C aven 16,373 70 0.4% 6 0.0% 112 0.7
% Eccleshill 17,945 959 5.3% 122 0.7% 151 0.8
% Great Horton* 17,683 6,429 36.4% 78 0.4% 1,517 8.6
% Heaton* 17,121 8,516 49.7% 398 2.3% 545 3.2
% Idle and Thackley 16,135 113 0.7% 3 0.0% 255 1.6
% Ilkley 14,809 27 0.2% 4 0.0% 56 0.4
% Keighley Central 18,255 7,909 43.3% 1,467 8.0% 136 0.7
% Keighley East 16,775 1,877 11.2% 344 2.1% 83 0.5
% Keighley West 16,551 459 2.8% 197 1.2% 74 0.4
% Little Horton* 21,547 10,447 48.5% 497 2.3% 602 2.8
% Manningham* 19,983 12,058 60.3% 1,806 9.0% 894 4.5
% Queensbury* 16,273 439 2.7% 1 0.0% 408 2.5
% Royds* 17,360 571 3.3% 42 0.2% 272 1.6
% Shipley 15,483 1,153 7.4% 140 0.9% 275 1.8
% Thornton and Allerton* 17,276 1,859 10.8% 67 0.4% 309 1.8
% Toller* 19,914 14,397 72.3% 154 0.8% 750 3.8
% Tong* 20,608 657 3.2% 90 0.4% 416 2.0
% Wharfedale 11,836 25 0.2% 1 0.0% 25 0.2
% Wibsey* 14,671 1,815 12.4% 92 0.6% 293 2.0
% Windhill and Wrose 16,308 460 2.8% 63 0.4% 307 1.9
% Worth Valley 14,387 68 0.5% 7 0.0% 45 0.3
% Wyke 14,950 374 2.5% 7 0.0% 191 1.3
% 
 
       
BRADFORD (CITY) 
TOTAL 
281,096 92,589 32.94
% 
7,458 2.65% 11,50
1 
4.0
9
% 
DISTRIC  TOTAL 522,452 
 
 
106,61
4 
20.41
% 
9,863 1.89% 13,55
5 
2.5
9
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 *Ward is part of Bradford (city) 
Table 2-2: Bradford District's South Asian Population, 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2013) 
 The majority of South Asians in the district are of Pakistani origin, and are concentrated 
in the Bradford city center.  In 2011, Pakistanis represented 20.4% of the district, and constituted 
the majority population in the Toller, Manningham, and Bradford Moor areas of Bradford (see 
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Figure 2-8).  In Toller, Pakistanis represented 72.3% of the census ward (14,397 Pakistanis/ 
19,914 total residents).  Telling of the Pakistani presence in the city, a Pakistani Consulate is 
located in downtown Bradford (53.796934°, -1.756171°).  As seen in Figure 2.9, the district's 
Indian community is centered in western Bradford.  The largest concentration of Indians is in 
Great Horton, where they represented 8.6% of the census ward (1,517 Indians/17,683 total 
residents).  Lastly, the Bangladeshi population is the smallest of the South Asian communities, 
representing 7.6% of the district's South Asian population.  As seen in Figure 2-10, the 
Bangladeshi population is centered in downtown Keighley and in southeast Bradford.  The 
largest concentration of Bangladeshis is in Manningham, where they constituted 9% of the 
census ward in 2011 (1,806 Bangladeshis/19,983 total residents) (Office for National Statistics 
2013b). 
 By religion, Bradford's Indian population is the most diverse of the South Asian 
communities.  In 2011, 32.2% of Bradford's ethnic Indian population identified themselves as 
Hindu, 30.6% as Muslim, and 25.3% as Sikh.  The district's Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
populations, on the other hand, are predominately Muslim.  According to the 2011 Census,  
94.3% of the ethnic Pakistanis identified themselves as Muslim, as did 93.8% of the district's 
Bangladeshi population (Office for National Statistics 2013b).  In all, 87.6% of the South Asians 
in Bradford District are Muslim. 
 Diversity within the Bradford's South Asian religious communities generally corresponds 
to the immigrants' places of origin.  For example, Bradford's Hindu population is divided into 
two distinct groups, the Gujuratis and Punjabis.  More than half of the Gujuratis, who outnumber 
the Punjabis, immigrated to Bradford from East Africa.  The two groups are distinctly different, 
and have developed their own social and cultural societies, as well as established their own  
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Figure 2-7: 2011 Census, South Asian Population in Bradford (Map) 
 
 
Figure 2-8: 2011 Census, Ethnic Pakistani Population in Bradford (Map) 
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Figure 2-9: 2011 Census, Ethnic Indian Population in Bradford (Map) 
 
 
Figure 2-10: 2011 Census, Ethnic Bangladeshi Population in Bradford (Map) 
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Hindu temples in Bradford (Halstead 1988).  The Muslim community reflects similar diversity.  
The Pashtuns from the area of Peshawar and Punjabis from Attock District are commonly 
associated with the Islamic revivalist Deobandi and Tablighi Jamaat movements.  However, the 
majority of Bradford's Muslim community is from Mirpur and practice the Sufi-oriented 
Barelevi form of Islam (McLoughlin 1998). 
The Establishment of South Asian Communities in Bradford 
 The establishment of the South Asian communities in Bradford has been traced to World 
War II.  According to Dahya (1974), the first South Asians to settle in Bradford were 
unemployed lascars who, in 1941, were directed by British authorities to find work in wartime 
munitions factories in Leeds and Bradford.  The community was small during the war.  In 1945, 
there were approximately 30 former lascars in Bradford, living in the vicinity of the University  
of Bradford in homes owned by Polish immigrants (Cohen 1974). 
 After the war, labor demands in the city's woolen mills encouraged further South Asian 
immigration.  Bradford's wool industry, which was the city's most important industry, had 
attracted migrant labor since the 19th century.  For example, German and Irish immigrants 
settled in Bradford in the 19th and early 20th century, and Eastern Europeans began arriving 
during the middle of the 20th century.  By the 1950s, however, the Eastern Europeans began to 
leave the mills for higher paying jobs in other sectors.  Initially, females filled the vacancies in 
the mills, but they were excluded by law from working the overnight shifts that were introduced 
in the 1950s.  These restrictions introduced the demand for a new source of inexpensive labor to 
work the overnight shifts that were introduced when the mills installed new machinery and 
converted to 24-hour operations to compete with growing international competition.  
 To meet the new labor demand, Bradford's mills turned to South Asian laborers who, on 
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average, earned less than British workers.  In 1961, the average weekly wage for manual labor 
was £15, but the average Asian in Britain earned £8.25.  By 1971, the average wage had risen to 
£36.25, while the average Asian still only earned £16.10 (Halstead 1988).  Because South Asian 
labor was relatively inexpensive, Bradford's woolen mills actively recruited in South Asia by 
placing advertisements for labor in Pakistani newspapers.  Although an Asian laborer in the 
1960s and 1970s earned roughly half the wage of his or her British counterpart, the wages still 
attracted South Asian laborers because the average weekly wage in Mirpur at the time was 37 
pence (Shaw 1988). 
 Bradford's South Asian population, particularly the Pakistani community, has continued 
to grow rapidly since the 1960s.  In 1964, there were an estimated 12,000 Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis in Bradford; in 2011, there were 116,477- representing an 871% population growth 
in under 50 years (Cohen 1974; Office for National Statistics 2013d).  Figure 2-11 depicts the 
growth of Bradford's New Commonwealth population between 1961 and 2011.  Immigrants from 
the West Indies and Africa are included in this graph, but their immigration has not been as 
numerically significant as that of the South Asians.  In 2011, there were only 8,574 West Indians 
and Africans in Bradford (Office for National Statistics 2013d).  As such, the chart primarily  
 
(Office for National Statistics 2013d; Halstead 1988; Office for National Statistics 2013a; Office 
for National Statistics 2001a) 
Figure 2-11: Bradford's New Commonwealth Population 1961-2001 
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represents the growth of Bradford's South Asian community.  The significant population growth  
after 1961 is due in large part to the permanent settlement of South Asian laborers and their 
families in Bradford because of the aforementioned Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. 
Socio-Economic Conditions of Bradford's South Asian Communities 
 According to most socio-economic indicators, Bradford's Sikh and Hindu communities 
fare better than the city's Muslim population.  According to Halstead (1988), members of the 
Sikh community were among the first South Asians to leave the woolen mills when jobs in better 
paying sectors were still available.  Their wives also commonly work, and the community has 
little objection to coeducation or western clothing; some are even willing to abandon their 
turbans and beards to more easily find work (Halstead 1988). 
 As a result, home ownership in the Sikh community is high.  According to the 2001 
Census (the most recent census data for home ownership by religion), 86% of Sikh households in 
Bradford owned their own homes, 35% of whom owned their homes outright.  The rate of home 
ownership among the Hindu community was even higher.  In 2001, 88% of Hindu households 
owned their own homes.  By comparison, 74% of Muslim households owned their own homes, 
27% of whom owned their homes outright.  In terms of home ownership, Bradford's South Asian 
communities each fared better than White British households.  As of 2001, 72% of White British 
households in Bradford owned their own homes (Office for National Statistics 2001b). 
 Compared to White British households, a lower percentage of Muslims were living in 
council homes in 2001.  While 12% of White British households lived in rented council homes in 
2001, only 4% of Muslim households lived in council housing (Office for National Statistics 
2001b).  Although this could be interpreted to suggest the Muslims are doing better 
economically, the lower proportion of Muslims in council estates is due in part to discriminatory 
 47 
 
housing practices and the Muslims' hesitance to move into council estates associated with crime 
and racism.  According to Kundnani (2001), only 2% of Bradford's council housing was 
allocated to Asians.  As a result, the Muslim community was compelled to stay in the inner city 
where housing prices were kept low by white flight from Bradford's working class 
neighborhoods (Kundnani 2001).  Phillips (2006) points out young British Muslims in Bradford 
also try to avoid council estates because of the crime, drugs, and gangs associated with them.  
Some of the large estates are also associated with racism, as participants in Phillips' study 
identified some estates in Bradford are "not for Asians" (Phillips 2006). 
 Although there is near-parity between the White British and South Asian Muslim 
populations in terms of home ownership, there is wide disparity between them in terms of 
education and employment rates.  By religion, Muslim adults have the lowest level of 
educational qualifications in Bradford, as represented in Figure 2-12.  In 2001, more than half 
(50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford between 16 and 74 years old had no educational or 
vocational qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d).  Younger Muslims have more 
educational qualifications than older Muslims in Bradford, but Muslims still had the fewest 
educational qualifications in every age group, as depicted in Figure 2-13.  Even though Muslims 
constituted only 14.2% of Bradford's adult population in 2001, one in five Bradfordians (20.5%) 
without qualifications was from the Muslim community (Office for National Statistics 2001d). 
 The Muslims' low level of educational qualifications most likely contributes to their high 
rate of unemployment.  In 2001, 7.7% of Bradford's population was characterized as either long-
term unemployed or as never having worked.  The unemployment rates of the Hindus and Sikhs 
were slightly better, at 5.8% and 6.2% respectively.  However, nearly a third (30.3%) of all 
Muslim adults were characterized as either long-term unemployed or as never having  
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worked (Office for National Statistics 2001c).  Muslims represented 56% of all the Bradfordians 
who had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2001.  
 As a result of the recession, overall unemployment rates in Bradford have increased since 
2001.  According to the 2011 Census, 11.1% of Bradford's population was characterized as either 
long-term unemployed or as never having worked.  The unemployment rates of the Hindus and 
Sikhs in Bradford both increased, to 8.5% and 9.4% respectively.  Although the Muslim rate of 
unemployment decreased slightly to 29.2%, they still represented 54.1% of all Bradfordians who 
had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2011 (Office for National Statistics 
2013c).  Figure 2-14 compares the unemployment rates in 2001 and 2011. 
 
(Office for National Statistics 2001c) 
Figure 2-12: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational, Vocational Qualifications 
 The high rate of unemployment in the Muslim community is partly attributable to the 
cultural tendency of Muslim women to remain in the home to care for the family.  According to 
the 2011 Census, 45.7% of Muslim females in Bradford had never worked in the formal 
economy (Office for National Statistics 2013c).  Nevertheless, Muslim males still had the highest 
rate of unemployment by religious affiliation.  In 2011, 6.9% of all males in Bradford District 
were long-termed unemployed or had never worked, compared to 11.6% of Muslim males.  
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While Muslims represented 21.3% of the male population in Bradford District, 35.7% of the 
males in Bradford who were either long-term unemployed or had never worked were Muslim 
(Office for National Statistics 2013c). 
 
(Office for National Statistics 2001c) 
Figure 2-13: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational Qualifications, by Age 
 
 
(Office for National Statistics 2001c; Office for National Statistics 2013c) 
Figure 2-14: Percentage of Bradfordians who have Never Worked or were Long-term 
Unemployed, by Religion (2001 and 2011) 
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2.6 Education and Bradford's Muslim Community 
Factors Contributing to the Muslim Community's Low Level of Educational and 
Vocational Qualifications 
 
 In 2002, Katz interviewed 300 Bradfordian youth, a majority of whom were South Asian 
Muslims.  Katz found only 11% of those she interviewed in Bradford demonstrated a high level 
of the "life skills" necessary to transition from adolescence to adulthood, including the ability to 
handle money, eat well, and apply for work.  By contrast, 34% of the national sample possessed 
a high level of these skills (Katz 2002).  Her study also highlighted a number of the obstacles 
which the city's South Asian Muslim students face when it comes to realizing their educational 
aspirations, including the lack of positive role models, poor communication skills and limited 
proficiency in English. 
 In addition to Katz's findings, other factors thought to contribute to the Muslim 
community's low level of educational and vocational qualifications include the socioeconomic 
status of the earliest Muslim immigrants to Bradford, the reluctance of some immigrant parents 
to allow their children to pursue higher education, and the extended absences of South Asian 
Muslim children from school.  The Muslims' perception that British schools threaten their 
cultural and religious identities likely also contributes to the community's qualification gap 
because it contributes to the reluctance of some Muslim parents to send their children to British 
schools.  The reported sense of alienation some Muslim youth feel in British schools may also 
contribute to their lack of qualifications as anecdotal evidence suggests it reduces their 
attentiveness at school. 
 Generally speaking, the first Muslim immigrants to Bradford were uneducated, rural 
laborers.  As a result, the earliest Muslim immigrants placed greater emphasis upon work over 
education to make a living (Shackle 2010).  The first immigrants' own lack of education, as well 
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as their emphasis on work over education, likely contributed to the limited educational 
qualifications of the second and third generation immigrants. 
 Studies and historical examples have also shown the reluctance of immigrant parents in 
Bradford to allow their children, particularly their daughters, to pursue an education.  Their 
reluctance has likely also contributed to the Muslim community's low level of qualifications.  For 
example, in the 1970s, Muslim parents Abdullah Patal and Riaz Shahid famously removed their 
daughters from school because they did not want them attending mixed-sex secondary schools in 
Bradford.  Katz's (2002) study found Muslim immigrant parents continued to resist allowing 
their daughters to pursue an education, even after they turned 18 years old.  Moreover, 38% of 
the youth she interviewed in Bradford stated the need of their families for them to stay in the 
home influenced their decision to either drop out of school or study close to home (Katz 2002). 
 Another known factor to contribute to the Muslims' education gap is their limited 
proficiency in English, even among second and third generation immigrants.  Even though many 
of the South Asian Muslim youth interviewed in Katz's study were born in England, their limited 
English skills were noted in the study results.  Katz pointed to the limited interaction between 
South Asian Muslim children and non-Muslims, inferred to be native-English speakers, as 
contributing to the Muslims' limited proficiency.  Noting the same, Lewis (2007) attributes the 
limited interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim youth to the time Muslim children spend 
after school in the city's madrassas.  According to Lewis, Muslim boys and young men are often 
required by their families to attend the madrasa for several hours each day after school to attain 
an Islamic education.  This schedule allows little time for Muslim youth to socialize with each 
other, let alone with non-Muslims (Lewis 2007). 
 To further explain the young Muslims' limited English skills, Lewis (2007) also points to 
 52 
 
the Muslim community's continued preference for arranged, transcontinental marriages.  
Through these marriages, British Pakistani families arrange spouses from Pakistan for their 
British-born sons and daughters.  As a result, many South Asian Muslim children in Bradford 
continue to be born to families where at least one parent is a new immigrant, and who themselves 
often have limited English skills.  In support of his claim, Lewis highlights a study of British 
Pakistani pupils and their fathers.  Of the 23 households in the study in northern England, all but 
one had at least one parent who was a new immigrant.  More than half of the fathers in the study 
could not fluently communicate in English, and two-thirds of the mothers could not read or write 
English (Lewis 2007). 
 The 2011 Census revealed the number of households in Bradford where English was the 
main language of the children but was not spoken by adults in the household.  According to the 
census, 2,943 (1.5%) households in Bradford had this language barrier in 2011.  Although the 
census did not identify the religious or ethnic backgrounds of these households, as seen in Figure 
2-15, these households were concentrated in South Asian neighborhoods.  For example, in 
Toller, where Pakistanis represent 72.3% of the population, 5.3% of the households there had 
children whose main language was English, but whose parents did not speak it (Office for 
National Statistics 2013e).  
 Because of the limited English skills of immigrant parents, many South Asian Muslim 
children in Bradford get their most exposure to English at school.  However, the immigrant 
children's exposure to English can be interrupted by truancy and extended absences from school, 
factors which are known to also contribute to the Muslim community's low level of 
qualifications.  In particular, education authorities in Bradford have noted how school term visits 
to the subcontinent are especially disruptive to the children's education.  In the early 1980s, 
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Figure 2-15: 2011 Census: Language Barriers at Home, Bradford District (Map) 
controversial head teacher Ray Honeyford estimated the education of a third of the pupils at 
Bradford’s Drummond Middle School was interrupted by extended school-term visits to the 
subcontinent (Halstead 1988).  Similar numbers were reported more recently at Victoria Primary 
School in Keighley, where approximately 98% of the school's students are South Asian.  As of 
2001, 44% of the students in the Bradford area school had a prolonged absence of at least four 
weeks, though the average extended absence from school was over ten weeks, according to 
Headmaster Kay Lindley (Crace 2004).  The students' extended absences disrupt both their 
mastery of English and education.  Explaining the impact of these absences, the school's assistant 
head teacher claimed: 
Almost all our children don't speak English at home, and many speak little, if at all, when 
they first arrive here. As a result, their learning can be fragile and needs constant 
reinforcement. When they go away for a long time they stop speaking English and forget 
much of what they've learnt. This is critical for a curriculum delivered in English. (Crace 
2004) 
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According to the staff, even the school’s best students struggled to make-up the material missed 
during their extended school term visits to the subcontinent. 
 The impact of these trips to the subcontinent has also been explored in qualitative studies.  
For example, a participant in M.Y. Alam’s (2006) study of Pakistani Muslim males in Bradford 
attributed his limited education to an extended visit to Pakistan, as he explained:  
I went to Pakistan in nineteen ninety-five.  My father went over to build himself a house.  
The general idea was to go back and live back home.  I'd just started my 'A' levels and my 
father asked me to come over in the summer holidays - 'Cove over, we haven't seen you 
for such a long time.'   
 
I left and I spent sixteen months there; didn't complete my first year.  My education, I 
couldn't really get into it when I came back, plus most of my friends were already at 
university.  I did 'A' levels at Bradford College and within two or three months I left.  I'd 
have loved to have gone to university and got a degree in something but that's not how 
things worked out. (Alam 2006) 
 
The participant's account of struggling to make-up missed coursework is in line with studies that 
indicate students who miss significant periods of school commonly struggle to complete their 
education or achieve high qualifications.  According to a British government study, only 35% of 
students who miss between 10% and 20% of their schooling achieve the five A* to C GCSEs 
necessary to continue on in higher education (Barnett 2011). 
Experiences of the Muslim Community in Bradford-Area Schools 
 Public education is commonly seen as a tool in nation building (Marginson 2002; Meyer 
1977).  This is especially true of those who ascribe to the modernist interpretation of the nation, 
or the view that the nation is a relatively new phenomenon constructed by the modern state.  
Hobsbawm, a leading proponent of this view, argues public education was one of the most 
important tools available to the state in creating the nation.  In addition to standardizing the 
nation's language, public schools instilled the "image and heritage of the nation" in the student 
(Hobsbawm 1992).  Public education plays a similar role in the acculturation of immigrants.  In 
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the 1960s and 1970s, for example, local authorities hoped Bradford's public schools would help 
to integrate minority immigrant students into "mainstream" British society (Halstead 1988). 
 Despite the authorities' intent for schools to help integrate the immigrants, experiences in 
Bradford-area schools have had the opposite effect for some within the Muslim community who 
felt marginalized by their encounters with prejudice and cultural misunderstandings at school.  
For example, another Pakistani male in Alam's (2006) study attributed his sense of exclusion 
from British society to his experiences at school, as he explained: 
I'm an outsider, we're outsiders.  I don't want to say we're left out or no one likes us or 
anything like that but we're like aliens from another planet.  Some people treat us or see 
us that way and we might as well be.  At school there were some teachers who said it, in 
a sly, clever way about us being not the same.  Still now it happens, this.  Even the ones 
who were okay used to sort of assume it because they were trying to be nice and help out.  
Some of them, they're genuinely nice but even them, they can't help it.  Any time 
anything happened, and they were like, 'Is it 'cos you got cultural problems?'  'Don't your 
parents understand you?' Yeah we understand.  It’s your culture, isn't it?  It's hard being 
in two cultures, innit?'  that kind of stuff.  Everything about us was about us as pakis, not 
normal people because we weren't normal people, weren't the same people.  Most of them 
didn't bother me and I didn't bother them.  I don't know if they were racist but they just 
cruised through -  they didn't give a damn so we didn't either.  I left school with hardly 
nowt worth writing home about.  My own fault.  Hold my hands up, but a better school 
would have made a difference.(italics added for emphasis) (Alam 2006) 
 
The participant's account demonstrates how the sense of exclusion at school can contribute to the 
students' reduced attentiveness and interest at school, both of which likely led to the participant's 
own lack of qualifications.  
 The participant's account of exclusion and prejudice in Bradford-area schools is not 
thought to be atypical.  Katz's (2002) study found students in Bradford were twice as likely as 
other participants in the nation to claim they had experienced racism at school.  One of the 
participants in Katz's study claimed, "If I did things again, I would change the teachers, I would 
try my best to get away from racist people, especially the teachers that I thought frankly were 
racist.  I really hate them, I really do.  They are so unfair and have no understanding about our 
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lives" (BBC News 2002). 
 Like the participant in Katz's study, British Muslims have argued state schools fail to 
fully understand or accommodate their cultural and religious identities.  The former director of 
the Association of Muslim Schools, Idreas Mears, has argued the schools' failure to understand 
their Muslim students contributes to the students' sense of alienation, as he argues: 
State schools do not handle the meaning of Muslim identity well for the children.  In 
actual fact, the way that general society looks at Muslims is as an immigrant minority-
ethnic-racial-group and how young people are made to look at themselves through the 
teaching in state schools tells them 'you are this marginal group/minority group and have 
therefore got to integrate with the mainstream'.  So there's a process of marginalization 
and that often leads to resentment. (Meer 2009) 
 
In response, Muslims in Britain have worked to inject their own values into state schools.  When 
this has failed, they have worked to open independent Muslim schools.  These efforts were 
undertaken in part to preserve the Muslims' unique cultural identities; however, they were also 
driven by the Muslim community's aspirations to more fully establish Islam in Britain. 
Injecting Muslim Values into Bradford Schools and the Opening of Independent Muslim 
Schools  
 
 The perceived failure of Bradford-area schools to accommodate Muslim values has, over 
the years, frustrated the city's Muslim community.  The city's Muslims have also expressed 
frustration when they thought schools in Bradford threatened their cultural identities.  For 
example, Riaz Shahid, a parent who, in the 1970s, sent his daughter to Pakistan rather than have 
her attend a mixed-sex school in Bradford, complained, “[In British schools,] Muslim children 
are being systematically transformed and indoctrinated into a British way of life, and are losing 
their identity" (McLoughlin 1998).  Shahid’s concerns were not necessarily unwarranted since 
local authorities at the time favored a policy of integration over multiculturalism.  These 
frustrations spurred the efforts of Muslim parents and associations in Bradford to inject their 
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cultural values and preferences into state schools.  In time, they also lead to the community's 
efforts to establish independent and state-funded Muslim schools in Bradford.   
 Since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have worked to implement changes in Bradford-
area schools.  In the 1970s, Muslim parents and organizations successfully introduced the 
teaching of Islam in area schools, and in the 1980s, the community successfully lobbied the local 
government to serve halal food in those schools attended by Muslims.  These efforts were in 
response to local demands, but they also represented the recognition of the wider British Muslim 
community that it needed to implement changes within state schools to transmit their religious 
heritage onto their children (Meer 2009). 
 According to Halstead (1998), it was traditionally the responsibility of the mothers and 
mosques in Bradford to transmit religious education onto their children.  In the 1960s, however, 
Muslims in Bradford became aware of the state’s responsibility under the 1944 Education Act to 
provide denominational education in state schools.  The Act allowed parents to remove their 
children from school at the beginning or end of each school day for off-site religious education.  
The act also made provisions for an outside instructor to give religious instruction in the school. 
 In the 1960s, Muslim associations, including the Muslim Association of Bradford and the 
Muslim Education Trust, lobbied local authorities to allow instructors of Islam to teach in 
Bradford's secondary schools.  Although their demand was guaranteed under the 1944 Education 
Act, local authorities were hesitant to accommodate the community’s request for Islam to be 
taught in state schools.  Bradford’s Director of Education, F.J. Adams, worried the introduction 
of Islamic religious education would be divisive and counter the city’s policy of promoting 
integration- a policy founded on the belief that minority immigrants should adopt the culture of 
the majority (Halstead 1988).  Despite his objections, the Council approved the Muslim 
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community's request, though only in part.  Initially, the Council restricted the state-funded 
instruction of Islam to Bradford’s immigrant education centers.  In 1972, however, local 
authorities more fully consented to the community’s demands and permitted Islam to be taught in 
any secondary school in Bradford. 
 Having secured the introduction of Islamic religious education in state schools, 
Bradford's Muslim community began a campaign against the serving of non-halal food in those 
schools attended by Muslims.  They secured this concession in 1983, but not without opposition.  
Animal rights activists were particularly opposed because of the method of animal slaughter 
mandated under Islamic law.  In the face of this opposition, the Bradford Council of Mosques 
mobilized the community.  According to Halstaed (1998), an estimated 3,000 Muslims joined a 
pro-hahal demonstration in Bradford, and 7,000 people signed a petition supporting the 
provision.  The mayor of Bradford was part of the opposition, but the Bradford Council 
ultimately voted in favor of the Muslim community. 
 Through such political pressure, the Muslim community has been able to inject some of 
its values into existing Bradford schools.  However, the community's other goals, including its 
demand for single-sex education, were only achieved through the opening of Muslim faith-based 
schools.  Efforts to open a Muslim school in Bradford were initiated in the 1970s, but they did 
not successfully establish one until the following decade. 
 According to Halstead (1998), one of the Muslim community's most sustained demands 
in Bradford has been its demand for single-sex education.  Many in the conservative community 
oppose co-education, particularly after primary school, because it violates their religious and 
cultural standards that outside of the family the sexes should be separated at puberty.  Halstead 
argues the Muslims' demand for single-sex education only intensified as Bradford Council 
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moved away from it in the 1970s.  For their part, local authorities favored co-education, arguing 
it promoted greater gender equality, and by 1974, Bradford Council only operated one girls’ 
school, the Belle Vue Girls’ School (Halstead 1988). 
 The Muslim community's demands for single-sex education came to the fore in 1973.  In 
May of that year, a local parent, Abdullah Patel, publically objected to the placement of his 
daughter at Hanson Upper School, a co-educational secondary school in Bradford.  After his 
appeals to the Department of Education and Prime Minister were dismissed, Patel removed his 
daughter from school.  Despite threats of legal action against him, he kept his daughter at home 
until 1975, when she turned sixteen and could legally leave school.  In December of 1973, Riaz 
Shahid, an immigration consultant, left the UK after a residence of 15 years so his 13-year-old 
daughter did not have to attend a co-educational school (Halstead 1988).  Also in 1973, the 
Muslim Association of Bradford, a Deobandi-orientated organization, proposed changes to the 
law that would have allowed girls to legally leave school at the age of twelve. 
 The Muslim Association of Bradford's proposal had little chance of adoption, but Muslim 
associations continued working towards opening a Muslim girls' school.  In 1974, Patel helped 
found the Muslim Parents’ Association (MPA) that worked to coordinate Muslim demands for 
concessions at Bradford's existing schools and to open new Muslim ones.  In the 1980s, Shahid, 
who had since returned to Bradford, also became involved with the MPA and unsuccessfully 
worked to secure state funding for five Muslim schools, including a girls’ school (Halstead 
1988). 
 According to McLoughlin (1998), the MPA ultimately failed to secure government 
funding because the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM), a local government funded 
organization established in 1981, did not endorse the MPA-backed plans.  Although the BCM 
 60 
 
agreed with the objectives of the plan, the organization did not support the plan because it did not 
view the MPA as a legitimate representation of Bradford's Muslim community (McLoughlin 
1998).  For its part, the BCM was involved in advocating the integration of Muslim values into 
local schools, securing the aforementioned serving of halal food in Bradford schools, for 
example. 
 Although the MPA failed to establish a state-funded Muslim girls’ school, the Muslim 
Association of Bradford successfully opened an independent girls' school in 1984.  Initially 
named Bradford Muslim Girls' Community School, the school opened with 26 students enrolled, 
and largely served the Deobandi Pashtun community who would have sent their daughters to 
Pakistan rather than have them attend a non-Muslim school (Lewis 2002).  Despite initial 
setbacks, including insufficient funding, inadequate facilities, unqualified teachers, and poor 
government reviews, in time, the school made significant strides in improving its reputation.  In 
1989, the school hired qualified teachers for the first time, and in 1990, it became registered with 
the Department of Education.  In 1993, with 178 pupils enrolled, the school’s students achieved 
GCSE results that were on par with other inner-city Bradford schools (McLoughlin 1998). 
 By 1994, these improvements allowed the school, renamed as Feversham College, to 
submit a competitive application to receive state funding as a Voluntary-Aided (VA) school.  As 
a VA school, the government would pay, at the time, the school's running costs and 85% of its 
capital costs.  According to McLaughlin (1998), the school hoped earning VA status would ease 
its abovementioned financial and staffing problems.  The school's application had the support of 
both the local community and local government, but the Secretary of State for Education 
ultimately rejected the application.  While recognizing the community's demand for single-sex 
education, the Secretary of Education Gillian Shephard rejected the application on the grounds of 
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safety and over concerns for its curriculum.  The school lacked a viable means of escape from 
the second floor in case of a fire, and the government was unsatisfied with the school's plans to 
implement technology education as required by the National Curriculum (McLoughlin 1998). 
 Although the school's application was rejected on the grounds of safety and its 
curriculum, the Muslim community assumed the government's rejection had greater meaning.  
According to McLaughlin (1998), the Muslim community saw the school's application as "a 
symbolic test of Muslims' equal participation and inclusion in the British nation", and the 
government's rejection of the application was seen as a rejection of the Muslim community.  
Demonstrating the sense of rejection felt by Bradford's Muslim population, McLaughlin points to 
the following reactions in the national press: 
The Government has missed an opportunity to show the Muslim community that it values 
what they are doing for their daughters ... Their decision not to is a violation of the 
Muslim community's human rights [The Independent, 17 February 1995).  
  
It is unfortunate that the UK remains out of step with Europe ... [The] Republic of 
Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands already have state-funded Muslim schools. We 
look forward to the day when we as British Muslims can also claim to have equitable 
treatment from our government [Q-News, 24 February 1995). (McLoughlin 1998)  
 
The rejection was also felt by some of the students at Feversham College.  In letters to the 
Muslim News, one student wrote, "I feel rejected, upset and unequal", and another wrote, "They 
wouldn't give it to us because we are Muslims, and they wouldn't like to see the Muslims getting 
the best education" (McLoughlin 1998).  The school's failure to receive state funding in 1994 
clearly left some Muslims in Bradford feeling rejected and wondering if they were an equal part 
of the nation. 
 Despite the rejection, Feversham College reapplied for government funding, and in 2001, 
was awarded state funding.  According to the school's website, the achievement was a "landmark 
in the college's journey"(Feversham College 2013).  It was also representative of the journey 
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taken by the British Muslim community to open and fund Muslim schools in Britain.  According 
to Meer (2009), the state's funding of Muslim schools in Britain was made possible with the 
election of New Labour in 1998.  Meer observes the Conservative government had been "hostile 
to the idea of state-funded Muslim schools", but New Labour had promised in its election 
manifesto to support Muslim schools (Meer 2009).  Blair's New Labour Government delivered 
on its promise in its first year in government as two Muslim schools, the Islamia School in 
London and Al-Furqan School in Birmingham became the first Muslim schools to be awarded 
VA status. 
 Since 1998, there has been a significant growth in the number of Muslim faith-based 
schools in England, including independent and state-funded schools.  Not including madrassas, 
in 2012, there were 142 Muslim schools in England, including 12 that were state funded 
(Department of Education 2013).  As seen in Figure 2-16, the growth in Muslim schools in 
England has occurred over a relatively short period.  One of the first Muslim schools in England 
was the aforesaid Islamia School in London, which opened in 1983 with the financial support of 
Yusuf Islam (the musician formerly known as Cat Stevens).  By 1989, there were 15 Muslim 
schools, and six years later, there were 25 in operation (Parker-Jenkins 2002; McLoughlin 1998).  
In 2003, there were 53 Muslim schools, and by 2005, there were nearly 100 independent Muslim 
schools in England (Garner 2005; BBC News 2007). 
 The rapid growth in Muslim schools represents a significant investment by the Muslim 
community, and speaks to the community's intent to more fully establish both itself and a unique 
Muslim identity in Britain.  Explaining the role Muslim schools play in more fully establishing 
the Muslim community, Mears, the former director of the Association of Muslim Schools, has 
stated: 
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I think we're at a very interesting stage.  The metaphor I use is that the first Muslims that 
came here were like the farmer standing on the ground; they were standing on it but 
didn't have roots in it.  But their seed has been scattered with some falling on good 
ground, others falling on stony ground and yet some being blown away in the wind.  In 
some ways, we're only now at the beginning of establishing a genuine Muslim presence in 
Britain, and Muslim schools are the key to that presence (italics added for emphasis). 
(Meer 2009) 
 
While Mears argues Muslim schools are critical to the establishment of the Muslim presence in 
Britain, the head teacher at the Islamia School in London, Abdullah Trevathan, argues Muslim 
schools are also crucial in the creation of a unique British Muslim identity, as he explained:  
If anything - [the Islamia] school is about creating a British-Muslim culture, instead of, as 
I've often said in the press, conserving or saving a particular culture, say from the 
subcontinent or from Egypt or from Morocco or from wherever it may be.  Obviously 
those cultures may feed into this British-Muslim cultural  identity, but we're not in the 
business of preserving... it's just not feasible and it's not sensible... it's dead; I mean I'm 
not saying those cultures are dead but it's a dead duck in the water as far as being here [in 
Britain] is concerned. (Meer 2009) 
  
The Muslim community in Britain is not monolithic, but is diverse in terms of its ethnicity, race, 
places of origin, and culture.  However, Muslim schools in Britain are seen by some as the key to 
unifying the nation's Muslim population under the umbrella of a new and distinct "British 
Muslim" identity. 
  
Figure 2-16: Number of Muslim Schools in England 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Research Questions 
 It is commonly held that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy 
full equality in civil, legal, and political rights (Smith 1991; Gellner 1997).  It is also argued that 
a strong national identity, which is the "social glue" that binds the community together, is 
promoted by economic advantage (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964; Jelen 
2011).  However, according to most socio-economic indicators, immigrants are often 
disadvantaged members of society.  For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households 
in the UK live in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006). 
 Peach (2006) has argued the Muslim community's poor socioeconomic conditions 
contribute to their sense of exclusion from British society.  This study sought to determine 
whether perceptions of inequality have also affected the South Asian Muslims' very 
identification with the nation.  In so doing, this study sought to add empirical evidence to the 
theoretical link between equality and national identity, evidence which is lacking according to 
Shulman (2003).  The education sector is one of the areas of public life where South Asian 
Muslims have, in the past, expressed feelings of discrimination and inequality.  It is also an area 
where they have struggled to achieve the same level of qualifications as others in Britain.  In 
2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no educational or vocational 
qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d).  The Home Office's inquiry into the 2001 
Bradford riots also concluded educational opportunities were far from equal in the city (Home 
Office 2001).  Because of these conditions, this study used access to education as a key measure 
of equality to test for an association between it and national identity.  In addition to determining 
whether Muslims in Bradford felt like they had equal access to an education, this study also 
sought to explore their educational goals and the level of emphasis they place upon an education.  
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These inquiries were intended to find other factors that may contribute to the Muslim 
community's low level of qualifications. 
 In addition to exploring perceptions of equality and national identity, this study sought to 
determine which acculturation strategies were being employed by young British Muslims.  
According to Berry (1997), immigrants can pursue one of four acculturation strategies depending 
on how they value the retention of their own cultural identities and their interactions with the 
host society; these four strategies are: integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalization.  
Despite the body of studies exploring these strategies elsewhere, Robinson (2009) claims Berry's 
theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain.  As such, this study adds to the limited 
body of studies exploring Berry's acculturation strategies in the country. 
 While Berry's theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain, British Muslims 
have commonly been accused of segregating themselves from society (Shaw 2002; Peach 2006).  
For example, the government's inquiry into the 2001 Bradford riots also concluded that the 
Muslim and White British communities were living "parallel lives" (Home Office 2001).  
Concern for the Muslims' separation from British society has again come to the fore since 2011 
as the Conservative Government has called for policies to better integrate them into society to 
combat "home grown" extremism.  Despite accusations that Muslims in Britain have pursued 
segregation, Phillips (2006) argues British Muslims in Bradford are in fact eager to more fully 
integrate into British society.  Given conflicting reports, this study sought to determine whether 
young British Muslims in Bradford more commonly exhibited indicators of integration or 
segregation. 
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Primary Research Questions 
To address these issues, this study sought to answer the following core questions: 
1. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford identify with the nation?  Do they identify 
as being English or British?  What are their dominant, or most important, identities? 
2. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford see themselves as equal members of 
society?  
3. Is there an association between perceptions of equality and national identity?  
4. Is education important to young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, and what are 
their educational goals?  Have they been able to achieve the type of education that is most 
important to them?  Do they think they have equal access to educational opportunities? 
5. What acculturation strategies have been adopted by young British South Asian Muslims?  
Have they integrated into British society? 
3.2 Assumptions and Hypotheses 
 Based upon a review of the available literature, this study worked under the following 
assumptions and hypotheses: 
Assumptions 
1. Most British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old in Bradford are second or third 
generation immigrants 
2. British South Asian Muslims at the University of Bradford were from Bradford or the 
immediate surrounding area 
3. Respondents who identified with the nation would describe themselves as British or 
English on the survey 
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Hypotheses  
1. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but they would 
be less likely than White British respondents to identify with the nation 
2. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but their 
identity as Muslim would be the more dominant identity 
3. Young British South Asian Muslims would be less likely than White British respondents 
to see themselves as equal members of society 
4. Young British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of society 
would be more likely to identify with the nation than those Muslims who did not see 
themselves as equal members of society 
5. Education would be important to most young British South Asian Muslims, but their 
educational goals would differ from those of young White British respondents 
3.3 Study Design 
Procedures 
 To answer the research questions, data was collected through administering a structured 
questionnaire in Bradford, England in late December 2009 and early January 2010.  Using non-
probable sampling, the questionnaire was completed by respondents at multiple locations in 
Bradford, including Bradford City Center, Lister Park, Bradford College, the University of 
Bradford, and multiple Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh places of worship (see Figure 3-1).  To 
minimize sampling and selection bias, static control points were established at the various survey 
sites.  For example, at the University of Bradford Library, the survey was administered at the 
main entrance.  This allowed the researcher to invite each library patron to participate in the 
study.  No incentives were offered to the participants, who were told the questionnaire was part 
of an academic study exploring perceptions of education and national identity.  The respondents 
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completed the questionnaires themselves unless they asked the researcher to record their 
answers. 
 
Figure 3-1: Survey Sites in Bradford, West Yorkshire 
Instrument 
 To gather data, a one-page, two-sided questionnaire was designed for the study.  The 
survey questions were designed to elicit the respondents' local and national identities, 
educational goals, and perceptions regarding their access to education, as well as the access of 
those of their religious and ethnic backgrounds.  The questionnaire also sought to determine 
whether the respondents saw themselves as equal members of society.  The questionnaire, seen 
in Figures 3-2 and 3-3, primarily utilized closed-ended questions which gave the respondents a 
series of forced-choice alternatives, Likert rating scales, and checklists.  Some of the questions 
also allowed respondents to provide comments or additional responses not included in the survey
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Figure 3-2: Study Questionnaire (Page 1) 
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Figure 3-3: Study Questionnaire (Page 2) 
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design.  The questionnaire recorded the respondent’s gender, age, citizenship, highest level of 
education completed, ethnicity, religion, and earnings.  To ensure the respondent’s identity 
would remain anonymous, the survey did not record a name, address, or other personal details. 
3.4 Study Site: Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (53° 47' 33'' N, 1° 45' 11'' W) 
Physical Context 
 The study was conducted in Bradford, West Yorkshire, England.  Bradford is located 
approximately 47 kilometers (30 miles) northeast of Manchester, 14 kilometers (9 miles) west of 
Leeds, and 278 kilometers (172 miles) north of London (see Figure 3-4).  Bradford is the 
administrative center of the City of Bradford, a metropolitan district that includes Bradford and 
the surrounding towns (see Figure 3-5).  Bradford is located in the eastern region of the South 
Pennines, a low mountain range running north-south that separates the North West from North 
East of England.  As seen in Figure 3-6, Bradford is not located on a major river, but is situated 
between two river valleys, the Aire Valley to the north and the Calder Valley to the south.  Of 
the two valleys, Bradford is closer to the Aire Valley.  The city is situated at the bottom of a wide 
valley which opens up to the west, where Bradford Beck (Stream) and its tributaries flow from 
the Pennine Hills.  The beck, which is now mostly beneath the city's foundations, flows east 
towards the City Center, where beneath Bradford Cathedral it turns north to meet the Aire River.   
The Bradford Beck was one of several streams that converged in Bradford, whose earlier 
crossing points, or fords, likely gave the city its name - from the Old English Brád (Broad) Ford.  
 Although Bradford is not located along a major river, Bradford's geologic record 
indicates the area once consisted of swamps, estuaries and coastal deltas.  The ancient vegetation 
created the local deposits of coal which have been extracted in Bradford since the 1600s.  In 
addition to a rich supply of coal, the bedrock from the Period also contains the ironstones, 
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Picture 3-1: Surveys were conducted at the Abu Bakr Mosque on Steadman Terrace Road (Reid, 
2010) 
 
 
Picture 3-2: Inside the Shree Lakshmi Narayan Hindu Temple on Leeds Road, where surveys 
were completed (Reid, 2010) 
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Picture 3-3: Surveys were conducted outside the Guru Gobind Singh Sikh Hudwara on Leeds 
Road (Reid, 2010) 
 
 
Picture 3-4: Most surveys were completed at the University of Bradford library, but some were 
completed at the Atrium above (Reid, 2010) 
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Picture 3-5: Cartwright Hall, Lister Park.  Surveys were completed in the park, which was 
donated to the city by Samuel Lister (Reid, 2010) 
 
 
Picture 3-6: Bradford City Hall in Centenary Square where surveys were conducted (Reid, 2010) 
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Figure 3-4: Bradford, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom (Map) 
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Figure 3-5: Bradford District (Map) 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Terrain and Geography of Bradford (Map) 
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sandstones and other sedimentary rocks that fueled Bradford's industrial economy.  For example, 
the ironstones were used to extract the iron used in the ironworks that were established in Low 
Moor south of Bradford.  According to Haworth (2006), the cannons fired at the Battle of 
Trafalgar came from Low Moor, as did the plates used in the construction of the Sydney Harbor 
Bridge.  The area's sandstones, particularly the flagstones, were quarried and used as a prized 
building stone throughout England, as Haworth claims, "London was said to be paved with 'gold' 
because of the colour of the flagstones produced in Bradford" (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford 
Heritage Recording Unit 2006).  Each of these resources were themselves significant, but their 
co-location, coupled with the city's access to canals, gave Bradford the economic advantage that 
allowed it to become the "worsted capital" of the world in the 19th century (Howarth, Smith, and 
Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006). 
Social Context: Bradford's Industry and Immigration 
 Historically, Bradford's most important industry was the wool industry.  The city's wool 
trade was responsible for transforming Bradford from a market town to the industrial hub of a 
global market in the 19th century.  Although Bradford's woolen trade waned in the 20th century, 
the industry created the cultural and ethnic diversity for which the city is known today.  For 
several centuries, Bradford's woolen industry attracted migrants to the city, including South 
Asians in the second-half of the 20th century. 
 Bradford has been a site of woolen production since at least the 14th century.  The 
presence of a fulling mill in Bradford was first recorded in 1311 (Keighley 2007).  However, 
woolen production remained a cottage industry until the introduction of the steam engine in the 
late 18th century.  The introduction of the steam engine allowed woolen and worsted production 
to move into the heart of the city, which allowed the mills to become large commercial 
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endeavors. 
 When the first steam powered mill in Bradford opened in 1798, East Anglia was the 
center of English worsted wool production (worsted yarn derives its name from the Norfolk 
village of Worstead in East Anglia).  By 1850, however, most of the country's worsted yarn and 
cloth production had transferred to Yorkshire.  In 1850, 88% of England's 850,000 spindles and 
89% of the country's 326,000 power looms were in Yorkshire (Clapham 1910).  The county 
remained the center of woolen production into the 20th century.  In 1904, 90% of the country’s 
2,823 combing machines were in West Riding, which corresponds to present-day West 
Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire (Weld 1912). 
 When the country's woolen production shifted to Yorkshire at the start of the 19th 
century, Halifax and Leeds were the centers of woolen manufacturing in the region.  By the 
middle of the 19th century, however, Bradford overtook its regional competitors (Smith n.d.).  
Bradford's rise was aided by the aforementioned presence of local coal, engine manufacturing, 
and metal works at Low Moor.  Technological innovations in Bradford also gave the city its 
competitive edge.  For example, Samuel Lister's Comb (see Picture 3-9), which was patented in 
1849, was one of several inventions in Bradford that mechanized the combing process, the last 
and most difficult process of wool production to be mechanized (Weld 1912).  The combination 
of natural resources, innovation and entrepreneurship allowed Bradford historian 
John James to write in 1841, "[Bradford] has risen to the capital of the worsted trade; and 
assumed an importance which, when contrasted with its condition a few short years ago, 
astonishes" (Webb 1976).  
 Bradford remained the world's preeminent wool manufacturer at the turn of the 20th 
century.  In 1907, Sir John Clapham wrote, "Bradford is the chief seat of wool-dealing, yarn-  
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Picture 3-7:Victorian-era woolen mills still dot Bradford's cityscape.  Drummonds Mill in the 
foreground, Lister Mill in the background (Reid 2010) 
dealing, and of all things commercial.  Its supremacy is unquestionable.  Bradford is actually by 
far the greatest wool-working city in the Riding or, for that matter, in the world " (Clapham 
1907).  The growth in Bradford's textiles industry was accompanied by growth in its related 
industries.  Warehouses, dyeworks, printing presses, commercial services, and metal works all 
thrived in Bradford during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 The rapid growth of Bradford's industrial base led to significant population growth in the 
city during the 19th century.  Attributing the population growth to the mechanization of the 
worsted wool industry, Mortimore (1969) claims Bradford's population grew more rapidly than 
many other northern industrial towns.  In 1801, there were 29,733 inhabitants in Bradford and 
the surrounding towns; by 1911, the population had grown to 293,321, representing an 885% 
population growth (Mortimore 1969; Richardson 1968).  The rapid population growth in the19th 
century was reflected in Bradford's urban expansion, which is depicted in Mortimore's map (see 
Figure 3-7).  Mortimore depicts the urban extent of Bradford in 1950 compared to the outline of 
Bradford in 1800. 
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(Mortimore 1969) 
Figure 3-7: Mortimore's Map of Bradford's Urban Expansion, 1800-1850 
 Bradford's population growth in the 19th century was primarily due to immigration.  The 
earliest immigrants to Bradford came from the surrounding towns, boroughs and counties.  By 
1851, 21.7% of Bradford's population was born outside of Yorkshire (Richardson 1968).  During 
the first half of the 19th century, international migrants also began arriving.  In 1834, a minister 
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at the Horton Lane Congregational Chapel in Bradford wrote of the city's changing human 
landscape, "The natives of Scotland are here, the natives of Ireland are here, from the pleasant 
vales of Devonshire men and women have come: from the banks of the Rhine and the Elbe they 
are coming" (Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service 
1987).  A century later, J.B. Priestley, the English novelist born in Bradford, echoed the 
minister's description of Bradford's cosmopolitanism, as he wrote, "Bradford was determinedly 
Yorkshire and provincial, yet some of its suburbs reached as far as Frankfurt or Leipzig" 
(Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service 1987).  
 A combination of "push" and "pull" factors brought the international migrants to 
Bradford.  For example, food shortages and landlessness in Ireland "pushed" Irish immigrants to 
the city in the 19th century.  Most immigrants to Bradford, however, were attracted by the 
economic opportunities in the city.  For example, German merchants settled in Bradford in the 
second half of the 19th century to establish woolen export warehouses at the heart of the woolen 
industry.  The German influence on architecture and culture in Bradford is still observable in a 
section of the city known as Little Germany. 
 Immigration to Bradford slowed as the textiles industry struggled at the turn of the 20th 
century.  International competition, changing fashion, and a depressed world economy contracted 
Bradford's export market, and profits slumped.  In 1920, the export of woolen and worsted goods 
totaled 139.5 million pounds; the following year, it equaled only 62 million pounds (Smith n.d.).  
The decreased demand for textiles in the 1920s and 1930s led to high unemployment and the 
closure of many of the city's textile mills.  Between 1928 and 1932, 400 textile mills in Bradford 
closed (Smith n.d.). 
 Despite the economic downturn in the 1920s and 1930s, immigration to Bradford 
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Picture 3-8: The 64-Spindle Cap Spinner, c. 1828.  During spinning, the roving is drawn out and 
the fibers are twisted together to create thread (Reid, 2010) 
 
Picture 3-9: The Lister Comb patented in 1849 by Samuel C. Lister of Manningham was one of 
several local inventions that gave Bradford an edge in woolen manufacturing.  Combing 
straightens the wool fibers, separating the short wool from the long wool (Reid, 2010) 
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continued, though at a reduced rate.  During the interwar years, Jewish immigrants came from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Russia, Germany, and Poland.  The Jewish 
immigrants were not motivated by economic considerations like most of the earlier migrants to 
Bradford.  Like the Irish before them, Jewish immigrants were motivated by "push" factors at 
home.  In the case of the Jewish immigrants, they were fleeing anti-Semitism and persecution on 
the Continent. 
 The Second World War spurred immigration again as the war created additional demand 
for labor in the textile mills and wartime factories.  South Asian immigrants first came to 
Bradford at this time, finding work in the city's munitions factories.  The demand for labor 
continued after the war, leading the government to introduce schemes to entice workers to 
Britain.  For example, Ukrainians from the 14th Waffen SS 'Galicia' Division who were captured 
by the British during the war were allowed to settle in Britain to protect them from retributions in 
Stalinist Ukraine.  Some of these settled in Bradford under the newly established European 
Volunteer Workers scheme, as did a number a Polish servicemen who had served Britain during 
the war. 
 Many of these immigrants initially found work in the city's woolen mills; however, by the 
1950s, the Eastern European immigrants began leaving the textile mills for better paying jobs in 
other sectors.  Initially, females replaced the lost labor, but they were excluded by law from 
working the overnight shifts that were introduced in the 1950s.  South Asian males, who had 
begun immigrating to the city during the war, fulfilled the new requirement for overnight 
laborers as Bradford's mills began to actively recruit in South Asia.  By 1964, there were 12,000 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Bradford, most of whom were working in the mills (Cohen 
1974). 
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 By the 1960s, Bradford's woolen industry was in decline.  Competition from overseas 
increased as wool producing countries like Australia and South Africa, which had previously 
supplied wool to Bradford, began to process it themselves.  Clothing fashions also changed as 
synthetic fibers replaced wool.  Due to these changes, the number of Bradfordians employed in 
the woolen industry declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s.  Between 1961 and 1978, the 
number of workers employed in Bradford's textile mills dropped from 73,000 to 28,000 
(Wainwright 2003).  In 2002, there were fewer than 1,000 people still working in the city's 
textiles industry (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006).  The few 
textiles companies in Bradford today specialize in high quality fabrics. 
 As the textiles industry declined, its associated industries either left Bradford or adapted 
to new markets.  For example, firms in Keighley that had once made looms and spinning frames 
now make lifts and escalators, while plants in Low Moor that once made dyestuffs have since 
become chemical plants (Wainwright 2003).  Printing companies are also still found in Bradford.  
For example, the UK headquarters of Hallmark Cards is located in the city.  
 As South Asians were predominately employed in the mills, the decline in the city's 
woolen industry had a disproportionate impact on the Muslim immigrant community.  On one 
hand, the closure of the mills led to the opening of small Asian businesses, mostly in the service 
industry, as Asian families pooled their resources to open shops, restaurants and takeaways 
(Kundnani 2001).  However, the closure of the mills primarily led to the community's ongoing 
high unemployment.  It also reduced the interaction between the South Asian and White British 
communities.  According to Kundnani, the textile industry had been "the common thread binding 
the white and Asian working class into a single fabric" (Kundnani 2001).  As the mills closed, 
however, the interaction between the two communities unraveled.  The separation of the two 
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communities was reinforced by the subsequent white flight from Bradford's working class 
neighborhoods. 
3.5 Selection of Bradford as the Study Site 
 Several factor contributed to the selection of Bradford as the study site, including its 
social history and current demographics.  As a center of recent immigration, Bradford is well 
suited for studies related to the construction of national identity.  Because of the immigrants' 
poor economic standing and known disparities in educational opportunities, the city is also well 
suited for this study's look at the hypothesized association between equality and national identity.  
 Within Bradford, the University of Bradford was selected as the primary study site.  The 
institution dates to 1832, when it opened as the Mechanics Institute.  In 1882, it changed its name 
to Bradford Technical College, and in 1957, the Bradford Institute of Technology was 
established to offer higher education.  In 1966, the Institute became the University of Bradford, 
receiving a Royal Charter to become Britain's 40th University.   
 As depicted in Figure 3-8, the university's student body reflects the diversity of 
Bradford's human terrain.  According to information provided by the University Registrar's 
Office at the time of the study, there were 12,314 students enrolled at the University of Bradford, 
including 2,691 post-graduate students.  Of the students domiciled in the UK, 4126 (44%) were 
white, while 2912 (31%) were ethnic Pakistanis.  Indicative of the university's outreach to the 
city's Pakistani community, the university's chancellor since 2005 is Imran Khan, the former 
cricketer and chairman of Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Insaf political party. 
 Conducting the surveys at the university was intended to gain greater access to the study's 
target population, namely young British South Asian Muslims.  As a male researcher, access to 
the female South Asian Muslim population would have been otherwise limited.  Attempts to gain 
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access to female respondents were initially made through contacting male powerbrokers in some 
of the city's mosques.  These attempts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful because mosques 
in Bradford remain a male-dominated domain.  Conducting the study at the university, therefore, 
allowed females to be included in the study.  As an outsider, the university setting also facilitated 
a more natural access to the city's young male Muslim population.  Because the Muslim 
community in Bradford is regularly scrutinized by outsiders, likely to include by security 
services, the university setting facilitated access to Muslim males who might otherwise have 
been suspicious of an outside researcher, particularly an American researcher inquiring about 
their national identity and sense of belonging in British society. 
 
Figure 3-8: Ethnic Breakdown of University of Bradford Students 
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Picture 3-10: Atrium and Richmond Building, University of Bradford (Reid, 2010) 
3.6 Study Limitations 
 Conducting the study at the university granted access to a large number of young British 
South Asian Muslims, but using the university students as the sample population also introduced 
limitations and potential biases in the study.  For example, it reduced the likelihood the entire 
sample would be from Bradford.  At the time of the study, only 30% of the students enrolled at 
the university were from Bradford according to the Registrar’s Office.  Nevertheless, the 
percentage of British Pakistani students from Bradford was higher.  At the time of the study, 
56% of the British Pakistani students enrolled at the university were from Bradford.  With 
moderate to high confidence, the study worked under the assumption that British South Asian 
Muslim respondents surveyed at the university were likely from Bradford or the immediate 
surrounding area. 
 While the South Asian Muslim respondents at the University of Bradford offer valuable 
insights into the city's Muslim community, this subset may not fully represent the wider Muslim 
community.  Because over half of the Muslim adults in Bradford have no educational or 
vocational qualifications, those at the university are more privileged than many of their peers.  
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They have had opportunities unknown to most in the city’s Muslim community, and, as a result, 
they may have been more predisposed to identify with the nation than other Muslims in the city.  
While this may be the case, because most respondents at the university indicated they too had 
experienced or witnessed inequality in British society, the sample population still serves as a 
suitable sample to test for associations between perceptions of equality and national identity. 
            By relying on the sample from the University of Bradford, survey questions related to 
educational priorities or goals may also have been biased.  As students at a university that 
focuses on science, technology, liberal arts, and life sciences, it could be expected that most 
students surveyed would favor a liberal education, regardless of the respondent’s ethnic or 
religious backgrounds. As such, the survey results may have misrepresented the educational 
priorities of the wider, more conservative Muslim community. 
            Lastly, based upon the history of the Muslim immigrant community, the study worked 
under the assumption that British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old were most likely 
second or third generation immigrants.  However, the survey did not ask respondents to indicate 
how long they or their families had been in Britain.  This limited the analysis and conclusions 
that could have been derived by further exploring the differences between immigrant 
generations. 
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Chapter 4 Results and Analysis 
 Between late December 2009 and mid-January 2010, the questionnaire was administered 
to 576 participants in Bradford.  The majority of participants were UK citizens, but the survey 
was also completed by citizens from at least 50 other countries and territories (see Appendix B).  
Only those surveys completed by UK citizens were included in the study.  Of the 359 
questionnaires completed by UK citizens, 305 surveys were answered in full.  The other 54 
surveys were partially completed, however, individual responses were included where possible. 
4.1 Demographics  
Gender:  The survey was completed by 154 (42.9%) females and 205 (57.1%) males. 
Age:  As depicted in Figure 4-1, the study was completed by 262 (73%) participants under 30 
years old, the study’s target age group.  The survey was also completed by 97 (27%) participants 
over the age of 29. 
Ethnicity:  As depicted in Figure 4-2, most participants were Asian.  The study was completed 
by 199 (55.4%) British Asians, including 194 (54%) British South Asians, the study’s target 
population.  The survey was also completed by 127 (35.4%) White British participants, and 33 
(9.2%) participants who described themselves as Arab/Middle Eastern, Black, Mixed, or Other.  
Of the 194 South Asians in the study, 148 (41.2%) were of Pakistani origin.  Figure 4-3 depicts 
the ethnic breakdown of the British South Asians in the study. 
Religion:  Figure 4-4 depicts the breakdown of respondents by religion.  Most of the study's 
participants identified themselves as Muslim.  The survey was completed by 193 (53.8%) 
Muslims, 71 (19.8 %) Christians, and 62 (17.3%) people who claimed they had no religious 
affiliation.  The study was also completed by 21(5.8%) Hindus, 3 (.8%) Sikhs, and 1 (.3%) 
Buddhist. 
Education: Figure 4-5 depicts the level of education completed by the British participants.  The   
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questionnaire asked respondents to identify the highest level of education they had completed, 
but the graph most likely represents the level of education the respondents had completed or 
were pursuing at the time of the study.  The survey was completed by 264 (73.5%) people who 
claimed they had completed either college or a higher education. 
 
Figure 4-1: Number of UK Participants, by Age 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Number of UK Participants, by Ethnicity  
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Figure 4-3: Ethnic Breakdown of British South Asian Respondents 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Number of UK Respondents, by Religion 
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Figure 4-5: Highest Level of Education Completed by Study Participants 
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  The questionnaire included nine independent questions, which are found in Table 4-1.  
The responses to each survey question are presented individually below, allowing for those 
surveys with some incomplete responses to be included where possible.  A snapshot of the 
results is found in Table 4-2.  
 
Q1) Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family? 
 
Q2) How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, how 
much do you plan to stress education to them? 
 
Q3) The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the most 
important to you? 
 
  Basic Education: One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math 
  skills 
  Religious Education: One that provides students with strong values and strong religious 
  beliefs 
  Liberal Education: One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for 
  themselves 
  Vocational Education: One that prepares students to find a good job 
  Civic Education: One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and show 
  respect for the laws of his/her country 
 
Q4) Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to 
you? 
 
Q5) Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country? 
 
Q6) How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have? 
 
Q7) How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have? 
 
Q8) Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society? 
 
Q9) Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society? 
 
Table 4-1: Survey Questions 
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Survey Question Responses 
Statistically 
Different? 
Key Finding (s) 
Q1: Growing Up, Level of 
Emphasis Placed upon 
Education 
YES 88.65% of respondents had education 
stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot"; 
however, British South Asian Muslims 
were more likely than white respondents to 
have had education stressed "a lot" 
Q2: Level of Emphasis Placed 
upon Education for their 
Children 
NO 96.69% of respondents stress education "a 
fair amount" or a "lot" to their children, or 
plan to when they have children 
Q3: Educational Goals YES Educational goals were dependent upon 
population; a religious education was the 
most important goal of British South Asian 
Muslims and a liberal education was the 
most important goal of White British 
respondents 
Q4: Achieve Educational 
Goal? 
NO 90.43% of all respondents claimed they 
were able to achieve their desired type of 
education; for Muslim respondents, 
achieving one's goal was dependent upon 
the goal 
Q5: Equal Access to 
Education? 
NO 89.58% of all respondents thought they had 
equal access to education 
Q6: Ethnic Group has Equal 
Access to Education? 
YES British South Asian Muslims were less 
likely to think members of their ethnic 
background had equal access to education 
(34.29% thought South Asians had less 
access)  
Q7: Religious Group has 
Equal Access to Education? 
YES British South Asian Muslims were less 
likely to think members of their religious 
background had equal access to education 
(28.78% thought Muslims had less access) 
Q8: Part of British Society? NO 94.68% of respondents thought they were 
part of British society 
Q9: Equal Member of Society? YES British South Asian Muslims were less 
likely to think they were equal members of 
British society (19.42% thought they were 
not equal members of society) 
Table 4-2: Comparison of Responses: White British and British South Asian Muslims under 30 
Years Old, University of Bradford 
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4.2.1 Q1: Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
 Because the earliest South Asian immigrants to Bradford placed more emphasis on work 
than education, the first survey question was designed to test claims that the immigrant 
community has since placed greater emphasis upon education as a means of social mobility 
(Shackle 2010).  The question utilized a Likert rating scale, allowing respondents to choose one 
of the following closed-ended responses: "not at all", "very little", "a fair amount", or "a lot".  
The question was answered by 137 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British 
respondents. 
 As seen in Table 4-3, most participants (88.65%) claimed education was stressed, or 
emphasized, "a fair amount" or a "lot" in their youth.  A statistical test for the difference between 
the two population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as 
White British respondents to have had education stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot" by their 
families (z = .292, p = .7707).  However, British South Asian Muslim respondents were more 
likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up  
(z = 2.39, p = .0084) (See Table 4-4). 
 
Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, <30 
6 
4.38% 
9 
6.57% 
46 
33.58% 
76 
55.47% 
137 
White 
British, <30 
1 
2.08% 
5 
10.42% 
25 
52.08% 
17 
35.42% 
48 
Total:  7 
3.78% 
14 
7.57% 
71 
38.38% 
93 
50.27% 
185 
Table 4-3: Responses to Question 1 
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Table 4-4: British South Asian Muslims More Likely to Have Had Education Stressed "A Lot" 
4.2.2 Q2: How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have 
Children Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them? 
 The survey also sought to determine how much stress, or emphasis, the respondents 
planned to place upon their children's education, or already did if they had children at the time of 
the study.  The question was intended to gauge how much the respondents value an education.  
The question utilized the same Likert rating scale as the previous question: "not at all", "very 
                                        
                                   
                                                    "a lot")  7  137 
                                                "a lot")  17  8 
British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White Respondents to Have Had 
Education Stressed "a Lot" While Growing Up 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British 
respondents to have had education stressed  "a lot" while growing up 
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1  p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
   2.39; p-value= .0084 
Decision Rule: one-tail test (right), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if  
z > 1.645 
Conclusion: Since 2.39 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British 
respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up.  Since the p-value is 
between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating 
the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null 
hypothesis with a significance level of .01 (2.326). 
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little", "a fair amount", and "a lot".  Respondents could also indicate they did not plan to have 
children.   The question was answered by 134 British South Asian Muslims and 47 White British 
respondents.  The vast majority (96.69%) of the respondents planned to emphasize education "a 
fair amount" or "a lot" to their children (see Table 4-5).  Although a greater proportion of British 
South Asian Muslims emphasized, or planned to emphasize, education "a lot" to their children, 
the difference in proportions was not statistically significant (z = 1.05, p = .1469)  
How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have Children 
Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children 
Total 
South 
Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
2 
1.49% 
3 
2.24% 
46 
34.33% 
83 
61.94% 
0 
0.00% 
134 
White 
British, 
<30 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
21 
44.68% 
25 
53.19% 
1 
2.13% 
47 
Total:  2 
1.10% 
3 
1.66% 
67 
37.02% 
108 
59.67% 
1 
0.55% 
181 
Table 4-5: Responses To Question 2 
 
4.2.3 Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You? 
 This question was based on Nelson's (2003) study of educational priorities in Rawalpindi, 
Pakistan.  Using the definitions in Table 4-6, Nelson asked Pakistani parents to prioritize their 
educational goals for their children.  Borrowing from Nelson, this study asked respondents to 
identify their educational goals based upon the definitions in Table 4-7.  The question was 
answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents.  According to a 
chi-square test of independence, the respondents' educational goals were dependent upon ethnic 
group (x
2
 = 22.891, p = .0001) (see Table 4-9).  For example, British South Asian Muslims were 
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more likely than white respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of 
an education (z = 3.576, p = .0002).  By contrast, White British respondents were more likely 
than British South Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important 
educational goal (z = 3.47, p = .0003) (see Tables 4-10 and 4-11). 
 
Nelson's (2006) Definitions of a "Good" Education 
 
Basic Education: "Some people say that a good school teaches students how to read 
and write.  In other words, good schools provide students with 
basic reading skills and basic math skills." 
Religious Education: "Some people say that a good school is a school that creates good 
Muslims.  In other words, good schools provide students with 
strong values and strong religious beliefs." 
Liberal Education: "Some people say that good schools teach students how to solve 
problems and think for themselves." 
Vocational Education: "Some people say that good schools prepare students to find good 
jobs." 
Civic Education: "Some people say that good schools make sure that every student 
becomes a good citizen, showing respect for the laws of their 
country." 
 
Table 4-6: Nelson's Definitions of a "Good" Education 
Educational Goals Included on Study Questionnaire 
Basic Education: One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic 
math skills 
Religious Education: One that provides students with strong values and strong religious 
beliefs 
Liberal Education: One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for 
themselves 
Vocational Education: One that prepares students to find a good job 
Civic Education: One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and 
shows respect for the laws of his/her country 
Table 4-7: Educational Goals Used on This Survey 
4.2.4 Q4: Do You Feel As If You Are/Were Able to Achieve the Type of Education that is 
Most Important to You? 
 Based upon the Muslim community's struggles to meet some of its demands in the 
education sector, the survey asked respondents whether they were able to achieve the type of 
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Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?  
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
South 
Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
14 
10.00% 
41 
29.29% 
35 
25.00% 
28 
20.00% 
22 
15.71% 
140 
White 
British, <30 
2 
4.17% 
2 
4.17% 
25 
52.09% 
15 
31.25% 
4 
8.33% 
48 
Total:  16 
8.51% 
43 
22.87% 
60 
31.91% 
43 
22.87% 
26 
13.83% 
188 
Table 4-8: Responses to Question 3 
education that was most important to them.  The question was answered by 140 South Asian 
Muslims and 48 White British respondents.  As seen in Table 4-12, the vast majority (90.43%) of 
respondents felt as if they were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to 
them.  A statistical test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates 
British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as White British respondents to have felt like 
they were able to achieve the type of education that was important to them (z = .23, p = .82). 
 However, within the Muslim sample, the achievement of one's educational goal was 
dependent upon the respondent's goal (p = .006, see Table 4-14).  Of the 49 British South Asian 
Muslims who claimed a liberal or basic education was the most important goal of an education, 
all claimed they were able to achieve it.  By contrast, 32 of the 41 (78%) Muslims who stated a 
religious education was their educational priority were able to achieve it. Of the 91 Muslims who 
favored a religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the 
type of education they valued most. 
4.2.5 Q5: Do You Feel as If You Have/Had as Much Access to Education as Anybody Else 
in the Country? 
 This was the first of the survey's four questions intended to gauge the respondents' 
perceptions of equality in British society.  The question was answered by 140 British South 
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Educational Goals Dependent Upon Ethnic Group 
Goal: Test to see whether educational goals were dependent upon ethnicity (British South 
Asian Muslim and White British) 
HO: Educational goals are independent of ethnicity  
H1: Education goals are dependent upon ethnicity  
Test Statistic:     
                    
        
= 22.891; p-value= .0001  
Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if    >   0.05,4 or 
9.488 
Conclusion: Since 22.891 > 9.488, we reject the null hypothesis.  There is enough evidence to 
claim education goals are dependent upon ethnicity.  Since the p-value is less than .001, there 
is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, 
the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level 
of .005 (14.860). 
 
 
Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Observed) 
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
14 
10.00% 
41 
29.29% 
35 
25.00% 
28 
20.00% 
22 
15.71% 
140 
White 
British, <30 
2 
4.17% 
2 
4.17% 
25 
52.09% 
15 
31.25% 
4 
8.33% 
48 
Total:  16 
8.51% 
43 
22.87% 
60 
31.91% 
43 
22.87% 
26 
13.83% 
188 
Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Expected) 
Expected Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocationa
l 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
South Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
11.91 32.02 44.68 32.02 19.36 
White 
British, <30 
4.09 10.09 15.32 10.98 6.64 
Table 4-9: Educational Goals Dependent upon Ethnic Group 
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British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British Respondents to Favor a 
Religious Education 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British 
respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of an education 
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1 > p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                         
                                   
   
                                                                      )   1 1 0 
                                                                    )     8 
   3.576; p-value= .0002 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z >1.645 
Conclusion: Since 3.576 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslim respondents were more likely than 
White British respondents to identify a religious education as their most important 
educational goal.  Since the p-value < .001, there is very strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large 
enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576). 
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified religious education as 
their most important educational goal, n*p is less than 5, but n*(1-p) is greater than 5.  
Table 4-10: British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British to Favor a Religious 
Education 
Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents.  163 (86.7%) of the respondents felt as if they 
had as much access to education as anyone else in the country.  While 10.42% of the White 
British respondents felt like they had less access to education, 14.29% of the British South Asian 
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Muslim respondents felt like they had less access.  Although a higher proportion of British South 
Asian Muslims felt as if they had less access to education, the difference in proportions was not 
statistically significant (z = .681, p = .25). 
White British Respondents More Likely than British South Asian Muslims to Favor a 
Liberal Education 
Goal: Test to see whether White British respondents were more likely than British South 
Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important goal of an education 
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1 > p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                   
                                         
                                                                 )   5  8 
   
                                                                    )  35 1 0 
   3.47; p-value= .0003 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null 
hypothesis is >1.645 
Conclusion: Since 3.47 > 1.640, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude White British respondents were more likely than British South 
Asian Muslim respondents to identify a liberal education as their most important 
educational goal.  Since the p-value is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against 
the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also 
large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).  
Table 4-11: White British Respondents More Likely than South Asian Muslims to Favor a 
Liberal Education 
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Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type 
of education that is most important to you? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, <30 
127 
90.71% 
13 
9.29% 
140 
White British, 
<30 
43 
89.58% 
5 
10.42% 
48 
Total:  170 
90.43% 
18 
9.57% 
188 
Table 4-12: Responses to Question 4 
 
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, <30 
120 
85.71% 
20 
14.29% 
140 
White British, 
<30 
43 
89.58% 
5 
10.42% 
48 
Total:  163 
86.70% 
25 
13.30% 
188 
Table 4-13: Responses to Question 5 
4.2.6 Q6: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Ethnic Background 
Have? 
 In addition to a question about the respondents' own access to education, the 
questionnaire asked respondents if they thought members of their ethnic background had equal 
access to education.  The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 
White British respondents.  While 3 (6.25%) of the White British respondents thought White 
Britons had less access than others to education, 48 (34.29%) of the British South Asian Muslims 
thought South Asians had less access.  A test for the difference in proportions indicates British 
South Asian Muslims were less likely than white respondents to think members of their ethnic 
background had equal access to education (z = -2.67, p = .0038) (see Table 4-19). 
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For British South Asian Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent Upon Goal 
Goal: Test to see whether achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the 
respondent's goal 
HO: Educational goals are independent of population  
H1: Education goals are dependent upon population  
Test Statistic:     
                    
        
= 7.408 (Yates); p-value= .006  
Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if    >   0.05,1 or 
3.841 
Conclusion: Since 7.408 > 3.841, we reject the null hypothesis.  There is enough evidence 
to claim achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the South Asian Muslim 
respondent's educational goal.  Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong 
evidence against the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test 
statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .01 
(6.635). 
Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is 
most important to you?  (Observed) 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Basic/Liberal/Vocational 
Education 
75 
97.4% 
2 
2.6% 
77 
55.00% 
Religious/Civic 
Education 
52 
82.54% 
11 
17.46% 
63 
45.00% 
Total:  127 
90.71% 
13 
9.29% 
140 
 
Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is 
most important to you?  (Expected) 
Expected Yes No 
Basic/Liberal/Vocational Education 69.85 7.15 
Religious/Civic Education 57.15 5.85 
Table 4-14: For Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent upon Their Goals 
4.2.7 Q7: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Religious Affiliation 
Have? 
 The third survey question related to equality in British society asked respondents whether 
they thought their coreligionists had equal access to education.  This question was answered by 
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139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents.  More than a quarter 
(40/139, 28.8%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had less access 
to education, while only one (2%) White British respondent, who described himself as a 
Christian, thought his coreligionists had less access to education.  A test for the difference in 
proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to think their coreligionists had equal access to education (z = -3.20, p = .0007) (see 
Table 4-20). 
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic 
background have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
48 
34.29% 
8 
5.71% 
84 
60.00% 
140 
White 
British, <30 
3 
6.25% 
6 
12.50% 
39 
81.25% 
48 
Total:  51 
27.13% 
14 
7.45% 
123 
65.43% 
188 
Table 4-15: Responses to Question 6 
How much access to education do most people of your religious 
affiliation have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
N/A Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, 
<30 
40 
28.78% 
8 
5.76% 
91 
65.47% 
0 
0.00% 
139 
White 
British, <30 
1 
2.08% 
1 
2.08% 
43 
89.58% 
3 
6.25% 
48 
Total:  41 
21.93% 
9 
4.81% 
134 
71.66% 
3 
1.60% 
187 
Table 4-16: Responses to Question 7 
4.2.8 Q8: Do You Personally Feel That You Are a Part of British Society? 
 Since 2001, Bradford's Muslim community has commonly been accused of segregating 
itself from "mainstream" British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006).  Peach (2006) has also 
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claimed the poor socioeconomic conditions of the British Muslim community isolate them from 
society.  As such, the survey asked respondents whether they felt as if they were part of British 
society.  The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British 
respondents.  The overwhelming majority of respondents (178/188, 94.68%) felt like they were 
part of British society.  Although a smaller proportion of Muslim respondents felt as if they were 
part of society, a test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates British 
South Asian Muslim respondents were just as likely as White British respondents to feel like 
they were part of British society (z = 1.16, p = .123). 
Do you personally feel that you are a part of British 
society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
South Asian 
Muslims, <30 
131 
93.57% 
9 
6.43% 
140 
White British, 
<30 
47 
97.92% 
1 
2.08% 
48 
Total:  178 
94.68% 
10 
5.32% 
188 
Table 4-17: Responses to Question 8 
4.2.9 Q9: Do You Personally Feel That You Are an Equal Member of British Society? 
 In addition to asking respondents to identify whether they felt like part of society, the 
survey asked respondents if they felt as if they were equal members of society.  The question was 
answered by 139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents.  While 131 
(93.57% ) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they were part of society, only 
112 (80.58%) thought they were equal members of society.  By contrast 45 (93.75%) of the 48 
White British respondents thought they were equal members of society.  As seen in Table 4-21, 
British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to feel like equal 
members of society (z = -2.144p = .016.).  
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Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of 
British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
South Asian Muslims, 
<30 
112 
80.58% 
27 
19.42% 
139 
White British, <30 45 
93.75% 
3 
6.25% 
48 
Total:  157 
83.96% 
30 
16.04% 
187 
Table 4-18: Responses to Question 9 
 
British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Think Members of 
their Ethnic Background Had Equal Access to Education 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to think that members of their ethnic background had equal access to education 
HO: p1 ≥ p2 
H1: p1 < p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                        
                                   
                                                                             
          )   8  1 0 
 
                                                                          
         )   39  8 
 
   -2.67; p-value= .0038 
 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z < -1.645 
Conclusion: Since -2.76 < - 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to think members of their ethnic background had equal access to education.  
Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis. 
Table 4-19: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British to Think Members of 
their Ethnicity Had Equal Access to Education 
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British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Think 
Their Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education 
Goal: Test to see whether South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to think members of their faith had equal access to education 
HO: p1 ≤ p2 
H1: p1 < p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                        
                                   
                                                                             
                         )   91 139 
                                                                           
                         )    3  8 
   -3.20; p-value= .0007 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z < -1.645 
Conclusion: Since -3.20 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to think that their coreligionists had equal access to education. Since the p-value 
is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  The test statistic 
(z) is also small enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (-
2.576).  
Table 4-20: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Think 
Their Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education 
4.3 Analysis and Discussion 
4.3.1 The Local, Religious, and National Identities of Bradford's Immigrant Muslim 
Community 
 In addition to the nine survey questions, the questionnaire asked respondents to describe 
themselves.  As seen in Table 4-22, the survey included a checklist with local, regional, and 
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British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Feel Like Equal 
Members of Society 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to see themselves as equal members of British society  
HO: p1 ≥ p2 
H1: p1 < p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                         
                                   
                                                                            
                )   11  139 
                                                                          
                )   5  8 
   -2.144; p-value= .016 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if  
z  < -1.645 
Conclusion: Since -2.144 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to feel like equal members of society.  Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, 
there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of 
the test, the test statistic (z) is also significant enough to reject the null hypothesis with a 
significance level of .025 (-1.960). 
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who perceived they were equal 
members of British society, n*p is greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5. 
Table 4-21: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely to Feel Like Equal Members of Society 
national identities which the respondents could choose.  It also included regional and national 
identities common to Bradford's immigrant communities.  In addition to the close-ended 
responses on the checklist, respondents had the option to write in other identities not listed on the 
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questionnaire. 
 Respondents were asked to describe themselves twice.  The first time, respondents were 
directed to select as many identities as applied.  The second time, respondents were instructed to 
select only one response.  The pairing of questions was designed to gain insight into the 
respondents' nested, or hyphenated, identities.  Forcing them to subsequently select only one 
identity was intended to determine the respondents' primary, or dominant, identities. 
Table 4-22: Identities Included on the Survey 
The National Identity of British South Asian Muslims 
 One of this study's primary objectives was to determine whether young British South 
Asian Muslims identified with the nation.  Figure 4-6 depicts the number of respondents who 
selected each identity on the checklist, and demonstrates the gambit of identities found amongst 
Bradford's South Asian Muslim community.  As hypothesized, most young British South Asian 
Muslim respondents identified with the nation.  When multiple identities were allowed, 105 of 
the 140 (75%) British South Asian Muslim respondents identified themselves as British or 
English. 
 A smaller sample collected elsewhere in Bradford also demonstrated the propensity for 
young British South Asian Muslims to identify with the nation; however, they were less likely 
than the respondents at the university to identify with the nation (z = -1.926, p = .0271).  Of 17 
British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who completed the survey elsewhere in 
 
How you describe yourself? (Choose all that apply)
 Asian      Atheist       Bangladeshi    Bradfordian    British    
 Buddhist   Christian     English       European      Hindu 
  Indian     Jewish       Jullunduri      Mirpuri       Muslim 
  Pakistani   Sikh          South Asian    Sylheti    
 Yorkshire(wo)man         Other_____________ 
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Bradford, only 9 (52.94%) described themselves as British or English.  It is thought the British 
South Asian Muslims at the university were more likely to identify with the nation because, as 
university students, they had probably enjoyed more opportunities than most other young 
Muslims in Bradford.  
 
Figure 4-6: Local, National, and Religious Identities (Multiple Responses Allowed) 
 While this study hypothesized most young British South Asian Muslims would identify 
with the nation, it was thought they would be less likely than white respondents to describe 
themselves as British or English.  Whereas 105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims at the 
university identified with the nation, 43 (93.75%) of 45 White British respondents described 
themselves as British or English.  As hypothesized, a test for the difference between the two 
population proportions demonstrates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White 
British respondents to identify with the nation (z = -2.730, p = .0032) (see Table 4-23). 
 As seen in Figure 4-6, this study also found British South Asian Muslims more 
commonly described themselves as British rather than English.  While 93 (66.4%) of the British 
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How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describe 
Themselves? (When Multiple Responses Allowed)  
n=140 
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South Asian Muslim respondents described themselves as British, only 31 (22.1%) described 
themselves as English.  By contrast, the study found White British respondents more commonly 
described themselves as English.  Of the 48 White British respondents at the university, 38 
(79.2%) described themselves as English, while 33 (68.8%) described themselves as British.  A 
test for the statistical difference between the two population proportions demonstrates White 
British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslims to describe themselves 
as English (z = 7.073, p < .0001). 
 This finding was subsequently corroborated by the 2011 Census of England and Wales 
that asked respondents about their national identity.  Geospatial analysis of the census shows 
White British Bradfordians identified more strongly with being English than British.  
Conversely, Pakistani Bradfordians identified more strongly with being British.  The bivariate 
maps in Figures 4-7 and 4-8 plot the White British population and where English and British 
identities were strongest in Bradford District.  In the census output areas with large white 
populations, English identity was the strongest while British identity was low.  In contrast, the 
bivariate maps in Figures 4-9 and 4-10 plot the Pakistani population and where English and 
British identities were the strongest.  In census output areas with high Pakistani populations, 
British identity was the strongest while English identity was low.  Linear regression confirms 
these relationships, as seen in Figures 4-11 and 4-12. 
 The propensity for British South Asian Muslims to more readily describe themselves as 
British suggests "British" is a more inclusive identity than "English", which likely has more 
ethnic and ancestral overtones.  As Colley (2009) has demonstrated how the British identity was 
able to subsume the English, Welsh, and Scottish under one national identity in the 18th century,  
so too has it been able to incorporate diverse immigrants in the 20th and 21st centuries.  Because  
 113 
 
British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify 
with the Nation 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to describe themselves as British or English  
HO: p1 ≥p2 
H1: p1 < p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                         
                                   
                                                                          ) 
   105 1 0 
                                                                        ) 
   5  8 
   -2.730 p-value= .0032 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if  
z  < -1.645 
Conclusion: Since -2.730 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to describe themselves as British or English.  Since the p-value is between .001 
and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance 
of the test, the test statistic (z) is also small enough to reject the null hypothesis with a 
significance level of .005 (-2.576). 
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified with the nation, n*p is 
greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5. 
Table 4-23: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify 
with the Nation 
a common national identity is thought to reduce both in-group bias and social tension, the British 
identity shared by both the South Asian and white communities will encourage those who seek to 
better integrate immigrant communities into British society. However, the ongoing process of  
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Figure 4-7: White British Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map) 
 
Figure 4-8: White British Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map) 
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Figure 4-9: Pakistani Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map) 
 
Figure 4-10: Pakistani Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map) 
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English Identity Dependent Upon Percent of White British Population in Output Area  
2011 Census 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
  Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.975683647 
R Square 0.951958578 
Adjusted R Square 0.951927097 
Standard Error 0.048721087 
Observations 1528 
 
 
ANOVA 
       df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 71.77789 71.77789 30238.25577 0 
Residual 1526 3.622334 0.002374 
  Total 1527 75.40022       
 
 
  
Coeffic-
ients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.18912 0.00296 63.841 0 0.1833 0.1949 0.1833 0.194 
Wh_BR_P. 0.68072 0.00391 173.89 0 0.6730 0.6884 0.6730 0.688 
 
Figure 4-11: English Identity Depends Upon Presence of White British Population 
 
y = 0.6807x + 0.1891 
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British Identity Dependent Upon Percent of Pakistani Population in Output Area 
2011 Census 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.898829014 
R Square 0.807893597 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.807767708 
Standard Error 0.066315257 
Observations 1528 
 
 
ANOVA 
       df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 28.22238 28.22238 6417.51451 0 
Residual 1526 6.710910 0.004397 
  Total 1527 34.93329       
 
 
  
Coeffic-
ients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.2549 0.002054 124.108 0 0.250907 0.2589 0.2509 0.258 
Pak_Per 0.5618 0.007014 80.1093 0 0.548094 0.5756 0.5480 0.575 
 
Figure 4-12: British Identity Depends Upon Presence of Pakistani Population 
y = 0.5619x + 0.2549 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
0% 50% 100% 
British 
Identity  
(% of Output 
Area) 
Pakistani Population as % of Output Area (Pak_Per) 
% of Output Area who 
Identified as British 
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devolution in the UK threatens this shared national identity as English, Scottish, and Welsh 
national identities become more salient amongst the white population. 
The British-Muslim Hyphenated Identity 
 Some within the Muslim community have claimed that Islam and British culture are 
incompatible.  Likewise, some have concluded that British and Muslim identities are 
irreconcilable.  For example, the Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which has a 
presence at the University of Bradford
3
, has claimed on its recruitment videos:  
Muslims in this country need to answer some very serious questions.  Where does their 
allegiance lie?... I think Muslims in this country need to take a long, hard look at 
themselves and decide what is their identity.  Are they British or are they Muslim?  I am 
Muslim. Where I live is irrelevant. (BBC News 2003) 
 
While some, like the HT, claim Muslim and British identities are mutually exclusive, this study 
found most Muslims at the university have reconciled these identities, laying claim to both.  Of 
the 124 British South Asian Muslims who described themselves as Muslim, 96 (77.4%) of them 
also described themselves as British or English. 
Muslim as the Dominant Identity 
 Allowing respondents to choose multiple identities revealed their nested, or hyphenated, 
identities.  To determine the respondents' dominant, or most important, identities, the survey 
forced respondents to select one identity.  Figure 4-13 depicts the number of British South Asian 
Muslim respondents who identified with each identity when they were forced to choose only 
one.  As hypothesized, the British South Asian Muslims' most important identity was their 
Muslim identity.  When forced to choose one identity, 78 (56.1%) of 139 British South Asian  
Muslims described themselves as Muslim.  Moreover, of the 96 British South Asian Muslims 
                                                          
3
 According to Rashad Ali, a former HT member who sat on its national leadership committee,  
the HT ran the University of Bradford's Islamic Society, a student organization that promotes 
Islam on campus and aims to act as the voice of Muslim student at the university(Ali 2008). 
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who described themselves as Muslim and either British or English, 58 (60.4%) subsequently 
described themselves as Muslim, while 25 (26%) described themselves as British or English.  Of 
note, one of the respondents refused to choose between the two identities, instead writing in 
"British-Muslim".  This probably indicates the presence of the unique hybrid identity that some 
Muslims, including Trevathan (2009), hope to create in Britain. 
 
Figure 4-13: Local, National, and Religious Identities (One Response Allowed)  
Continued Identification with South Asia 
 The study found young British South Asian Muslims continue to strongly identify with 
South Asia.  When multiple identities were allowed, this study found 124 (88.5%) of the 140 
British South Asian Muslims described themselves using at least one "Asian" identity (meaning 
they described themselves as Pakistani, Mirpuri, Sylheti, South Asian, Asian, Bangladeshi, 
Indian, or Jullunduri).  Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims in the study, 90 (64.3%) 
described themselves as Pakistani, while 77 (55%) described themselves as Asian.  This study 
also found local Pakistani identities remain important to the community, as 24 (17.1%) 
respondents described themselves as Mirpuri.  Although accounts of young British South Asian 
Muslims suggest their ties with South Asia are not as strong as those of their parents, family ties 
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How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describes 
Themselves? (When One Response Allowed) 
n=139 
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and visits to the subcontinent likely explain in part their continued identification with South 
Asia. 
 Although this study demonstrated young British South Asian Muslims still strongly 
identify with Asia, only 3 (2.1%) of the 140 British South Asian respondents described 
themselves as South Asian.  This is in keeping with Dash's (2008) study of South Asian 
regionalism that found the South Asian regional identity was still underdeveloped.  Dash found 
Pakistanis were the least likely of the five South Asian nationalities he studied (Bangladeshi, 
Indian, Nepali, Pakistani and Sri Lankan) to think of themselves as citizens of South Asia.  In his 
study, only 12% of Pakistanis saw themselves as "South Asian" (Dash 2008). 
4.3.2 Association between Equality and National Identity 
 It is commonly thought that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy 
equality in legal, civic, and political affairs (Smith 1991).  However, Shulman (2003) argues 
there is little empirical evidence to support the theory that equality promotes national identity.  In 
his own study, Shulman found poorer members of society were slightly more likely than 
wealthier members to identify with the nation.  
 Given Shulman's claim, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions 
of equality and national identity.  To do this, the questionnaire utilized four measures of equality.  
In addition to directly asking respondents whether they saw themselves as equal members of 
society, the survey asked them about their educational access, as well as the access of those 
within their ethnic and religious backgrounds.  Access to education was used as a key barometer 
of equality because of the known disparity in educational qualifications and opportunities in 
Bradford. 
 This study found perceptions of inequality and discrimination were high amongst the 
British South Asian Muslim population.  Nearly 1 in 5 (19.4%) young British South Asian 
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Muslim respondents saw themselves as unequal members of society, compared to just 3(6.3%) of 
the 48 White British respondents.  This study also found more than half (79/140, 56.4%) of the 
British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious 
backgrounds were discriminated against.
4
  By contrast, 10 (20.8%) of 48 White British 
respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds had been 
discriminated against. 
 Even though British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British 
respondents to identify with the nation, this study found an association between perceptions of 
inequality, or discrimination, and national identity.  It found those Muslims who saw themselves 
as equal members of society, or had not experienced discrimination, were more likely to identify 
with the nation.  British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they 
felt like they were equal members of society (z = 2.192, p = .0142), thought they had equal 
access to education (z = 1.673, p = .0472), or thought South Asians had equal access to education 
(z = 2.507, p = .0061).  Collectively, those who had not experienced or witnessed discrimination 
were also more likely to identify with the nation, as seen in Table 4-24.  This finding is in line 
with other studies, including studies by Loden (2008) and Robinson (2009) that found the 
absence of discrimination was key in determining whether immigrants identified with the nation.  
The key findings from the four tests for association are discussed below, but also summarized in 
Table 4-25. 
                                                          
4
 This represents respondents who felt they were unequal members of society, had less access to 
education, thought members of their ethnic background had less access to education or thought 
members of their religious background had less access to education 
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Table 4-24: Absence of Discrimination Promoted National Identity 
Equal Members of British Society and National Identity 
 As hypothesized, this study found British South Asian Muslims were generally less likely 
than White British respondents to identify with the nation (z = -2.730, p = .0032).  However, this 
study also found that British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of 
    
                                                         
                        
      
    
                                                     
                        
      
                                                                         
                                                                      
                                                        )   5  79 
Absence of Discrimination Promoted National Identity among Young British South 
Asian Muslims 
Goal: Test to see whether young British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or 
witnessed discrimination were more likely to identify with the nation 
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1 > p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                        )   51/61 
   2.0677; p-value= .0194 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z > 1.645 
Conclusion: Since 2.067> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or 
witnessed discrimination against members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds were 
more likely to identify with the nation than those who experienced or witnessed 
discrimination.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large 
enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960).  As the p value 
is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis. 
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Summary of Associations: Measures of Equality and National Identity (British South 
Asian Muslims Under 30 Years Old, University of Bradford) 
Measure of Equality Association Between 
Measure of Equality 
and National 
Identity? 
(significance level of α 
= .05) 
Key Finding (s) 
Perceived Equal Access to 
Education 
YES Of those who thought they had equal 
access to an education, 78% 
identified with the nation; 60% of 
those who thought they had unequal 
access identified with the nation 
Perceived Ethnicity Had 
Same Access to Education 
YES Of those who thought South Asians 
had equal access to an education, 
82% identified with the nation; 63% 
of those who thought South Asians 
had less access identified with the 
nation 
Perceived Coreligionists Had 
Same Access to Education 
NO Of those who thought Muslims had 
equal access to an education, 75% 
identified with the nation; 75% of 
those who thought Muslims had less 
access identified with the nation 
Perceived Self as Equal 
Member of British Society 
YES Of those who thought they were 
equal members of society, 79% 
identified with the nation; 59% of 
those who thought they were unequal 
identified with the nation 
Table 4-25: Summary of Associations between Measures of Equality and National Identity 
society more readily identified with the nation than those who thought they were unequal.  The 
study found 89 of the 112 (79.46%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who saw 
themselves as equal members of society identified with the nation.  By contrast, 16 of the 27 
(59.26%) British South Asian Muslims who felt like they were unequal members of society 
described themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-14).  As seen in Table 4-26, the 
difference in proportions is statistically significant, demonstrating those who see themselves as 
equal members of society are more likely to identify with the nation (z = 2.192, p = .0142).  
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Figure 4-14: Equal Member of Society and National Identity 
 
Equal Access to Education and National Identity 
 As seen in Table 4-27, this study found British South Asian Muslim respondents who 
thought they had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than 
those who thought they had unequal access (z = 1.673, p = .0472).  The study found 93 of the 
120 (77.50%) British South Asian Muslims who felt as if they had equal access to education 
identified with the nation.  By contrast, 12 of the 20 (60%) British South Asian Muslim 
respondents who thought they had unequal access described themselves as British or English 
(see Figure 4-15). 
Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity 
 As seen in Table 4-28, this study found British South Asian Muslims who thought South 
Asians had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation (z = 2.507, p = 
.0061).  The study found 69 of the 84 (82.14%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who 
thought South Asians had equal access to education identified with the nation.  By contrast, 30 of 
the 48 (62.5%) British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had less access to 
education identified themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-16). 
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British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Were Equal Members of Society were 
More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal 
members of society were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those 
who thought they were unequal  
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1 > p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                                      
      
                                                                       
     
                                                                    
       
                  )   89 11  
                                                                   
       
                  )   1   7 
   2.192; p-value= .0142 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z > 1.645 
Conclusion: Since 2.192> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal 
members of society were more likely to identify with the nation than those who did not feel 
like equal members of society. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate 
evidence against the null hypothesis.  The test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the 
null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960). 
Table 4-26: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they were Equal Members of Society 
were More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity 
 Although 40 (29%) of 139 British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had 
less access to an education, it had no bearing on their identification with the nation.  The study 
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 British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Had Equal Access to Education were 
More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to 
an education were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those who 
thought they had less access 
HO: p1 ≤p2 
H1: p1 > p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
        
                                                    
                         
      
    
                                                               
                   
      
                                                                         
                              )   93 1 0 
                                                                          
                                      )   1   0 
   1.673; p-value= .0472 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of  .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z  > 1.645  
Conclusion: Since 1.673 is > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to 
education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought they had less 
access to education.  Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence 
against the null hypothesis. 
Table 4-27: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they had Equal Access to Education 
More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
found 68 (74.73%) of the 91 British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought Muslims had 
equal access to education identified with the nation.  By contrast, 30 (75%) of the 40 British 
South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education described themselves as 
British or English (see Figure 4-17).  As seen in Table 4-29, the difference between the  
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British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians Had Equal Access to 
Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had the 
same access to education were more likely to identify with  the nation than those who 
thought South Asians had less access  
HO: p1 = p2 
H1: p1  p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
           Size, British South Asian Muslims who Felt Like Ethnic Group Had Same 
Access)  = 84 
                                                                         
                
                                                                          
                                                         )   9 8  
                                                                              
                                                  )  30  8 
   2.507; p-value= .0061 
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null 
hypothesis if z > 1.645 
Conclusion: Since 2.507 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.  At the 5% level of 
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had equal 
access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought 
South Asians had less access to education. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is 
strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  Demonstrating the significance of the test, the 
test statistic (z) is large enough to also reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of 
.001 (2.326). 
Table 4-28: British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians had Equal Access to 
Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation 
population proportions was not statistically significant (z =-.033, p = .9737).  As a result, this 
study concluded British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education 
were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had equal access. 
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National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access to 
Education 
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access 
to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had 
less access 
HO: p1 = p2 
H1: p1  p2 
Test Statistic:    
       
          
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
            ize, British South Asian Muslims who Thought Most Muslims Had Equal 
Access) = 91 
                                                                     
                 
                                                                    
                                           )   8 91 
                                                                   
                                          )  30  0 
   -.033; p-value= .9737 
Decision Rule: Two-tail test, for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if z 
< - 1.960 or > 1.960 
Conclusion: Since -.033 is not less than -1.960, we do not reject the null hypothesis.  At the 
5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims 
had equal access to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who 
thought Muslims had less access.  Since the p-value is greater than .1, there is little evidence 
against the null hypothesis.  
Table 4-29: National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access 
to Education 
4.3.3 Acculturation: Integration, Assimilation, Separation and Marginalization 
 Berry (1997) claims immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies when 
interacting with others in their host society. Depending on how immigrants value both 
maintaining their own cultural identities and having relations with members of the host society, 
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Figure 4-15: Equal Access to Education and National Identity 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-16: Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-17: Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity 
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immigrants can choose one of four strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or 
marginalization (Berry 1997).  A matrix depicting how these values and strategies intersect is 
seen in Figure 4-18.  Immigrants who want to maintain their own cultural identities as well as 
interact with the host society tend to integrate, while those who only value relations with the 
larger society tend to assimilate.  Conversely, those who emphasize the maintenance of their own 
cultural identities without desiring to interact with the host society tend to seek segregation.  
Those immigrants who neither seek to maintain their own cultural identities nor adopt those of 
the host society pursue marginalization. 
 
(Berry 1997) 
Figure 4-18: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry 
 Over the years, Muslims in Bradford have been accused of segregating themselves from 
"mainstream" British society.  Indeed, the building up and clustering of Asian businesses, shops, 
restaurants, schools, places of worship, and funeral homes allows the city's South Asian 
communities, if they so choose, to go from cradle to grave without the need to meaningfully 
interact with the majority white population.  Despite ethnic clustering in Bradford, Phillips 
(2006) argues the city's Muslim community wants to be better integrated into British society.  
She, like Kundnani (2001), argues the city's ethnic clustering is due to institutional 
discrimination in the housing market as well as the Muslims' desire for the support and 
protection associated with living near other South Asians.  
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 To determine whether the Muslim community in Bradford more commonly demonstrates 
indicators of integration or segregation, this study adapted Berry's matrix to see which 
acculturation strategies were being employed by young Muslims in the city.  In this analysis, 
respondents were assessed to have pursued integration if they described themselves using 
identities associated with both the immigrant community and British society.  Those respondents 
who described themselves using only "local" identities were assessed to have pursued 
assimilation, while respondents who identified themselves using only identities common to the 
immigrant community were assessed to have adopted a strategy of segregation.  Lastly, those 
respondents who did not use identities common to either British society or the immigrant 
community were assessed to have pursued marginalization.  Table 4-30 depicts how the 
acculturation  strategy of each respondent was inferred based upon their descriptions of 
themselves. 
 
Picture 4-1: Example of the businesses serving the Muslim community in Bradford, Muslim 
Funeral Service on Darfield Street (Reid, 2010) 
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Picture 4-2: Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam Central Mosque, built in 1995.  The mosque sits off Lumb 
Lane, opposite the Muslim Funeral Service pictured above and less than 500m from the Pakistani 
Consulate (Reid, 2010) 
 
Picture 4-3: Another example of the businesses serving the Muslim community, Raja's Pizza 
serves samposas and the "Tastiest Halal Pizza Ever" (Reid, 2010) 
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Picture 4-4: South Asian females walking down terraced street in Manningham where Muslims 
constitute the majority.  Muslims claim they continue to live in Muslim enclaves because of the 
mutual support it provides (Reid, 2010) 
 Analysis of the survey data reveals most British South Asian Muslims at the university 
have integrated into British society.  Of the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents, 114 
(81.4%) described themselves using identities associated with both the immigrant community 
and British society.  Separation, or segregation, was the second most common strategy observed, 
and was seen in 22 (15.7%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents.  Assimilation, or the 
adoption of only British identities, was identified in only 4 (2.9%) of the respondents.  None of 
the respondents exhibited traits of marginalization. 
 A smaller sample of surveys collected elsewhere in Bradford revealed similar proportions 
amongst young British South Asian Muslims in the city.  Of 17 young British South Asian 
Muslims surveyed elsewhere in Bradford, 11 (64.7%) showed signs of integration, while 5 
( 9. %) demonstrated signs of segregation.  Using a significance level of α   .05, a chi-square 
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test for independence confirmed that the acculturation strategies were not statistically different 
(x
2
 = 1.314 with Yates correction, p = .2516).  This suggests the acculturation strategies seen at 
the university are probably representative of those in the city's wider South Asian Muslim 
community. 
 These study results differed from those in Robinson's (2009) study of Pakistani Muslim 
and Indian Hindu adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester.  While Robinson found Indian 
adolescents favored integration, she found separation was the most common acculturation 
strategy amongst Pakistani adolescents.  The differing results may be due to differences in the 
study populations.  Robinson conducted her study amongst secondary school students, while this 
study focused on university students and other university-aged respondents.  
4.3.4 Education and the British South Asian Muslim Community in Bradford 
 Bradford's Muslim population has achieved a disproportionately low level of educational 
qualifications.  In 2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had none 
(Office for National Statistics 2001c).  Factors known to contribute to the Muslim community's 
lack of qualifications include their extended absences from school and limited proficiency in 
English (Lewis 2007).  The socio-economic conditions of the earliest Muslim immigrants has 
also been cited as a contributing factor, as has the first immigrants' emphasis on work over 
education as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010). 
 Because education was not emphasized at first by the earliest South Asian Muslim 
immigrants to Bradford, this study sought to test claims that education has since become more 
valued as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010).  If a continued undervaluation of education 
was found, it would help to further explain the community's education gap.  However, this study 
found the vast majority of British South Asian Muslim respondents valued education.  Of 137 
British South Asian Muslim respondents, 122 (89%) claimed education was emphasized "a fair 
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Integration Assimilation 
Identities 
Commonly 
Associated with 
Immigrant 
Community 
Asian 
Bangladeshi 
Indian 
Jullunduri 
Mirpuri 
Muslim 
Pakistani 
South Asian 
Sylheti 
 
& 
Identities 
Commonly 
Associated with 
British Society 
 
British 
Bradfordian 
English 
European 
Yorkshireman 
Identities Commonly Associated with British 
Society 
 
 
 
British 
Bradfordian 
English 
European 
Yorkshireman 
 
Count (Percentage) 
114/140 (81.4%) 
Count (Percentage) 
4/140 (2.9%) 
Separation/Segregation Marginalization 
Identities Commonly Associated with 
Immigrant Community 
Asian 
Bangladeshi 
Indian 
Jullunduri 
Mirpuri 
Muslim 
Pakistani 
South Asian 
Sylheti 
 
Identities Not Commonly Associated with 
Immigrant Community or British Society 
 
 
 
 
Other 
Count (Percentage) 
22/140 (15.7%) 
Count (Percentage) 
0/140 (0.00%) 
Table 4-30: Identities Used to Infer Acculturation Strategies 
amount" or "a lot" in their families.  Moreover, 129 (96.3%) of 134 British South Asian Muslim 
respondents intended to emphasize education "a fair amount" or "a lot" to their children.   
 One might expect most university students to have had education emphasized to them, 
regardless of their ethnic or religious background.  However, this study found British South 
Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed 
"a lot" to them by their families (z = 2.39, p = .0084).  Demonstrating the value of an education 
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to the Muslim community, more than 55% of the British South Asian Muslim respondents at the 
university had education emphasized "a lot" to them, while only 35% of the White British 
respondents at the university had education stressed "a lot" to them in their youth. 
 Because most Muslims in Bradford have no educational qualifications, the sample at the 
university may not have represented the wider Muslim community's views on education.  
However, the surveys conducted elsewhere in Bradford suggest education is probably valued by 
most Muslim families in the city.  Of 24 surveys completed by British South Asian Muslims 
elsewhere in Bradford, 21 (87.5%) indicated education was stressed to them "a fair amount" or 
"a lot" while growing up.  Using a significance level of α   .05, a two-tailed statistical test for the 
difference in population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims elsewhere in 
Bradford were just as likely as those at the university to have had education stressed "a fair 
amount" or "a lot" in their youth (z = .222, p = .824).  This suggests the level of emphasis placed 
upon an education by the families of university students likely mirrors the emphasis that the 
wider Muslim community places upon an education.  
 This study also explored the educational demands, or preferred goals, of Bradford's 
Muslim community.  Based upon Nelson's (2003) study in Rawalpindi that demonstrated 
Pakistani families favored civic and religious educations, this study hypothesized that the 
educational goals of Bradford's Muslim community would differ from those of the White British 
majority.  It was thought the British South Asian Muslims' goals would reflect the findings in 
Nelson's study. 
 As in Nelson's study in Pakistan, the most common educational goal identified by British 
South Asian Muslims in Bradford was a religious education, defined as an education that 
provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs.  In this study, 41 (29.29%) of 
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the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents identified a religious education as being the 
most important goal of an education.  A liberal education, defined in this study as an education 
that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves, was the second most 
common response, and was identified as a priority by 35 (25%) of the British South Asian 
Muslim respondents. 
 By contrast, a liberal education was the priority for the majority of White British 
respondents.  This study found more than half (25/48, 52.09%) of the White British respondents 
identified a liberal education as the most important goal of an education.  Furthermore, only 2 
(4.17%) of the white respondents claimed a religious education was their educational priority. 
 The white respondents' preference for a liberal education corresponds with the stated 
aims of the National Curriculum.  While the National Curriculum is designed to reflect and 
incorporate Britain's minority populations, including allowance for their religious education, the 
Curriculum is ultimately designed to pass on the knowledge and values of society as influenced 
primarily by the majority population.  In this case, the basis of the National Curriculum is a 
liberal education as championed by the Victorian school inspector and literary Matthew Arnold 
(1822-1888), who was the first to propose a national curriculum in England (Conway 2010).  It 
was Arnold's belief that a liberal education was the most important goal of an education, 
superseding religious, civic and vocational aims, as he argued: 
The aim and office of instruction, say many people, is to make a man a good citizen, or a 
good Christian or a gentleman; or it is to fit him to get on in the world, or it is to enable 
him to do his duty in the state of life to which he is called. It is none of these, and the 
modern spirit more and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best secondary 
and indirect aims of instruction; its prime direct aim is to enable a man to know himself 
     h  w    … T  k  w h m   f,   m   m    k  w  h    p  ilities and performances of 
 h  h m    p    ;      h  v      f  h  h m       …     h       ff     f    h   p  p       
     p              f    h         m    … But it is also a vital and formative knowledge 
to know the world, the laws which govern nature, and man as a part of nature. (Italics 
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added for emphasis)(Conway 2010) 
Despite the inclusion of religious and civic education in the current curriculum, a liberal 
education still forms the basis of the National Curriculum today.   
 Based upon the findings in this study, it is suggested that the differing educational goals 
of the white and immigrant Muslim communities may contribute to the latter's limited 
educational qualifications.  The National Curriculum, with a liberal education as its foundation, 
may not appeal to those with differing educational goals, particularly if they feel like they are 
unable to achieve them in state schools.  All 49 of the British South Asian Muslim respondents 
who claimed a liberal or basic education was their most important educational goal said they 
were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to them.  By contrast, 32 
(78%) of the 41 Muslim respondents who stated a religious education was their top educational 
priority claimed they were able to achieve their goal.  Of the 91 Muslims who favored a 
religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the type of 
education they valued most. 
 While the National Curriculum includes some provision for religious education, if the 
Muslim students' demands for it are not being met in state schools, they have other options, 
including seeking out a religious education in one of Bradford's increasing number of madrassas 
and independent Muslim schools.  As of 2013, an estimated 9,000 children in Bradford attended 
a madrasa at least one hour several days a week, while Lewis (2007) claims they commonly 
spend several hours each school day in a madrasa.  In 2013, roughly 1,000 children also attended 
an independent Muslim school in Bradford (Economist 2013a). 
 The pursuit of studies at the madrassas, though highly desired by Muslim families, may 
actually contribute to the community's low level of educational qualifications.  Lewis (2007) has 
argued the time that Bradford's Muslim youth spend in the city's madrassas disrupts their 
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mastery of English, which, in turn, has been observed to contribute to the Muslim community's 
underachievement at school (Crace 2004; Katz 2002).  The very time being spent in the 
madrassas may also affect the students' performance at school if it subtracts from the time they 
have available to do their other schoolwork.  While this may be the case, further research is 
required to determine if there is a relationship between time spent at the madrasa and the 
students' performance at school.   
 Although this study found 9 (22%) of the 41 British South Asian Muslim respondents 
who favored a religious education felt like they were unable to achieve it, the survey did not 
include follow-up questions to determine why their educational goals were not being met.  
Despite the provision of some religious education in state schools, it is possible their goals were 
not realized because of the National Curriculum's primary focus on a liberal education.  
Alternatively, it is just as likely their goals went unfulfilled because of the identified 
shortcomings in the education provided by Bradford's madrassas. 
 The quality of education provided in Bradford's madrassas is said to be improving; 
nevertheless, many of them reportedly offer their students only a very basic knowledge of Islam.  
A 2013 study by Bradford's Council of Mosques concluded many of the city's madrassas have 
only a "very narrow understanding of faith education," and are largely limited to assisting their 
students to identify and read Qur'anic text, memorize the five pillars of Islam, and pray (Council 
for Mosques 2013).  The Council's study also highlighted the language barrier that is commonly 
found in the city's madrassas.  Although English is the primary language of many of the city's 
youth, the teachers at the madrassas are commonly brought in from Pakistan and frequently have 
little or no command of the language.  The linguistic and cultural barriers between teacher and 
student most likely limits the students' ability to learn and fully place into context the material 
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being taught.  The poor learning environment reported in many of the city's madrassas may 
explain why some of the participants who favored a religious education also claimed they were 
unable to attain it.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for Further Study 
5.1 Key Findings and Implications 
Key Findings 
 This study's primary objectives were to determine whether British South Asian Muslims 
in Bradford identified with the nation and felt like they were equal members of British society.  
In so doing, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions of equality and 
national identity.  Although the association between the two is commonly accepted in theory, 
Shulman (2003) has argued there is little empirical data to support the theoretical link between 
them.  Table 5-1 provides a summary of the study's findings, while Table 5-2 summarizes how 
the study's hypotheses were borne out by the study results. 
 As hypothesized, this study found most young British South Asian Muslims identified 
with the nation.  Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who participated in 
the study at the University of Bradford, 105 (75%) described themselves as British or English.  
Importantly, this study also found an association between perceptions of equality and national 
identity.  The British South Asian Muslims who participated in this study were more likely to 
identify with the nation if they felt like they were equal members of society (z = 2.192, p = 
.0142), thought they had equal access to education (z = 1.673, p = .0472), or thought South 
Asians had equal access to education (z = 2.507, p = .0061). 
Implications 
Finding an association between equality and national identity adds a layer of empirical 
data to the literature to support Deutsch’s theory (19  ) that equality promotes national identity.  
More importantly, it has implications for policymakers, stakeholders, and community 
powerbrokers who have worked to promote social cohesion in Bradford following outbreaks of 
ethnic tension and violence in the city.  Because a shared national identity is thought to reduce 
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in-group bias and promote social cohesion, promoting equality and highlighting, or publicizing, 
the British Muslims' identification with the nation may help to reduce social tension in the city.   
Because the Conservative government has also linked "home grown" extremism to a lack 
of the immigrants' integration at the local and national level, publicizing the Muslim 
community’s attachment to the nation as identified in this study may also help to refute the 
commonly held misconception that the British Muslim community does not identify with the 
nation.  Disputing these misperceptions is important because participants in the study identified 
negative representations of the Muslim community in the media as having contributed to their 
sense of exclusion from British society.  
By 2020, it is projected that 50% of Bradford’s population will be under  5 years old 
(University of Bradford 2013).  The quickly changing demographics in Bradford will have major 
implications for policymakers, not in the least in the education sector.  With emerging choices in 
the city’s education market as a result of the opening of independent Muslim schools, 
policymakers will need to consider the educational preferences and demands of the community 
when allocating scarce resources.  This study provides invaluable insight into the educational 
priorities of the city’s Muslim community. While a liberal education, which is the cornerstone of 
the existing National Curriculum, is important to the Muslim community, so too are religious and 
vocational educations.  Educators and policymakers will need to find innovative ways to 
incorporate these demands into the education that is offered in Bradford-area schools.  Better 
addressing and incorporating the community’s demands in the education sector would probably 
encourage further community involvement and buy-in, which may increase qualification 
attainment rates as a result.  Conversely, failure to consider the community’s educational 
priorities could work at cross-purposes with government efforts to integrate the community by 
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giving them the impression they are being excluded from the education sector as has happened in 
the past.  It might also lead to higher enrollment in the city’s Muslim schools, which could 
disrupt government efforts to better integrate the Muslim community if British South Asian 
Muslim and White British children have even less interaction as a result. 
5.2 Suggestions for Further Study 
 This study concluded a religious education was a priority for Muslims in Bradford.  
The time Muslim youth spend in the city's madrassas may contribute to the 
community's qualification gap if it detracts from their course work.  However, further 
studies are necessary to determine if there is a relationship between the time being 
spent in the madrasa and the Muslim community's performance at school. 
 This study found Muslim respondents who favored a basic or liberal education were 
able to achieve their educational demands.  However, those who favored a religious 
education were less likely to feel as if they had been able to achieve the type of 
education they valued most.  Further research is required to determine why they are 
not achieving their educational goal.  Possibilities include the National Curriculum's 
focus on a liberal education and the identified shortcomings in the city's madrassas. 
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Research Question 
Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under 
30 Years Old at the University of Bradford 
Do British South Asian 
Muslims in Bradford identify 
with the nation? Do they 
identify themselves as English 
or British? 
105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified 
with the nation, describing themselves as British or English; 
93(66%) described themselves as British and 31(22%) 
described themselves as English 
  
What are the British South 
Asian Muslims dominant, or 
most important, identities? 
When forced to select only one identity, the three most 
common identities were: Muslim (78, 56%), British (26, 
19%), and Pakistani (13, 9%).  Of 96 respondents who 
described themselves as Muslim and identified with the 
nation, 58 (60%) subsequently described themselves as 
Muslim, and 25 (26%) as British or English 
  
Is there an association 
between perceptions of 
equality and national 
identity? 
Using a significance level of α   .05, those who thought 
they were equal members of society were more likely to 
identify with the nation (p = .0142). Those who thought 
they had equal access to education were also more likely to 
identify with the nation (p = .0472), as were those who 
thought South Asians had equal access to an education  
(p = .0061)  
  
Is education important to 
young British South Asian 
Muslims, and what are their 
educational goals? Have they 
been able to achieve the type 
of education that is most 
important to them? 
Nearly 9 in 10 British South Asian Muslim respondents 
claimed education was stressed to them a "fair amount" or a 
"lot" while growing up.  The British South Asian Muslims' 
educational goals differed from those of the White British 
respondents.  The most common goal identified by British 
South Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education 
(41, 29%), followed by liberal (35, 25%), vocational (28, 
20%), civic (22, 16%), and basic (14, 10%) educations.  All 
of those who identified a liberal or basic education claimed 
they were able to achieve it; 32 (78%) of 41 respondents 
who favored a religious education felt like they were unable 
to achieve their educational goal  
  
What acculturation strategies 
have been adopted by young 
British South Asian Muslims 
in Bradford? Have they 
integrated into British 
society? 
114 (81%) British South Asian Muslims demonstrated 
indicators of integration, having described themselves with 
identities common to both the immigrant community and 
British society. Separation, or segregation, was identified in 
22 (15.7%) respondents, while 4 (2.9%) of the respondents 
demonstrated signs of assimilation. 
 
Table 5-1: Research Questions (Conclusions) 
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Hypothesis 
Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under 30 
Years Old at the University of Bradford 
Most young British South 
Asian Muslims would 
identify with the nation, but 
they would be less likely than 
white respondents to identify 
with the nation 
105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified 
with the nation; however, 45 (94%) of 48 white British 
respondents identified with the nation. Using a significance 
level of α   .05, a test for the difference in the population 
proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less 
likely than white respondents to identify with the nation (p = 
.0026) 
  
Most young British South 
Asian Muslims would 
identify with the nation, but 
their identity as Muslim 
would be the more dominant 
identity 
105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified 
with the nation.  Of 96 respondents who described 
themselves as Muslim and identified with the nation, 58 
(60%) subsequently described themselves as Muslim, and 25 
(26%) as British or English 
  
Young British South Asian 
Muslims would be less likely 
than non-Muslims to see 
themselves as equal members 
of society 
112 (81%) of 139 British South Asian Muslims claimed they 
thought of themselves as equal members of society, 
compared to 45 (93.75%) of 48 White British respondents.  
Using a significance level of α   .05, a test for the difference 
in the population proportions indicates British South Asian 
Muslims were less likely than white respondents to feel like 
equal members of British society (p = .016).  British South 
Asian Muslims were also more likely than white respondents 
to feel as if they or those of their ethnic or religious 
background were discriminated against (p < .0001)  
  
Young British South Asian 
Muslims who saw themselves 
as equal members of society 
would be more likely to 
identify with the nation than 
those Muslims who saw 
themselves as unequal 
members of society 
89 (79%) of 112 British South Asian Muslims who thought 
of themselves as equal members of society identified with 
the nation.  By contrast, 16 (59%) of 27 British South Asian 
Muslims who did not feel like equal members of society 
identified with the nation. Using a significance level of α   
.05, those who thought they were equal members of society 
were more likely to identify with the nation (p = .0142)  
  
The educational goals of 
young British South Asian 
Muslims would differ from 
those of the young white 
respondents 
While the most common educational goal of British South 
Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education 
(41/140, 29%), 25 (52%) of 48 White British respondents 
favored a liberal education.  A chi-square test for 
independence demonstrates educational goals are dependent 
upon ethnic group (p = .0001) 
Table 5-2: Study's Hypotheses (Conclusions) 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  Major Attacks, Attempted Attacks, and Terror Plots in the UK Involving 
British Muslim Immigrants since 2001 
Date of 
Attack Target 
Type of 
Attack Casualties 
7/7/2005 
Public 
Transportation in 
London 
4 x PBIEDs 
56 Killed, including 4 Bombers 
~700 Injured 
7/21/2005 
Public 
Transportation in 
London  
5 x PBIEDs 1 Injured 
6/30/2007 
Glasgow 
International 
Airport 
1 x VBIED 
1 Killed (Bomber) 
5 Injured 
5/10/2010 
MP Stephen 
Timms 
Attempted 
Assassination 
1 Injured (MP Timms) 
5/22/2013 British Soldier Murder 1 Killed (Drummer Lee Rigby) 
 
Date Plot 
Disrupted Intended Target Type of Attack 
09/03/2004 
Sites in the UK and US, including 
NYSE, IMF, World Bank 
VBIEDs (Limousines), "Dirty 
Bomb" 
8/9/2006 10  x Transatlantic Flights PBIEDs, "Liquid Bombs" 
01/31/2007 British Muslim Soldier Abduction, Murder 
12/20/2010 
US Embassy in London, London 
Stock Exchange, and Home of 
London Mayor; Mumbai style attack 
on Parliament 
IEDs 
11/2011 
Civilians in supermarkets and town 
centers 
11 x PBIEDs 
4/23/2012 Luton Territorial Army Base VBIED 
7/3/2012 
English Defense League rally on 30 
June 2012 in Dewsbury 
IEDs 
7/5/2012 
Royal Wooten Bassett, British 
Security Services 
IEDs, Assassinations 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device; PBIED: Person-borne IED;  
VBIED: Vehicle-borne IED 
 
Date of 
Attempted 
Attack Target Type of Attack 
12/22/2001 Transatlantic Flight PBIED 
6/29/2007 Night Clubs in London 2 x VBIEDs 
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Appendix B. Count of Respondents by Country of Citizenship 
 
Country/Territory # of 
Respondents 
 Country/Territory # of 
Respondents 
 
United Kingdom 359  Bangladesh 1  
Other/Not 
Identified 
23  Belgium 1  
India 18  Brazil 1  
Nigeria 17  Denmark 1  
Pakistan 17  Egypt 1  
China 10  France 1  
Malaysia 10  Gambia 1  
Lithuania 7  Hong Kong 1  
Latvia 5  Iran 1  
Libya 5  Italy 1  
Ireland 3  Jordan 1  
United States 3  Kuwait 1  
Vietnam 3  Malawi 1  
Botswana 2  Mexico 1  
Eritrea 2  Poland 1  
Germany 2  Portugal 1  
Ghana 2  Refugee 1  
Greece 2  Romania 1  
Iraq 2  Russia 1  
Kenya 2  South Africa 1  
Norway 2  St. Lucia 1  
Oman 2  Tanzania 1  
Saudi Arabia 2  The Netherlands 1  
Zimbabwe 2  Uganda 1  
Australia 1  Zambia 1  
Austria 1  Total 529  
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Appendix C. Responses of All UK Citizens 
Q1. Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family? 
The question was answered by 355 of the 359 respondents.  
 
 
a. Q1: By Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at All, 13 
Very Little, 41 
A Fair Amount, 
134 
A Lot, 167, 
47% 
Q1: Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your 
Family? 
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot Total 
Male 5 
2.48% 
24 
11.88% 
78 
38.61% 
95 
47.03% 
202 
Female 8 
5.23% 
17 
11.11% 
56 
36.60% 
72 
47.06% 
153 
Total:  13 
3.66% 
41 
11.55% 
134 
37.75% 
167 
47.04% 
355 
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b. Q1: By Age 
 
c. Q1: By Ethnicity 
 
 
 
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
1 
1.22% 
6 
7.32% 
32 
39.02% 
43 
52.44% 
82 
20-29 Years 
Old 
7 
3.95% 
17 
9.60 
66 
37.29% 
87 
49.15% 
177 
30-39 Years 
Old 
3 
7.69% 
5 
12.82% 
17 
43.59% 
14 
35.90% 
39 
40-49 Years 
Old 
2 
5.71% 
7 
20.00% 
13 
37.14% 
13 
37.14 
35 
50-59 Years 
Old 
0 
0.00% 
6 
35.29% 
4 
25.53% 
7 
41.18% 
17 
Over 60 
Years Old 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
40.00% 
3 
60% 
5 
Total:  13 
3.66% 
41 
11.55% 
134 
37.75% 
167 
47.04% 
355 
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
0 
0.00% 
4 
50.00% 
0 
0.00% 
4 
50.00% 
8 
Asian 8 
4.08% 
17 
8.67% 
64 
32.65% 
107 
54.59 
196 
Black 0 
0.00% 
1 
9.09% 
3 
27.27% 
7 
63.64% 
11 
Mixed 0 
0.00% 
1 
9.09% 
4 
36.36% 
6 
54.55% 
11 
Other 1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
3 
White 4 
3.17% 
18 
14.29% 
62 
49.21% 
42 
33.33% 
126 
Total:  13 
3.66% 
41 
11.55% 
134 
37.75% 
167 
47.04% 
355 
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d. Q1: By Religion 
 
Q2. How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, 
plan to stress education to them?  
The question was answered by 348 of the 359 respondents.  
 
Not at All, 6 
Very Little, 7 
A Fair 
Amount, 102 
A Lot, 215 
I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children, 18 
Q2: How much do you stress education to your 
children? 
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family? 
Count 
Row % 
Not At All Very Little 
A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot Total 
Buddhist 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
100% 
1 
Christian 
2 
2.82% 
13 
18.31% 
30 
42.25% 
26 
36.62% 
71 
Hindu 
1 
4.76% 
3 
14.29% 
5 
23.81% 
12 
57.14% 
21 
Muslim 
6 
3.16% 
18 
9.47% 
63 
33.16% 
103 
54.21% 
190 
Sikh 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
2 
66.67% 
3 
Other 
2 
25.00% 
1 
12.50% 
3 
37.50% 
2 
25.00% 
8 
No Religion 
2 
3.28% 
6 
9.84% 
32 
52.46% 
21 
34.43% 
61 
Total:  
13 
3.66% 
41 
11.55% 
134 
37.75% 
167 
47.04% 
355 
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a. Q2: By Gender 
 
b. Q2: By Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, 
plan to stress education to them?  
Count 
Row % Not At All Very Little 
A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot 
I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children 
Total 
Male 
0 
0.00% 
2 
1.02% 
59 
29.95% 
129 
65.48% 
7 
3.55% 
197 
Female 
6 
3.97% 
5 
3.31% 
43 
28.48% 
86 
56.95% 
11 
7.28% 
151 
Total:  
6 
1.72% 
7 
2.01% 
102 
29.31% 
215 
61.78% 
18 
5.17% 
348 
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, 
plan to stress education to them? 
Count 
Row % Not At All Very Little 
A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot 
I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children 
Total 
16-19 
Years Old 
1 
1.23% 
1 
1.23% 
26 
32.10% 
50 
61.73% 
3 
3.70% 
81 
20-29 
Years Old 
3 
1.75% 
3 
1.75% 
56 
32.75% 
107 
62.57% 
2 
1.17% 
171 
30-39 
Years Old 
0 
0.00 
1 
2.56% 
9 
23.08% 
24 
61.54% 
5 
12.82% 
39 
40-49 
Years Old 
1 
2.94% 
2 
5.88% 
6 
17.65% 
19 
55.88% 
6 
17.65% 
34 
50-59 
Years Old 
1 
5.56% 
0 
0.00 
4 
22.22% 
11 
61.11% 
2 
11.11% 
17 
Over 60 
Years Old 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
20.00% 
4 
80.00% 
0 
0.00 
5 
Total:  
6 
1.72% 
7 
2.01% 
102 
29.31% 
215 
61.78% 
18 
5.17% 
348 
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c. Q2: By Ethnicity 
 
d. Q2: By Religion 
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, 
plan to stress education to them? 
Count 
Row % Not At All Very Little 
A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot 
I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children 
Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
28.57% 
4 
57.14% 
1 
14.29% 
7 
Asian 
5 
2.59% 
6 
3.11% 
56 
29.02% 
124 
64.25% 
2 
1.04% 
193 
Black 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
20.00% 
8 
80.00% 
0 
0.00% 
10 
Mixed 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
20.00% 
7 
70.00% 
1 
10.00% 
10 
Other 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
3 
White 
1 
.80% 
0 
0.00% 
40 
32.00% 
71 
56.80% 
13 
10.40% 
125 
Total:  
6 
1.72% 
7 
2.01% 
102 
29.31% 
215 
61.78% 
18 
5.17% 
348 
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, 
plan to stress education to them? 
Count 
Row % Not At All Very Little 
A Fair 
Amount 
A Lot 
I Don't Plan 
to Have 
Children 
Total 
Buddhist 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
1 
1.43% 
0 
0.00% 
17 
24.29% 
48 
68.57% 
4 
5.71% 
70 
Hindu 
1 
4.76% 
3 
14.29% 
6 
28.57% 
11 
52.38% 
0 
0.00% 
21 
Muslim 
4 
2.17% 
3 
1.63% 
54 
29.35% 
120 
65.22% 
3 
1.63% 
184 
Sikh 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
2 
66.67% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
0 
0.00% 
1 
12.50% 
3 
37.50% 
2 
25.00% 
2 
25.00% 
8 
No Religion 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
21 
34.43% 
31 
50.82% 
9 
14.75% 
61 
Total:  
6 
1.72% 
7 
2.01% 
102 
29.31% 
215 
61.78% 
18 
5.17% 
348 
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Q3. The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the 
most important to you? 
 
Basic Education:     One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math 
    skills 
Religious Education:     One that provides students with strong values and strong religious  
      beliefs 
Liberal Education:   One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for  
    themselves 
Vocational Education:   One that prepares students to find a good job 
Civic Education:     One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and  
    shows respect for the laws of his/her country  
The question was answered by 356 of the 359 respondents.  
  
a. Q3: By Gender 
Basic 
Education, 44 
Religious 
Education, 60 
Liberal 
Education, 120 
Vocational 
Education, 73 
Civic 
Education, 59 
Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You? 
Which educational goal is the most important to you?  
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
Male 
29 
14.29% 
38 
18.72% 
68 
33.50% 
37 
18.23% 
31 
15.27% 
203 
Female 
15 
9.80% 
22 
14.38% 
52 
33.99% 
36 
23.53% 
28 
18.30% 
153 
Total:  
44 
12.36% 
60 
16.85% 
120 
33.71% 
73 
20.51% 
59 
16.57% 
356 
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b. Q3: By Age 
 
c. Q3: By Ethnicity 
 
 
 
 
Which educational goal is the most important to you?  
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
16-19 
Years Old 
12 
14.81% 
13 
16.05% 
24 
29.63% 
19 
23.46% 
13 
16.05% 
81 
20-29 
Years Old 
16 
8.94% 
40 
22.35% 
54 
30.17% 
38 
21.23% 
31 
17.32% 
179 
30-39 
Years Old 
7 
17.95% 
3 
7.69% 
14 
35.90% 
6 
15.38% 
9 
23.08% 
39 
40-49 
Years Old 
3 
8.57% 
1 
2.86% 
24 
68.57% 
5 
14.29% 
2 
5.71% 
35 
50-59 
Years Old 
5 
27.78% 
3 
16.67% 
4 
22.22% 
3 
16.67% 
3 
16.67% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
1 
25.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
50.00% 
1 
25.00% 
4 
Total:  
44 
12.36% 
60 
16.85% 
120 
33.71% 
73 
20.51% 
59 
16.57% 
356 
Which educational goal is the most important to you?  
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
Arab/Middl
e Eastern 
2 
28.57% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
14.29% 
1 
14.29% 
3 
42.86% 
7 
Asian 
22 
11.17% 
51 
25.89% 
47 
23.86% 
38 
19.29% 
39 
19.80% 
197 
Black 
1 
9.09% 
2 
18.18% 
4 
36.36% 
2 
18.18% 
2 
18.18% 
11 
Mixed 
1 
9.09% 
0 
0.00% 
8 
72.73% 
1 
9.09% 
1 
9.09% 
11 
Other 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
66.67% 
3 
White 
17 
13.39% 
7 
5.51% 
60 
47.24% 
31 
24.41% 
12 
9.45% 
127 
Total:  
44 
12.36% 
60 
16.85% 
120 
33.71% 
73 
20.51% 
59 
16.57% 
356 
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d. Q3: By Religion 
 
Q4. Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most 
important to you? 
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents. 
 
 
Yes, 318 
No, 37 
Q4: Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type 
of education that is most important to you? 
Which educational goal is the most important to you?  
Count 
Row % 
Basic 
Education 
Religious 
Education 
Liberal 
Education 
Vocational 
Education 
Civic 
Education 
Total 
Buddhist 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
10 
14.08% 
7 
9.86% 
21 
29.58% 
23 
32.39% 
10 
14.08% 
71 
Hindu 
4 
20.00% 
2 
10.00% 
6 
30.00% 
3 
15.00% 
5 
25.00% 
20 
Muslim 
23 
12.04% 
51 
26.70% 
45 
23.56% 
34 
17.80% 
38 
19.90% 
191 
Sikh 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
4 
50.00% 
3 
37.50% 
1 
12.50% 
8 
No 
Religion 
6 
9.68% 
0 
0.00% 
42 
67.74% 
9 
14.52% 
5 
8.06% 
62 
Total:  
44 
12.36% 
60 
16.85% 
120 
33.71% 
73 
20.51% 
59 
16.57% 
356 
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a. Q4: By Gender  
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the 
type of education that is most important to you? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Male 
177 
87.62% 
25 
12.38% 
202 
Female 
141 
92.16% 
12 
7.84% 
153 
Total:  
318 
89.58% 
37 
10.42% 
355 
 
b. Q4: By Age 
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the 
type of education that is most important to you? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
73 
90.12% 
8 
9.88% 
81 
20-29 Years 
Old 
163 
91.06% 
16 
8.94% 
179 
30-39 Years 
Old 
30 
78.95% 
8 
21.05% 
38 
40-49 Years 
Old 
32 
94.12% 
2 
5.88% 
34 
50-59 Years 
Old 
16 
88.89% 
2 
11.11% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
4 
80.00% 
1 
20.00% 
5 
Total:  
318 
89.58% 
37 
10.42% 
355 
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Q4: By Ethnicity 
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the 
type of education that is most important to you? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
8 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
8 
Asian 177 
90.77% 
18 
9.23% 
195 
Black 11 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
11 
Mixed 10 
90.91% 
1 
9.09% 
11 
Other 2 
66.67% 
1 
33.33% 
3 
White 110 
86.61% 
17 
13.39% 
127 
Total: 
318 
89.58% 
37 
10.42% 
355 
 
d.Q4: By Religion 
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the 
type of education that is most important to you? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Buddhist 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
62 
87.32% 
9 
12.68% 
71 
Hindu 
20 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
20 
Muslim 
171 
90.00% 
19 
10.00% 
190 
Sikh 
3 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
4 
50.00% 
4 
50.00% 
8 
No Religion 
57 
91.94% 
5 
8.06% 
62 
Total: 
318 
89.58% 
37 
10.42% 
355 
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Q5. Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the 
country? 
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents. 
 
 
a. Q5: By Gender 
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Male 
162 
80.20% 
40 
19.80 
202 
Female 
134 
87.58% 
19 
12.42% 
153 
Total:  
296 
83.39% 
59 
16.62% 
355 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, 296 
No, 59 
Q5: Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
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b. Q5: By Age 
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
67 
82.72% 
14 
17.28% 
81 
20-29 Years 
Old 
153 
85.47% 
26 
14.53% 
179 
30-39 Years 
Old 
32 
84.21% 
6 
15.79% 
38 
40-49 Years 
Old 
26 
76.47% 
8 
25.53% 
34 
50-59 Years 
Old 
14 
77.78% 
4 
22.22% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
4 
80.00% 
1 
20.00% 
5 
Total:  
296 
83.38% 
59 
16.62% 
355 
 
c. Q5: By Ethnicity 
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
4 
50.00% 
4 
50.00% 
8 
Asian 
168 
86.15% 
27 
13.85% 
195 
Black 
8 
72.73% 
3 
27.27% 
11 
Mixed 
10 
90.91% 
1 
9.09% 
11 
Other 
1 
33.33% 
2 
66.67% 
3 
White 
105 
82.68% 
22 
17.32% 
127 
Total: 
296 
83.38% 
59 
16.62% 
355 
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d. Q5: By Religion 
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to 
education as anybody else in the country? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Buddhist 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
56 
78.87% 
15 
21.13% 
71 
Hindu 
18 
90.00% 
2 
10.00% 
20 
Muslim 
158 
83.16% 
32 
16.84% 
190 
Sikh 
3 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
6 
75.00% 
2 
25.00% 
8 
No Religion 
54 
87.10% 
8 
12.90% 
62 
Total: 
296 
83.38% 
59 
16.62% 
355 
 
Q6. How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have? 
The question was answered by 358 of 359 respondents. 
 
 
Less Access, 
79 
More Access, 
41 
Same Access, 
238 
Q6: How much access to education do most people of your 
ethnic background have? 
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a. Q6: By Gender 
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic 
background have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
Total 
Male 
45 
22.06% 
28 
13.73% 
131 
64.22% 
204 
Female 
34 
22.08% 
13 
8.44% 
107 
69.48% 
154 
Total:  
79 
22.07% 
41 
11.45% 
238 
66.48% 
358 
 
b. Q6: By Age 
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic 
background have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
24 
28.92% 
7 
8.43% 
52 
62.65% 
83 
20-29 Years 
Old 
44 
22.58% 
18 
10.06% 
117 
65.36% 
179 
30-39 Years 
Old 
6 
15.38% 
6 
15.38% 
27 
69.23% 
39 
40-49 Years 
Old 
4 
11.76% 
7 
20.59% 
23 
67.65% 
34 
50-59 Years 
Old 
1 
5.56% 
3 
16.67% 
14 
77.78% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
5 
100.00% 
5 
Total:  
79 
22.07% 
41 
11.45% 
238 
66.48% 
358 
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c. Q6: By Ethnicity 
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic 
background have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
3 
37.50% 
0 
0.00% 
5 
62.50% 
8 
Asian 
61 
30.81% 
16 
8.08% 
121 
61.11% 
198 
Black 
6 
54.55% 
0 
0.00 
5 
45.45% 
11 
Mixed 
4 
36.36% 
1 
9.09% 
6 
54.55% 
11 
Other 
1 
33.33% 
2 
66.67% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
White 
4 
3.15% 
22 
17.32% 
101 
79.53% 
127 
Total:  
79 
22.07% 
41 
11.45% 
238 
66.48% 
358 
 
d. Q6: By Religion 
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic 
background have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
Total 
Buddhist 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
100.00% 
1 
Christian 
5 
7.04% 
8 
11.27% 
58 
81.69% 
71 
Hindu 
3 
14.29% 
4 
19.05% 
14 
66.67% 
21 
Muslim 
63 
32.81% 
13 
6.77% 
116 
60.42% 
192 
Sikh 
1 
33.33% 
2 
66.67% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
1 
12.50% 
2 
25.00% 
5 
62.50% 
8 
No Religion 
6 
9.68% 
12 
19.35% 
44 
70.97% 
62 
Total:  
79 
22.07% 
41 
11.45% 
238 
66.48% 
358 
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Q7. How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have? 
The question was answered by 357 of 359 respondents. 
 
a. Q7: By Gender 
How much access to education do most people of your religious 
affiliation have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
N/A 
Total 
Male 
39 
19.21% 
13 
6.40% 
145 
71.43% 
6 
2.96% 
203 
Female 
19 
12.34% 
11 
7.14% 
114 
74.03% 
10 
6.49% 
154 
Total:  
58 
16.25% 
24 
6.72% 
259 
72.55% 
16 
4.48% 
357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Less Access, 
58 
More Access, 
24 
Same Access, 
259 
N/A, 16 
Q7: How much access to education do most people of your 
religious affiliation have? 
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b. Q7: By Age 
How much access to education do most people of your religious 
affiliation have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
N/A Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
17 
20.48% 
7 
8.43% 
56 
67.47% 
3 
3.61% 
83 
20-29 Years 
Old 
33 
18.54% 
13 
7.30% 
130 
73.03% 
2 
1.12% 
178 
30-39 Years 
Old 
4 
10.26% 
1 
2.56% 
29 
74.36% 
5 
12.82% 
39 
40-49 Years 
Old 
2 
5.88% 
2 
5.88% 
25 
73.53% 
5 
14.71% 
34 
50-59 Years 
Old 
1 
5.56% 
1 
5.56% 
15 
83.33% 
1 
5.56% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
1 
20.00% 
0 
0.00% 
4 
80.00% 
0 
0.00% 
5 
Total: 
58 
16.25% 
24 
6.72% 
259 
72.55% 
16 
4.48% 
357 
 
c. Q7: By Ethnicity 
How much access to education do most people of your religious 
affiliation have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
N/A Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
2 
25.00% 
0 
0.00% 
6 
75.00% 
0 
0.00% 
8 
Asian 
51 
25.89% 
14 
7.11% 
132 
67.01% 
0 
0.00% 
197 
Black 
1 
9.09% 
1 
9.09% 
9 
81.82% 
0 
0.00% 
11 
Mixed 
1 
9.09% 
2 
18.18% 
7 
63.64% 
1 
9.09% 
11 
Other 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
White 
2 
1.57% 
6 
4.72% 
104 
81.89% 
15 
11.81% 
127 
Total: 
58 
16.25% 
24 
6.72% 
259 
75.55% 
16 
4.48% 
357 
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d. Q7: By Religion 
How much access to education do most people of your religious 
affiliation have? 
Count 
Row % 
Less 
Access 
More 
Access 
Same 
Access 
N/A Total 
Buddhist 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
2 
2.82% 
4 
5.63% 
65 
91.55% 
0 
0.00% 
71 
Hindu 
4 
19.05% 
2 
9.52% 
15 
71.43% 
0 
0.00% 
21 
Muslim 
50 
26.18% 
12 
6.28% 
129 
67.54% 
0 
0.00% 
191 
Sikh 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
0 
0.00% 
1 
12.50% 
6 
75.00% 
1 
12.50% 
8 
No Religion 
1 
1.61% 
4 
6.45% 
42 
67.74% 
15 
24.19% 
62 
Total: 
58 
16.25% 
24 
6.72% 
259 
72.55% 
16 
4.48% 
357 
 
 
Q8. Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society? 
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents. 
 
 
Yes, 336 
No, 19 
Q8: Do you personally feel that you are a part of British 
society? 
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a. Q8: By Gender 
Do you personally feel that you are a part of 
British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Male 
192 
94.58% 
11 
5.42% 
203 
Female 
144 
94.74% 
8 
5.26% 
152 
Total:  
336 
94.65% 
19 
5.35% 
355 
 
 
b. Q8: By Age 
Do you personally feel that you are a part of 
British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
75 
91.46% 
7 
8.54% 
82 
20-29 Years 
Old 
170 
94.97% 
9 
5.03% 
179 
30-39 Years 
Old 
36 
94.74% 
2 
5.26% 
38 
40-49 Years 
Old 
32 
96.97% 
1 
3.03% 
33 
50-59 Years 
Old 
18 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
18 
Over 60 
Years Old 
5 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
5 
Total:  
336 
94.65% 
19 
5.35% 
355 
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c. Q8: By Ethnicity 
Do you personally feel that you are a part of 
British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
6 
75.00% 
2 
25.00% 
8 
Asian 
188 
94.95% 
10 
5.05% 
198 
Black 
8 
88.89% 
1 
11.11% 
9 
Mixed 
9 
81.82% 
2 
18.18% 
11 
Other 
3 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
White 
122 
96.83% 
4 
3.17% 
126 
Total: 
336 
94.65% 
19 
5.35% 
355 
 
d. Q8: By Religion 
Do you personally feel that you are a part of 
British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Buddhist 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
67 
95.71% 
3 
4.29% 
70 
Hindu 
18 
94.74% 
1 
5.26% 
19 
Muslim 
180 
93.26% 
13 
6.74% 
193 
Sikh 
3 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
7 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
7 
No Religion 
60 
96.77% 
2 
3.23% 
62 
Total: 
336 
94.65% 
19 
5.35% 
355 
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Q9. Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society? 
The question was answered by 353 of 359 respondents. 
 
a. Q9: By Gender 
Do you personally feel that you are an equal 
member of British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Male 
165 
81.68% 
37 
18.32% 
202 
Female 
127 
84.11% 
24 
15.89% 
151 
Total:  
292 
82.72% 
61 
17.28% 
353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, 292 
No, 61 
Q9: Do you personally feel that you are an equal 
member of British society? 
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b. Q9: By Age 
Do you personally feel that you are an equal 
member of British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
16-19 Years 
Old 
68 
82.93% 
14 
17.07% 
82 
20-29 Years 
Old 
154 
86.52% 
24 
13.48% 
178 
30-39 Years 
Old 
31 
81.58% 
7 
18.42% 
38 
40-49 Years 
Old 
22 
66.67% 
11 
33.33% 
33 
50-59 Years 
Old 
14 
82.35% 
3 
17.65% 
17 
Over 60 
Years Old 
3 
60.00% 
2 
40.00% 
5 
Total:  
292 
82.72% 
61 
17.28% 
353 
 
c. Q9: By Ethnicity 
Do you personally feel that you are an equal 
member of British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Arab/Middle 
Eastern 
5 
62.50% 
3 
37.50% 
8 
Asian 
164 
82.83% 
34 
17.17% 
198 
Black 
6 
66.67% 
3 
33.33% 
9 
Mixed 
9 
81.82% 
2 
18.18% 
11 
Other 
0 
0.00% 
3 
100.00% 
3 
White 
108 
87.10% 
16 
12.90% 
124 
Total: 
292 
87.72% 
61 
17.28% 
353 
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d. Q9: By Religion 
Do you personally feel that you are an equal 
member of British society? 
Count 
Row % 
Yes No Total 
Buddhist 
1 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
Christian 
59 
85.51% 
10 
14.49% 
69 
Hindu 
17 
85.00% 
3 
15.00% 
20 
Muslim 
156 
81.25% 
36 
18.75% 
192 
Sikh 
3 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
3 
Other 
5 
71.43% 
2 
28.57% 
7 
No Religion 
51 
83.61% 
10 
16.39% 
61 
Total: 
292 
87.72% 
61 
17.28% 
353 
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